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PREFACE
The decade of

the 1970's was touted

by many to have

ushered in a

new era of relative prosperity for agriculture.

The early 1980's, how-

ever, have instead been bleak years for farmers.

Total net farm income

in South Carolina, for example,

declined from an annual average of $220

million in 1979 and 1980 to an average of only $75 million in 1980,
and '82.

Poor prices

and poor weather in many of

'81

the southern states

were the villains.
By late 1981, a number of influential southern agricultural leaders
began pointing to a third culprit--U.S. Farm Policy.
tion controls were

promoted by many as the

Mandatory produc-

only solution.

Simultane-

ously, other groups such as the National Farm Bureau maintained that the
logical answer was to get the government out of agriculture.
Within this seething cauldron, the role of the University remains a
neutral but important one.

It is

to coherently define problems,

name

the relevant alternatives that may solve them, and to predict the poten
tial consequences of these options.
It was with this view in

mind that several agricultural economists

at Clemson University began in 1982
ing a national forum to address
tives.

to discuss the feasibility of host

agricultural policy issues and alternathe "teachable moment" existed.

From an academic perspective,

Encouragement for the

project was received from

University administra

tors and farm leaders in the state.
The idea of
Thurmond Institute

a conference began to approach reality
of Government and

expressed

an

interest in

financial

assistance required

Public Affairs at

co-sponsoring
to make

a
such

program and

when the Strom
the University
offering

an undertaking

the

possible.
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Events then moved rapidly.

A planning committee was formed.

Clemson in November of 1982 and a

It met at

consensus was reached that a national

symposium was not only feasible but most timely.
We would like to express our
planning committee--Luther P.

appreciation to fellow members of the

Anderson, Dean of the College of Agricul

tural Sciences; Bob Robinson, Head, Department of Agricultural Economics
and Rural Sociology; Jim Hite, Alumni Professor;

Horace Fleming, Direc-

tor of the Thurmond Institute;

who moved from Senator

Cochran's (R.
tives during
Future;

Miss.)

staff to the

the planning

Ron Knutson,

University;

Tom

Wayne

National Council of Farmer Coopera

process;

Professor of

Little of

Boutwell,

Ken Farrell

of Resources

for the

Agricultural Economics at Texas A&M

the Senate

Agricultural Committee

and the

staff of Senator Huddleston (D . , KY); Jim Hildreth, Managing Director of
the Farm Foundation; and John Lee, Administrator, Economic Research Ser
vice, USDA.
The goal of the symposium was to
policy needs in the agricultural arena

provide a forum for discussion of
and to examine policy approaches

that may provide viable alternatives for the future.

To accomplish this

goal a program was developed that set

the stage in terms of an histori

cal perspective of agriculture policy

development and an examination of

the important macroeconomic linkages between

the agriculture sector and

the general economy in both a domestic and a worldwide context.
ing this scene-setting,
discussed in detail
government,
to include as
ings,

specific farm,

food,

the farm,

industry,

It was the intent of the planning committee

broad a range of viewpoints as

therefore,

and resource issues were

by knowledgeable experts from

and academia.

Follow

possible.

This proceed-

reflects the thinking of a broad cross-section of the

agricultural community.

V

It is
that could

our belief that
have been

the symposium

assembled.

bureaucrats, political figures,
that

this collection

of the

speakers were the

Outstanding

papers representing

We hope

their thoughts

and ultimately,

will

to policy

Congressional attention, in the aftermath of PIK, will first be

drawn to fine
concerns.

businessmen,

and farmers gave their views.

prove useful to individuals, organizations,
makers.

scholars,

very best

tuning of grain programs and immediate
But next

year--amid likely

continuing

dairy and tobacco
high farm

program

costs, drought induced higher food prices, and four consecutive years of
inadequate returns from
must be addressed.

the farmers' point of view--the

For those involved in the

1985 Farm Bill

decision process,

collection of papers should perhaps be made mandatory reading.
Mike Hammig and Hal Harris
Symposium Co-Chairmen

this

CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON FARM AND FOOD POLICY
Frank Naylor*
It is particularly appropriate, I think, to have this Food and Farm
Policy Symposium here at Clemson and

as part of the Thurmond Institute .

It has been my privilege for a number of years to work very closely with
Senator Thurmond on farm and agricultural issues.

He has been a leader

in that area for the South and for the nation.
I think as we begin to look

toward the future,

and that future is

really upon us much sooner than many of us expected, that the timeliness
of this forum is particularly appropriate.
Secretary Block will hold what we have
be a meeting of about 75

been calling a summit.

PIK?

It will

of the nation's leading agricultural commodity

group presidents, farm group presidents,
ness.

Within the next six weeks,

and other leaders in agribusi-

And the question that we must answer is "what next?"
Where do we go with the

What after

next farm legislation which we are going

to begin to develop this summer?
One of

the unique features

of the PIK program

itself, it is a self-destruct program.
government.

We've been

served their purpose

trying to

is that in

and of

That's unheard of in the federal
destruct some

and some programs that have

agencies that

have

served their purpose,

and I've come to the conclusion that if there is anything that has eternal life, it is a federal program.
self-destruct mechanism.

But PIK is an exception.

It has a

And when that mechanism triggers, we are going

to have to be prepared with the

solutions to lead agriculture back into

a sustained, strong economic position.

*Undersecretary
Development.

of

Agriculture

for

Small

Community

and

Rural
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I think we tend to forget, as we talk in groups like this how often
we end up preaching to the choir,
the fact

that we

have so

and

I think that is evident today in

little recognition

in this

country of

the

importance and the role and the

strength that American agriculture rep

resents to our entire economy.

Our 2.4 million farmers provide 21 mil-

lion jobs in this country.
80 people now,

One

farmer supplies enough food for almost

and agriculture provides the real strength in the export

market to keep a reasonable balance
vide the least

of payments.

expensive food to our

And our farmers pro-

population of any country

in the

world.
We rattle those items off very easily among ourselves.
ourselves about it.

We discuss it among ourselves but though we are the

most efficient

producers in the

salesmanship.

We

American people

We talk to

world,

have not done a

and getting

we have

learn about

good job of communicating

them to understand

important American agriculture is,

a lot to

what a

how efficient

bargain it is,

that flaw.

And we

and how

and how good

the quality of the food that we have, and, Ladies and Gentlemen,
better correct

with the

had better correct it

we had

fairly soon,

because the composition of Congress and the national forum is changing.
Today there
tives that
farmers,

have more than

South have

a 25

members of the House

of Representa

percent rural composition.

Not just

but a rural composition to their congressional districts.

will no longer
as it has

are less than 10

be as easy to forge agricultural

been in the past.

Our ability to

agricultural legislation before the Congress
is largely gone.

policy and legislation

The old coalitions based

substantially broken down.

It

largely in the
routinely take

and pass it through easily

We increasingly are going to have to work on a bipar-
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tisan,

unified basis within the agricultural community to develop sound

federal agricultural programs.
We must not lose sight that agriculture is after all dependent upon
the overall
taking.

strength of the

American economy

To get this country back on its feet and going again,

sustain a long-term economic recovery.
men,

headed in the right direction.

We

We

necessary to bring interest rates down,

done to get

we must

The economic indicators are

have made the necessary changes,

in the basic tax structure.

to come down some more.

it is

And frankly, Ladies and Gentle-

we are doing that with some success.

think,

and the direction

I

have made the changes that are
but not far enough.

They need

We have made the basic changes that have to be

some of the regulations,

some of

the government interfer

ence, that have become so costly out of your knickers.
There is one basic cloud though

that still remains,

the leadership in Congress is finding
as is the President,
are going

to cope

recovery which

and one which

extremely difficult to cope with,

and that is the question of deficits.
with them

must take

so that

place and

they do
continue on

agriculture and the American economy in general.

And how we

not interfere
its way

with the

for American

Just a few weeks ago,

the Congress passed a new ceiling on the United States debt--1.398 tril
lion dollars.

And you know that will only last us till this fall.

had projected a $200 billion deficit in

the budget this year,

projection was

of some responsible

Congress,

based on the assumption

particularly in the House

of Representatives,

the year,

just a few weeks ago

that in the first

but that
conduct by

in throttling

down some of the expenditures that have gotten out of control.
forced to report

We

We were

six months of

that deficit was not 100 billion that you would have expected
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at that point, but it hit $130 billion in the first six months,
well ahead of projections largely because

Congress has not acted.

the changes and assumptions that were needed
in place.

And

to be in place are not yet

The effect of that quite simply is that if we do not begin to

cope with those deficits and do it
years, perhaps less,
at the federal level,
deficit,

running

promptly,

that within the next five

if we do not begin to show some responsible action
we are going to be looking at a 2 trillion dollar

an increase in a little over

4 years of $4,000 for every man,

woman, and child in the United States.
I think perhaps
that puts it

we need to look

a little closer to

at this in one

home.

underway today has a very bright future,

other perspective

The economic recovery

that is

and we have every reason to be

optimistic not only in behalf of the American farmer, but also on behalf
of the general

economy if we don't torpedo it

by irresponsible action.

That recovery is dependent upon capital created

by what you and I save,

the profits of our businesses, and the surpluses of state and local governments .
lion.

In 1982,

those three sources of funds amounted to $199 bil -

It is that money which serves as the catalyst,

as the source of funds to get
small problem.

America moving again.

Uncle Sam wants most of it .

as the strength,
There is only one

And if we are not careful,

could easily consume all of it.
I watched

with great

interest as

the liberal

leadership in

the

House of Representatives passed a budget resolution in which they raised
your taxes $40 billion, but did they use that funding to reduce the def
icit to bring some fiscal sanity so
ing and sustain it the way that it
that.

that we could get the recovery movcan and must go?

No,

we didn't do

The leadership in the House chose instead not to add to existing
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programs,

but

to create

beyond the 200 that
dollars.

Not

new social programs,

new programs

already exist to the tune of

only did those

new taxes

over and

48 billion additional

not reduce the

deficit,

our

spenders were prepared to increase it another $8 billion.
It seems

that the

responsibility in
there are
them.

only way that

check is not

those there who

we can keep

to provide

are going to

any kind

the funds to

spend them

of .f iscal

spend because

if you give

it to

It is like giving a youngster a dollar and letting it burn a hole

in his

pocket.

There is
more,

And that

a lot of

seems to be the

way Congress wants

discussion that we ought

to cut the

to act.

defense budget

and yet the federal establishment is the only place that provides

the defense for this country;

the defense that has made it possible for

us to stay free and remain the leader of the free world.
way that
world,

we are going
and

to be able

to sustain

it is a responsibility

It is the only

that system in

the free

that is solely the

federal govern-

January proposed cuts that would

amount to about

ment's.
The President in
$10 billion,
a defense
speech,

and some of the leadership in Congress that has called for

reduction appeared on

television immediately

and the question that was raised

much is enough?
our defense

following that

was if 10 is not enough,

how

That question is one that many of those who want to cut

budget don't really want

pressed on and finally got Mr.
reduce it by $20 billion."

to answer.

But

the newscasters

Kennedy to say, "Well, I think we should

But you know against a $200 billion deficit,

$20 billion is only 10 percent.

In the process we do severe damage to a

sound and realistic defense for this country that is absolutely critical
if we are going to be successful in our efforts to get Russia to come to
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the negotiating table to get meaningful arms reduction moving again.
Defense is a

task and responsibility which rests

with the federal

establishment, and one which we must continue to accept the responsibil
ity for.

Do not be deluded.

Adjustments in the defense budget are not

goirig to create or correct the deficit problem we are faced with today.
The simple

truth of the

matter is that

almost 78 percent

of our

federal budget this year is involved in what we loosely call entitlement
programs.

There are more than 200 of those.

Mr.

O'Neil likes to call

those uncontrollable expenditures.

I've always found that interesting,

and I daresay that I'd ask those of

you in this audience today how many

of you have ever sat down and asked

a member of Congress what the devil

is an uncoltrollable expenditure?
definition.

Ask that question.

I'll give you my

My definition very simply is that the Congress has passed a

law which provides something to somebody

and that something to somebody

is automatically indexed either to inflation or some other basis without
additional review by the Congress of the United States, without a deter
mination in answering to the American public whether or not that program
has been successful.

And it will continue to function that way indefi-

nitely into the future racheting up in

most cases at a much faster rate

than inflation itself, whether or not it has, is, or will serve the pur
pose for which it was intended, or whether the American taxpayer is get
ting his money's worth.
Very simply
only because
place are

those who

uncontrollable
passed the laws

expenditures are
in Congress

lacking the intestinal fortitude

are those programs
Those are

put,

working?

the kind of questions,

that put

to answer to

And if they are not,

uncontrollable
them in

the taxpayer,

to eliminate them.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

that

we must
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answer.

And it

can only be done

by leaders like yourselves

peers, going to the members of Congress,

supporting those that have the

concern and the willingness to deal with that question,
and questioning those

that do not.

and your

Because the only

and challenging
cloud,

the only

dark cloud on the horizon right now,

from the general economic picture,

is whether

deal effectively

or not

we can

and will

months with our federal expenditures.
sponsibly scuttle the
tends a

ultimately will be

for this country.

underway and por-

It is a

yours along with many others across

decision that
this country in

the message that we convey to the leadership in Washington,
Executive branch and Congress,

next few

And whether or not we will irre-

economic recovery that is well

very bright future

in the

both in the

and it is a fundamental component of the

symposium in which you are engaged today.
It is with that

background then that I think that

at our agricultural picture itself.
How do we stand today and what are

Where are we?

by

the economic

situation in

impacted on

the farming community

industry in

America.

prices,
the most
years.

Couple

You

doubly in the last several years.
the country

perhaps as

that with

itself,

hard or harder

huge surpluses

which

has

than any

and depressed

and couple it further in many parts of the country with some of
incredibly bad

weather,

particularly in

the last

couple of

And for many of us this year in a unique set of weather circum-

stances unparalleled in the last 100 years.
can farmer through one of the greatest
rienced.

Where are we going?

we going to do for the future?

know the American farmer has been hit
First,

we need to look

And we have put the Ameri-

wringers which he has ever expe-

It is a credit to their vitality, to their strength, to their

productivity that the American farmer has

been able to see through this
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period.

And in fact

in numbers has for the first

century remained relatively stable even to

time in almost this

the point in the last couple

of years of showing some slight increases.
We see many stories
other reasons,
farms,

we are

in the press today that because
losing large

and that simply is not the

programs like

the Farmers Home

great agony in many

numbers of

case.

producers off

Administration,

which last

year after

only 800 and some

farms out of 270,000 borrowers,

and

special consideration,

assistance in some form

while that was going on,

producers to keep them in business for another year.
the commercial

farm sector or lending

of the

Whether it be the government

cases was forced to foreclose on

special

of credit and

provided

to some 42,000

Or whether it was

sector itself which

went beyond

the normal limits to stay with and work with producers in numbers unpar
alleled considering the pressure they were under from examiners and from
their own boards.
was perhaps one of

Whether it be that action, or an action which I think
the most innovative steps that we

have seen in sev

eral decades, the payment in kind program.
The payment in kind program was a program which had to be.
faced with surpluses which
taken off the

would have been a drag on

hung as a pall

next

year,

and in the

with always the risk of them being dumped,

to cope with those surpluses

not adversely

no matter how

As long as those stocks had

over the marketplace this year,

subsequent years,
find a way

the market if not

marketplace and out of government stocks,

sound a farm program we had put into place.

and do it in a

affect the American producer.

we had to

way that would

And the payment

program was the best solution that we were able to find.
I think has put a large measure

We were

in kind

It is one that

of optimism back in the American scene .
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The light at

the end of the tunnel

is not a small speck,

but a broad

beam.
There is considerable hope across the
first step toward

countryside that this is the

significant recovery even though it

is recognized by

everyone to be a temporary program, but a very effective one.
participation went far beyond our expectations,
going to see

in the next 4,

5,

size and

of this

and in doing so you're

or 6 weeks a growing

which will look for the warts on

the program.

magnitude with its

cost is

Certainly

band of critics

And any program of this
going to

have problems.

This program started from ground zero shortly before Christmas to become
the largest and one

of the most complex farm programs

ever attempted to manage.

From a

all is a major accomplishment.
some problems.

this country has

business perspective,

to do that at

Make no mistake about it,

we will have

We will have some warts as we work our way through this

program, but we will solve them.
will talk about the

And there will be those critics which

cost of the payment in kind program

move further into the year,

but I

as we begin to

would only remind them of what value

those commodities would have had, if they were allowed to continue to be
a drag on the marketplace,
the

American commodity

longer stay in
conditions?

if they

prices to

operation.

Not very

much.

were allowed to continue to depress
the

producers could

What value would they have
On balance it has been

the kind of economy and economic

we are going to see in the farming

no

had under those
a very effective

But as that crisis dissipates,

program to meet a crisis situation.
we begin to see

point that

as

recovery that I think

community and the nation as a whole,

that picture is going to have to change.
Consider if you will with me that

while some have said this admin-
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istration has not been
last

two years

all that interested in the farmer,

expenditures by

Department of Agriculture

the

United States

government to

in commodity program activity

$4 billion to $12 billion last year,
tary Weinberger would like

that in the
the

have gone from

to $21 billion this year.

to know what our secret is,

Secre-

along with the

rest of the Cabinet officers .
Perhaps our secret weapon is the President himself.
tern in Washington called Cabinet Councils
brought forward.

And Jack Block and I

We have a sys~

in which policy questions are
have repeatedly as we have gone

around the countryside kiddingly said the President of the United States
thinks he's a rancher, and we do nothing to discourage him from thinking
so.

Let me tell you, that is not a joke.

few times when Jack Block has had a
agricultural issue.
and time again

There have been more than a

12-1 vote in the cabinet room on an

But that 14th vote has a lot of weight.

whether it's a long-term trade

agreement,

And time

whether it's

trade issues, whether it's the PIK program, or any number of other major
decisions that have been made on behalf of American agriculture,
been the President that

has made that decision and come

of American agriculture.
what we have been

Without that,

it has

down on behalf

we could not have done much of

able to do in turning things

around and beginning to

move things in the right direction again .
The PIK program

though represents the domestic side

of the issue .

The fundamental requirement that we must have in order for American proAnd that market

ducers to be healthy is a substantial overseas market.
has been shrinking in
nomic conditions,

the last couple of years,

because

because of strength in the dollar,

in the communist block.

of world eco

because of unrest

It represents our greatest challenge .
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I

am sure

important talks .
long-term trade

many

of

you realize

that

. They are talks at this

we

point,

agreement with the Russians.

have begun

some

in London,

for a new

Many of you

may expect

that we'll see some instant results.

Let me tell you, we will not.

Russians do not

We are beginning

move that quickly.

take time to conclude an agreement.
basic understandings between

very

talks.

The

It will

It will take some time to work the

the two countries.

Do not

expect out of

these two talks that are occurring these next two days any quick resolu
tion, because it is not there.
In that same

vein,

But a resolution I think we will obtain.

we are beginning to see

the Europeans finally

recognize that they cannot, and the American government is dead serious,
they cannot

continue the

types of

restrictive agricultural

practices

that have caused the problems in the world market that they have caused.
And that

they are going

to have to open

up and make

some fundamental

changes within that common market to accommodate a free flow of interna
tional agricultural trade.
European leaders
about.

That is a position which frankly many of the

in agriculture have

not believed America

was serious

And they are just beginning to fully understand that.

The Japanese have their own problems within their agricultural sys
tem.

And

I'm not sure

how many of

thing in the Japanese government.
up,

when they reapportion,

you recognize a

The way way their constitution is set

the farm vote becomes stronger.

larger proportional share of the total
single voting block in Japan.
that

we have

in this

vote.

And they

country about

between the two countries.

very fundamental

It gets a

It is the most important

have many of the same concerns

free flow

of agricultural

Some of you may have seen

trade

a recent poster

which has popped up all over Japan of the American superman,

represent-
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ing American agriculture,

dumping its

products on the Japanese farmer.

It is not an easy thing for the Japanese government,

with their politi

cal system, to deal with the agricultural problems that we have, and yet
they have been very responsible.
It's a slow process
if we

are going

to begin to open up markets

to be successful

exports necessary for the American
Again it is

eluded overnight.
But I think

It is

in providing the

not one that is going

not one that is going to

we are going to

size and

scale of

producer to return to profitability.

It is

not an easy job.

that we must have

times, but we will get the job done.

happen now,

today.

painfully

slow at

Slow,

be successful.

to be con-

And that is critical and fundamen

tal to the future of the American producer.
Those become the two basic points that

we have to cope with.

Now

with the changing environment in Congress today, I think we have to rec
ognize in a real world that a program
cost of about

that is going to be credited at a

$21 billion against an optimistic projection

of net farm

income, perhaps in the $22-24 billion range, is not going to continue to
be acceptable to the urban members of Congress.
deal responsibly

and put government

expenditures at a

the farming community is willing to cope

with that themselves or will let it be
stones that

Secretary Block is working

done for them.
on today is to

capacity to deal with those problems ourselves.
cal,

most visible

issues that are before

strate that capacity to

One of the keydemonstrate -our

And the two most criti

us today that we

deal with are the issue of

of freezing target prices.

realistic level

The question that is going to

and to modify our programs accordingly.
be before us is whether or not

We are going to have to

can demon

dairy and the issue
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The need

to do something

in the

dairy area is

self-evident.

problem from the beginning has been to forge a cooperative agreement,
cooperative piece of legislation,
the interests of the
the right

a

representing in a balanced ration all

dairy industry.

direction in that

A

We have I think

area in

the House of

taken a step in

Representatives and

have what represents a compromise, and it is a compromise because no one
including ourselves are fully satisfied with that legislation, certainly
those in the South are not fully satisfied with it.
tant step

in the right

effective and
than many

much more

and frankly

in the long-term

of the court

this very time.

actions that are

one that is

interest of

much more

dairy producers

flowing and underway

The solution to the dairy problem

legislative solution,
us.

direction,

But it is an impor

even at

is fundamentally a

and one which must be done or it will be done for

And the same analogy I think applies to target prices.
Target prices automatically racheting up without regard to what the

costs of production are are sending the
own producers,
tines,

wrong signals,

but also to the Canadians,

and the Brazilians.

not only to our

the Australians,

They react to what they foresee as a world

market price as a result of American agricultural programs,
up to

expand production.

the Argen-

Racheting of

by cranking

target prices sends

the wrong

message, the wrong signal, which is not in the best interest of American
producers.

We need a freeze.

In the case of feedgrains we simply
season is much farther
for next year.

And

decision until very

do not know until this growing

along what the likely direction will
you should not expect nor do I

late in the summer

and other commodity areas.

expect any kind of

or early fall in

But in wheat,

need to be

the feedgrain

we feel that it is important
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to get that first announcement out by the first of July.
One of the great impediments to that
lative battle and their rhetoric last
or not we are going to have
of Congress

on the

prices until we

and as you watched the legis

week,

is the question of whether

target prices frozen.

House side have

know what kind of

said well

Many of our members

we can't

freeze target

program you're going to

offer.

To

which we can only respond in a catch 22 fashion, we don't know what kind
of program we can offer until we know whether or not we're going to have
prices frozen.
There is

And we certainly don't want to go out with two programs.

enough confusion in the

swered questions,
the American

and

producer to leave the

within the next 60-90 days.
prices.

And

having unan

it certainly would be unrealistic

over their heads as they have to

target

countryside now without

we need

and unfair to

question of dangling

target prices

make their decisions in the wheat area

We simply
to do

have to resolve the question on
it

in a

timely and

responsible

fashion.
Those two steps in our view would also serve another very important
purpose.

It would tell the urban members of Congress, it would tell the

American consumer

that American agriculture

undertake its responsibility to manage
tively.

And if we

willing to

its affairs prudently and effec-

are to continue to do that we are

demonstrate that and demonstrate it very
talking about here in

is capable and

soon.

going to have to

Much of what you'll be

the next couple of days will

revolve around that

type of decision.
Now let's go one step beyond.

Where

are we headed in the future?

Quite frankly, we don't have that answer yet.

We know that the time is

approaching for some fundamental changes in farm policy.

Some fundamen-
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tal new directions are going to have to be found.
have to be found

on a unified basis.

And I think

And they are going to
the message that we

are trying to convey with the summit

meeting that is being held in July

is to illustrate and drive home that

need to sit down and work together

for the common
of us

good of American agriculture and to

will have to

saleable,

make some adjustments to

that is reasonable,

swings in

develop a policy

that is

but is responsible and will not send and

continue to send the wrong message
these huge

understand that all

to the American producers that cause

production from one

end of

the spectrum

to the

other.
We have about twelve months to

put together those fundamental pre

cepts to work out that next step as

we begin to see a PIK program phase

out.

Frankly we don't know yet what kind if any of a PIK program we're

going to see for next year.

It would appear likely that in some form at

least we'll see something in the

wheat area.

Programs for the balance

of our commodities are going to depend largely on what this growing season provides

and the direction

early to make that assessment.

that it takes

us.

And it's

much too

But as the PIK program phases out, it's

replacment must be ready.

And we really only have about 12 months to do

that job.

tools will be in place during

The necessary

time whether it be credit,

that period of

whether it be fundamental farm programs like

PIK, or other actions in the terms of trade that have to be developed to
continue the type
American

of recovery that I

agriculture.

But

we don't

think we are beginning
have

much longer

develop and bring forward a new and responsible program.
to be a real year of trial in America.

to see in

than that

to

This is going
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I don't know how
pump after

it was

many of you as a youngster ever

already running.

Most of

enough not to do something stupid like that.
tried that,

tried to prime a

you are

probably smart

I'm not one of them, I've

and I can assure you that the only result is that you waste
We're seeing today

a lot of water.

in Congress a great temptation not

only in the general area, but even in agriculture itself, to do a lot of
pump priming after the pump is already running.
does is waste a lot of water,
needed for productive use
the farming community.
seen a time

a lot of your taxpayer's dollars that are

in the private sector by you

sought and looked for

guidance and

constituents than this Congress has.

seen a Congress that has been less definitive,
and work out the

and the rest of

It's going to be a tough year, and I have never

when Congress has more

direction from its

And the only thing that

I have never

less willing to sit down

tough problems because they don't quite

want than this one is.
next six months are

And yet the

know what you

decisions that will be made in the

perhaps some of the most critical

in terms of your

future and your community's future that are going to made.
tough calls.
reason to

There is every reason

be bright.

profitability

There is

and strength

to be optimistic.

every reason to have

again in

They will be
There is every

expectations for

American agriculture

and in

the

American economy, as long as we make reasonable decisions in Washington.
And we do it with your help.

THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY ENVIRONMENT IN 1983:
WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT HERE

B. H. Robinson*
The purpose of this

paper is to set the stage

of departure for the discussions which
will concentrate on the state of the
and explore policy alternatives and
problems and

issues facing

follow.

and provide a point

Speakers who follow me

economy,

both at home and abroad,

programs needed to address critical

the food

and agricultural

complex in

the

years ahead.
One way to set the stage is to ask the questions:
and "How

did we get here?"

helpful in

"Where are we?"

Lessons learned from experience

addressing future

needs.

In

an attempt

should be

to answer

these

questions we need:
1.

To identify the problem

2.

To discover

or problems;

any experience

we have

had in

dealing with

similar problems;
3.

To ask if

we have been successful in

dealing with sector

problems and what mistakes have been made;
4.

To determine if the problems have changed; and

5.

To investigate any unique situations.

A review of
dealing with
provide a

past

current and

successes and

failures

future problems.

historical perspective in exploring

provides

Thus,

I

a basis

for

have chosen

some of the

to

forces that

have shaped the food and agricultural industry and the associated policy

*Professor and Head, Department
Sociology, Clemson University

of Agricultural

Economics and

Rural

18

environment.
of

the

I bave chosen this approach, hoping that identifying some

market

evolution of
manner in

and

institutional

agriculture will

which government

development and

forces

lead to

that

a better

policies influence

performance.

Such

have

categories:

southern agriculture from
(2)

(1)

understanding of

the

an exploration

should help

a description of the evolution

lay a

My remarks are divided

the current situation

a market,

government policies affecting

the

agricultural structure,

better foundation for future policy directions.
into three major

influenced

structure and

in U.S.

and

policy perspective,

of the agricultural industry and of

agriculture;

and (3)

an

exploration of

some unique problems in the development of southern agriculture.
Perspective
At

the outset,

I

will outline

some

general perceptions

agricultural policy and market interference.
are

personal perceptions,

they should

about

While I realize that these

serve

to set

forth my

basic

assumptions and are intended to generate discussion.
The only reason
into the

for any segment of the public

market through the

vehicle of

market is not performing in the manner
results of market
"If

it's not

societal

government policy is

goals through

don't fix
the

11

While

policies that

policy is made by

result of public pressure.

it.

are

we

or the

In other words,

often reflect
established,

politicians and is,

However,

that the

desired by that segment,

allocations are not to its liking.

broke,

recognize that

to interject itself

we

therefore,

Thus,

desires frequently

compromise generally

must
the

pressure is most often brought to

bear through vested interest groups which push particular policies,
one group's

broad

conflict with

the desires

is required and the result

and

of another.

likely does not
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completely satisfy any group, but a policymaker can hope that compromise
serves

the best

interests

of the

majority.

So

goes a

democratic

society.
A dependable and productive food sector is critical to the economic
and total well-being of any society.

Any time the food production and

distribution system is seriously disrupted,
is threatened.
been

willing to

desired

societies and

Thus,
depend

results

food

protected and managed its vested
policies aimed at

governments historically have not

solely upon

for their

the

achieving desired goals through

the

decade,

production

the

Public
and

Rather,

policy

continues

decisions

the

public

has

market intervention.

its
to

as

well

changed during

involvement
influence
as

performance, and viability of the agricultural sector.
society has been able to avoid

the

food policy has

continues

public

marketing

to produce

interest in agriculture through public

emphasis of agricultural and

agriculture.

marketplace

systems.

While the
past

the total fabric of society

in

U.S.

agricultural

the

structure,

It seems that no

exercising some control or guidance over

an area so critical to its very existence.
The performance

of an economic

well it serves the aims of society.

system can

be gauged only

In the broadest sense,

by how

the tasks

any economic system must accomplish boil down to the following three:
1.

Allocation of resources;

2.

Distribution of incomes;

3.

Organizing the process of economic growth and development.

Unfortunately,
example,

we perceive

institution to

here is where the policy dilemma begins.
an unfair distribution of income and

correct it,

chances are

that the policy

If,

for

dream up an
will conflict
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with one

of the

suppose farm

other roles

incomes are too

of the
low,

economic system.
in

Specifically,

society's judgment.

A set of

institutions that shores up farm prices is devised to solve the problem.
But this leads
to

to misallocation of resources by

produce more

farm products.

resources--too many

In

committed to farm

fact,

creating the incentive

it

was misallocation

production--that led to

of

the low

income in the first place.
The problems
tasks of

of American agriculture

our economic

system have

been,

with respect to
and

continue to

these three
be,

these

(Harris):
Allocation of Resources:
there has

been a

labor,

and

arisen

in

Since the earliest years of our country,

chronic excess

of the

capital--committed to
no small

measure

three basic

resources--land,

agricultural production.

from

the

immobility of

This has

resources

once

committed to farm production and to continuous productivity gains.
Distribution

of

Income:

Farmers

(and

farm

workers)

have

persistently fared worse by conventional measures of economic well-being
than non-farmers.

Within the farm

income disparities.

community itself,

Low farm incomes arise from excess resources in an

industry faced with

an inelastic aggregate demand,

that larger crops sell for considerably
crops.
it arises

there are severe

In addition,

which means simply

less total revenue than smaller

a few of us recognize and are willing to say that

from a relative lack

of economic and,

since

the mid-1900s,

political power of farmers.
Economic Growth and Development:
agriculture is the
has been due,

Here,

envy of much of the world.

in part,

to innate

in sharp contrast,

U.S.

This tremendous growth

advantages of the United States with

21

respect to soils, climate,
stems from our

and location.

But,

past agricultural policies.

for the most part,

Results

it

of these policies

include land grant universities, USDA, government subsidized credit, and
a government-financed infrastructure.
structure rather

than some

acreage controls have

Our opting for an entrepreneurial

other system,

and

also played a part.

even price

This is

support and

our success story.

Professor Lester Thurow recently lauded agricultural policy as a "policy
success" and

suggested that the

same approach

"sick" industries in today's economy.
success

has

meant

agriculture.

continued

Moreover,

since

beneficiaries of

such programs,

disparity within

agriculture.

resource control

raise questions

future industry growth
loss,

with

large farmers

and

excess
have

resources

been the

policy has contributed

Finally,

past

about the

patterns of

adequacy of

and development and other

water shortages

in other

Over the long run, this apparent

problems

the

might be used

environmental

in

primary
to income

growth and

resources for

societal uses.

quality problems

Soil

also

are

legacies of our policies.
Policies and institutions change more slowly than the problems they
were designed to address.
years of experimentation.

Often the policy machinery is the product of
Such is the case

Tradition, politics, power clusters,

sunk costs,

structures,

and compromise tend to forestall

food policy

even though

track record.

the policies

with agricultural policy.
existing bureaucratic

major changes in farm and

themselves may

not have

a good

Major societal, economic, or political change usually is

required to stimulate minor, to say nothing of major, policy changes.
Policymaking tends to be reactionary in nature.
usually exists

long before policies

That is, a problem

and institutions are

developed to
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deal with the problem.

Seldom, if ever,

do we see policy developed to

deal with emerging or anticipated problems.
found in defense policy.
lead to continuous

Even in

A possible exception may be

this area differences in perceptions

debate and compromise,

and

the generals frequently

are accused of preparing to refight the last war.
While it
long-run

has been argued

agricultural

agriculture can

that the United

policy,

be identified.

several

States never has

long-run

The first,

policy

a goal of

goals

had a
for

any reasonable

society, was and is to assure our citizens a stable supply of reasonably
priced food.

Second,

our land settlement policy

programs have presupposed a long-run goal
concept.

A third

agriculture
markets.

is

of supporting the family farm

major long-run policy goal for

increased farm productivity.
demand

and subsequent farm

agriculture has been

A fourth, more recent, longer-run goal for

expansion,

primarily

through

international

Ttis fourth goal ties agriculture to a myriad of economic and

political factors, and represents a major shift in agricultural policy.
The Current Situation
As a consequence of economic developments

including good

crop years,

stocks of grains,
prospective

the U.S.

both at home and abroad,

finds itself in 1983

with large

oilseeds and cotton relative to current and near term

demands.

As

a further

consequence,

prices

of

these

commodities are low, both relative to the highs of the 1970s and in real
terms; farm income is low in absolute terms;
is at its lowest
farmers in

in decades.

a severe cash flow

aggregate real farm income

Low prices and incomes
bind,

have caught many

particularly if they

are heavily

debt-leveraged (Lee).
The situation

has resulted

in sharp

increases in

debt repayment

delinquencies,

bankruptcies and

concentrated

on

the

foreclosures

have not

"sell-outs,"

liquidation.

the

yet reached

estimated that fewer than
percent, of U.S.

foreclosures.

While

numbers

of

the news

has

bankruptcies

and

crisis proportions.

10 percent,

It has

perhaps as few as

been

three to five

farms have financial problems that would warrant asset

However, many of those who have lost their businesses were

highly

debt-leveraged young

Others

were

southeastern

drought-reduced crops and

farmers

who

farmers

who

expanded during
experienced

the

two

1970s.

successive

farmers who had expanded on

land of marginal

in the farm sector has led to

a decline in the

productivity.
The turn of events

demand for land, and in 1982 land values decreased for the first time in
more than

20 years.

Declining land

position of farmers,

their ability to

have compromised the integrity of

values have

and rural

equity

borrow to cover rising debts and

their investment portfolios.

purchases of goods and services have declined,
supply industries

reduced the

communities.

Farmer

posing problems for farm

Additionally,

the federal

government is incurring unprecedented farm program costs--$12 billion in
1982,

and a

storage,

projected $18 to $20 billion in

and supply management programs (Lee).

under the 1981 Farm Bill are higher
market prices than
farm

1983--for price supports,

program

was anticipated.

signals

rather

than

Target and loan prices

relative to costs of production and
That producers

are responding to

to

market

signals

has

predict a

strong

rebound in

further

aggravated the excess supply problem.
Most
markets for

forecasters do

not

several years.

remainder of the decade,

Most foresee

a slow recovery

commodity
through the

and do not expect exports to reach 1981 levels
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before the late
match

the

1980s.

1980

projections,

Aggregate real farm income is

level

the

before

the end

prospects are that

of

the

not expected to

decade.

With

problems of balancing

such

supply and

demand will persist and price instability will continue to be a problem.
Current Farm Programs
U.S.

food

and agricultural

policy

described as crisis intervention.

of

A crisis

the

1980s can

best

be

has been developing in our

agriculture since the late 1970s.

The situation has become particularly

severe

unusual

in the

programs

South

provide

because of

a stopgap

mechanism

weather problems.

for

dealing with

characterized by weak demand and increasing stocks.
viewed as a
deal with

mechanism to hold off

long-run

industry

stability,

problems

resource

such

returns and

as

a

situation

The PIK program is

the auctioneer on some

the current surplus problem.

Current

farms and to

It was not designed
production

a stable

to solve

adjustment,

and reasonably

price

priced food

supply.
~

New Era for Agriculture?

The current market and policy situation
product

of

the

past

decade.

that gave
Proponents

rise to arguments that
of

this

industry structure

number

A

agricultural markets and in farm and

is,

camouflaged by

changes

occurred

agriculture has entered a

argument

maintain that

have changed

and that

of the basic problems
the events of

of

a
in

non-farm policies during the 1970s

the

problems

new policies

guide the sector in the years ahead (Knutson).
argued that many

to a large extent,

and

basic

are needed

to

However, it also can be

have not changed but

the past decade.

"new era."

have been

Agricultural problems
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have

become

more

complex

and more

interrelat.ed

with

problems

and

developments in the national and international economies.
Events of

the early 1970s which

had major impacts

on agriculture

included:
1.

Changes in the

value of the dollar and

a subsequent move

to place the currency in a floating exchange system;
2.

Widespread world crop failures;

3.

International policies which opened new trade channels;

4.

Increased world population, particularly in underdeveloped
countries;

5.

Increasing income levels in many countries;

6.

Unprecedented levels of credit, both public and private.

The results of these changes
the impacts on U.S.
the

market

domestic

agriculture were

for our

market

influences.

agricultural

to

a

and prevailing

surplus commodities.

been

market

significant.

products

Within a few years

shifted from

characterized

by

-However,

heavy

primarily

a

international

Prior to 1971, most agricultural commodities were marketed

domestically,

of the

have been well documented.

farm

expanded market

to

large stocks

of

By the mid-1970s, exports accounted for one-third

market for agricultural
reduced

programs led

significantly.

commodities,
Although it

involved more risk

initial market success dampened these

and commodity
was

recognized

and potentially was
concerns.

U.S.

stocks had
that

the

more volatile,
net farm income

doubled within three years and the potential for rising real farm prices
seemed greater than ever before.
The
dominated

structure of
by large

U.S.

agriculture

efficient commercial

in the
farms

1970s invariably
with competitive

was
farm
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family incomes

and investment

returns (Lee).

The farms

were highly

capitalized and heavily dependent upon borrowed capital.
Improved farm commodity prices and
the expectations
expand,

of farmers and

policy makers.

to improve efficiency,

and labor.

Based on the

increasing farm incomes altered
Farmers

continued to

and to substitute capital for both land

historical performance of

agriculture,

results were very predictable .

During the

output expanded by 30 percent.

Output per unit of labor almost doubled

and output

decade of the 1970s,

the

increased by about 30

per acre of land

production and increased productivity were
dependence on nonfarm

percent.

Expanded

closely t i ed to an increased

inputs and borrowed capital .

energy crisis continued to

total

Inflation and the

push up the prices of those

inputs to which

the sector had become addicted.
The expectations

of policy

makers also

market absorbing the product of

were altered .

the efficient U.S.

With the

agricultural plant,

farm policy shifted away from production controls, allotments,
price

and income

getting

supports to

their signals

programs,

and

policy

government

involvement.

from the

reliance on
market,

makers welcomed
Policy

increased market instability,
program to

a

markets.

rather
the

Farmers

were

than government

farm

opportunity

makers recognized

however,

protect against wide· swings

and high

the

to

decrease

problems

of

and provided a new type of farm
in prices.

Target

prices and

loan prices were used to protect against downside price risk.
Price
viewed as
The

and income

temporary phenomena created

interruptions

measures.

problems that

in

the

recurred during
by increased

long-term trend

were

the decade

were

market volatility .
handled

by

stopgap

The farm policy environment continued to be based on a market
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philosophy with minimum

government intervention.

farmers continued to expand output.
costs of

production,

land prices.

higher

During the

new era,

In addition to inflation-increased

income expectations

stimulated increased

Both required an increasing dependence on outside capital

and farm debt.
Where Are We?
Despite the coming of the "new era," U.S.
in 1983

in a supply/demand

Although the
1970s,

farm sector

imbalance chara c teristic of
experienced booms and

the decade ended on an upbeat.

matched the record se-t
was here

and that

disruptions

of

agriculture finds itself

busts during

the long-term

of 1976,
upward

the late

Net farm income in 1979 almost

in 1973 and reaffirmed that the

the problems

the pre-1970s.

1977 and

trend

in

"new era" truly
1978 merely

farm prices

were

and

net

incomes.
Farmers, particularly those in the South,

were able to retire some

of the carry-over debt from the drought-reduced income of 1977.
unrest and demonstrations began to taper off.

Farmer

Before farmers and policy

makers had time to reflect on the situation and adjust to the new trend,
a new series of events once again altered expectations.
Higher

world

price

levels

and

low

real

stimulated increased production capacity both
1975-1980.

Although 1980

and particularly

in many

interest

had

at home and abroad during

brought a drought-reduced crop
areas of the

rates

South,

generally

in the U.S.,
good weather

around the world in 1980, 1981, and 1982, and good growing conditions in
the U.S.

in 1981 and 1982 led to record yields and supplies in the U.S.

Global recession
interest rates

weakened income

growth and

slowed investment and

demand.

demand and

Sharply

higher

discouraged importing
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nations from holding food stocks.
in foreign

exchange markets

importing countries.

The higher value of the U.S.

increased the

costs of

U.S.

dollar

exports

to

Tighter credit, high energy prices, and recession

left many nations in precarious cash flow and foreign exchange positions
All

(Lee).

of these factors

agricultural products,
1980-81,

the

volume,

but in

combined to

and the value of

1982-83

for U.S.

exports began to decline.

realized increase primarily
1981-82 and

weaken the demand

was due to

(projected)

In

increased export

the

value of

U.S.

agricultural exports began to decline.
The weak
escalating

demand occurred in

production costs.

incomes and cash-flow

conjunction with bumper
The

problems,

obvious

result was

particularly for highly

harvests and
reduced

farm

leveraged and

marginal farmers.
How Did We Get Here?
The first question that arises given
or so is, "Have we come full circle?"
from

the same

decades?
the

chronic

of

Does U.S.

excess capacity

agricultural

problem

agriculture now suffer
that

plagued it

for

A brief review of farm problems and

Has the problem changed?

evolution

the events of the past decade

policy

should

provide

a

basis

for

addressing the question.

Prior to the 1860s,
on the development

most

agricultural related policy concentrated

of agriculture,

and on

export tariffs

Early

land settlement

which were
policies

distribution of
used to

favored the

the land resource,

raise government
family

revenues.

farm unit.

developing nation was heavily dependent upon agriculture,

The

not only as a
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domestic industry but as an

export base.

related exports accounted for
exports in the 1860s.

For example,

agriculturally

over 72 percent of the value

of all U.S.

Foreign exchange earned from agricultural exports

helped offset the growing trade deficit of the young nation.
Establishment of the
Morrill Act

in 1862

Department of Agriculture and

marked the

beginning of

government involvement in agriculture.
federal

funds

for

research

at

The

concept was

In

extended to black colleges

mission of today's Land Grant system
of the

Smith-Lever Act

more than

a century

of

Hatch Act of 1887 provided

agricultural

associated with Land Grant Colleges.

passage of the

1890,

experiment

stations

the Land Grant College

in the South.

The three-fold

was completed in 1914 with passage

which provided

federal funds

for agricultural

extension.
Other

federal

legislation

that

had

significant

impacts

on

agricultural development included the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the
Clayton Act of 1914, the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922,
Commission Act of

1914,

the Hollis-Bulkley Act of

the Farm Credit System,

and the

the Federal Trade
1916 that initiated

Reclamation Act of 1902 which provided

federal funding for irrigation development in the West.
The primary

goals of early

agricultural legislation were

(1)

to

insure a stable supply of reasonably priced food; (2) to facilitate land
settlement and

support the

family farm concept;

increased agricultural productivity.

and (3)

These goals were complementary to

national goals of industrialization and economic development.
increased agricultural
development.

productivity was

Resources,

primary industry to

a prerequisite

primarily labor,

In fact,

for industrial

had to be released from the

meet the needs of a growing,

industrial economy (Robinson).

to promote

but labor intensive,
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The institutions

that were created

in the

last half of

the 19th

century provided the basis for government-sponsored productivity growth.
However,

the

payoff

development for

from

government

agriculture was

minimal until

The trend in productivity was basically
early 1900s;

investments

As

late as 1900,

research

after the

and

early 1900s.

unchanged through the 1800s and

it stagnated during the depression,

the depression.

in

bnt accelerated after

well over one-third

of all gainful

employment in this country was provided by production agriculture.
The technological

revolution in

period of over half a century.

a gestation

Public and private R&D investments began

to make an impact after 1900 but
until after the depression.

agriculture ~equired

the major financial payoff was delayed

However, the returns from those investments

have been impressive since the 1930s.
The Early Twentieth Century
During the period 1910 to 1930,
agriculture

experienced

two

of

the U.S.
the

economic system and U.S.

greatest

shocks

in

U.S .

history--World War I and the Great Depression.
The

period

1910

to

1920

was

a

period

of

war

prosperity.

Agricultural production increased to support the war effort and supply a
growing foreign market for agricultural

products.

and

high

increased

production

foreign

and technological

between 1910 and 1920 and
accounted for 20
receipts.

demand

led to

innovation.

U.S.

U.S. exports.

prices
Gross

which

stimulated

farm income

agricultural exports tripled.

percent of gross income

Agricultural exports

War time conditions

and about 30 percent

accounted for about 45

doubled
Exports
of cash

percent of all
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Following World War
many

countries

I and the collapse of

strove

to

Numerous trade barriers

adhere to

policy

were erected to curb

agricultural commodities.
U.S.

a

their economic systems,
of

self-sufficiency.

imports,

The overexpansion

particularly of

and increased capacity of

agriculture during World War I and the collapse of foreign markets

and prices plunged agriculture into a worldwide depression.
The Inter-War Period
The

payoffs

from

and

research and development

additional

investments

in

agricultural

continued throughout the period;

even though

agriculture had acquired the ability to produce in excess of demand.

As

markets contracted, the problem reached chronic proportions.
The

results

were

both

a

blessing

productivity resulted in ample food
claimed

a

smaller share

of

experienced falling prices,

per

and

a

curse.

at decreasing prices.
capita income.

Increased
Thus,

However,

reduced incomes and low

food

farmers

factor returns as

production exceeded domestic consumption.
By the early 1930s,
that

public

industry.
of the

the agricultural

intervention was

deemed

necessary

for survival

of

the

Passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 became one

most significant landmarks in

policy.

problem had become so severe

It

the development of

also marked the beginning

intervention

in

agricultural

of an era of

markets

and

American farm

direct government
decision

making.

Interestingly, the Act was passed and the era began when exports were at
a low ebb and productivity was on the increase.
The
following
shifted in

1933

Act set

50 years.
the last

the

stage

While the
decade,

for

agricultural policy

emphasis of

vestiges of

over

the

agricultural policy

has

the 1933

philosophy remain.
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Major goals underlying agricultural policy during the past 50 years have
been:
1.

Abundant food for domestic consumers at reasonable cost;

2.

Equitable returns to

resources used in agriculture

vis a

vis returns to nonagricultural resources;
3.

Maintenance of the family farm concept;

4.

Conservation

of

resources

for

future

generations

and

(recently) preservation of environmental integrity.
Massive internal adjustments were required
accommodate technological advances and
problems.

in U.S.

agriculture to

the accompanying excess capacity

Agricultural productivity increased at about one percent per

year from the early 1900s to the late 1930s.

Since that time, however,

agricultural productivity has increased at about six percent per year.
The proportion of the labor force engaged in production agriculture
declined from

about one-fourth in

1939 to 4.8

currently stands at about three percent.
specialized.

Farmers sought

Capital

rate and often became fixed in the

specialized agricultural production activity to
fixity

of land (the

and to reduce per unit costs.

was substituted for labor at a rapid

resource

and it

Farms became larger and more

to increase output per unit

government controlled resource)

The

percent by 1970

phenomenon

aggravated

which it was committed.
adjustment

to

changing

economic conditions.
Internal adjustments were
in

the face

of

changes in

not sufficient to maintain
productivity.

agriculture continued to be plagued

From

by excess capacity,

prices, and low returns to resources (incomes).
and stable returns to resources were

the

farm incomes

1930s to

1972,

relatively low

Realizing that adequate

required to avoid severe shocks to
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this critical sector, agricultural policy focused on the domestic market
was developed
support

to address

prices,

these problems.

protect

incomes

Programs were

and control

the

included to

capacity

of

the

agricultural plant through production and acreage limitations.
However,
provided

these

the

programs

income

and

also produced

price

stability

conflicts
which

because

encouraged

they

further

investment in improved

technology as farmers sought

costs.

farmers responded to government program signals,

not

In this case,
to

market

signals.

Investments

in

to reduce per-unit

technology

increased

productivity, further aggravated the excess capacity problem and created
the "action-reaction" syndrome between

agricultural production capacity

and government farm policy.
Adjustments to technological change and government control programs
increased

resource

Additionally,

concentration

capital intensification

capacity and resource
prices and low
prices

and reduced

a

further

number

of

farms.

aggravated the

excess

fixity problem which ultimately

returns.

created

the

Farm programs to bolster

vicious

circle.

Except

led to depressed

returns and support

for

a

few

humanitarian

programs, most of agricultural policy was geared to the domestic market.
Farm prices

were supported at levels

and, for all practical purposes,
from world markets.

eliminated U.S.

Additionally,

production expansion in less

in excess of world

the U.S.

market prices

agricultural products

price umbrella encouraged

efficient and/or underdeveloped production

regions.
The short-run policy goals produced high government costs and large
surpluses by
price

and

the late 1960s.
income supports,

Public opinion shifted
the

political

power

on agricultural

of the

farm

bloc
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decreased and new entrants from outside agriculture became active in the
agricultural policy arena.
policies

of

the

agriculture.

1970s

The result was a move to the market-oriented
which

provided

less

lucrative

support

to

Of course other institutional and market changes supported

the shift in agricultural policy.
The agricultural policy of the late
be

characterized as

agricultural

plant

an

attempt to

in

check

hold

within

agricultural policy environment.

1960s and early 1970s can best
the increasingly
an

The shifts

productive

increasingly

unfavorable

in economic,

weather and

national and international policy conditions which occurred in the early
1970s

were

environment

discussed
shifted in

In

earlier.
response

typical

to those

market oriented philosophy was adopted.
late 1970s

and early 1980s continued

farmers should
market.

receive their

fashion,

changing

the

policy

conditions and

a

The policy environment of the
to stem from the

production signals

philosophy that

and incomes

from the

Yet, several "stop-gap" measures have been developed to address

"temporary" price and income problems.
The Southern Experience
Much

of what

has

been said

about

U.S.

agricultural

markets and institutions also applies to the South.

problems,

However, there were

and are differences in southern agriculture that help to explain why the
regional

development

of the

industry

and

its current

problems

are

somewhat different.
Southern agriculture began

developing as an export

economy during

the Colonial period and the traditional export crops, tobacco,
cotton,

continue

to play

an important

role in

rice and

Southern agriculture.

Plantation agriculture would not have developed when it did if there had
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not been a

strong European demand for these

commodities (McPherson and

Langham).
Soon after the Civil War, the sharecropping system replaced earlier
farm organizations.
in the

The system prevailed

South from the 1860s

as the predominant structure

until 1940.

Throughout the

acreage per farm and production systems changed little.
were combined

in fixed proportions

period,

the

Inputs

to produce traditional

crops which

were geared to export markets.
Soil fertility deteriorated
over half of all

under continuous cropping and

commercial fertilizers sold in the U.S.

by 1930

were used in

the South.
In the early 1900s,
The proportion

65 percent

of cotton production was exported.

dropped to 40 percent

by the mid-1930s.

The

value of

cotton and tobacco exports in 1921-24 amounted to 48 percent of all U.S.
agricultural exports and to 66 percent in 1936-40.
After the collapse of international markets

in the 1920s and 1930s

and the shift of cotton to the West due in part to government subsidized
irrigation,
problems.

the

South

However,

was faced

the prevailing

through the

1960s insulated the

South

the

from

production

with

volatility

significant

farm policy

farm

adjustment

from the

late 1930s

traditional export commodities

of

through allotments.

international
Thus,

the

markets

South

but

began to

of the
limited
increase

production of grains, soybeans and livestock.
The

South

development
present,

lagged

the

and innovation.
the change

decreased more

in the

has

rest

the

However,
been dramatic.

South than

01:E ■ SON

of

in any

country

from the
The

in

technological

late

1940s to

the

number

of farms

has

other region

of the

llNBlERSlIY [IBR1IB'!

United
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States.
From

Between 1950 and 1960, the South lost 40 percent of its farms.

1960

to

1970,

it

lost

48

percent

of

those

remaining.

Simultaneously, farm size and capital investments in improved technology
were increasing.
Since 1945 and particularly in the last 15 years, cropping patterns
in

the South

have undergone

major

changes.

Shifts

soybeans and cash grains have occurred in most areas.
has moved to the Delta and
have declined

due to supply

the Southwest.

In the past 20 years,

farms and

livestock farms

Tobacco and peanut acreages

for example,

has doubled and

to

Cotton production

controls and competition

markets.

from cotton

in international

the number of cash grain

cotton farms

have declined

from 35 percent to 3 percent of total farms.
Although productivity gains in the
matched

those

of

the

Cornbelt,

South recently have exceeded or

average

yields

remain

lower

and

production costs per acre are higher.
Over the past decade,

the

cropping patterns,

investment and productivity gains have changed.
about 27 percent
about 22

net income.

Net income

percent of that for the average U.S. farm.

capital

The South accounts for

of total cash receipts for U.S.

percent of the

structure,

agriculture but only
per farm is

only 66

The South accounts for 26 to

27 percent of total farm assets,

debt and equity.

However,

debt per

dollar of net income is almost 20

percent higher for the South than the

average U.S. farm, including the South.
Every agricultural

region has

problems that face most regions,

problems,

but

in addition

to the

the South experiences more biological

risks with its warm, moist climate which is attractive to pests, and its
more leached soils which require more inputs per acre.

37

The South is a more nearly
and higher per

marginal area with lower average yields

acre production costs than other

farming areas .

Thus,

the South is less able to adjust to or endure price declines, especially
with the heavy
face

debt loads incurred during the 1970s.

adjustments

to current

conditions,

one

While all areas

can argue

that

those

adjustments and their consequences are most severe in the South.
Has It Changed?

The
Farm Problem:
- ---

In 1983,

we find

conditions in the
grains,

the situation

late 1960s and even

oilseeds

and

cotton,

prospective demands suggest
earlier

decades.

unstable,
policies,

to be

The

and not

uncomfortably similar

in the 1920s.

relative

to

Large

current

that the farm problem has

foreign

market once

insatiable!

world crop failures,

Have the

again
shifts

to

stocks of

or

near

term

not changed from
has

proven to

in national

be

trade

and domestic and international economic

conditions only camouflaged the persistent excess capacity problem?
After 30-plus

years of

controlling the

events of the 1970s signaled to both
"new era"

was beginning.

unleashed in response
producers was
The

new

million

and

Higher

and total

percent greater

farm output

the

market

planted

nonland

the number of

oriented

input

policies

Between

1971 and

to principal
use,

to new

highs.

Crop

continued.

farm

crops by

availability

and·recent favorable weather

than a decade ago.

plant was

productivity increases

the area

yield-increasing technology,
yields

Although

investments and expansion.

farmers increased
acres.

of the agricultural

to the new environment.

encouraged heavy capital
1982,

The capacity

situation

the

producers and policy makers that a

drastically reduced,

market

agricultural plant,

of

have pushed

production is

The combined effects

60

17

of expanded
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crop acreage, non-restrictive government farm programs and rising yields
have increased U.S. crop production by about one-fifth over the decade.
We must conclude

that the agricultural sector still

the age-old problem of excess capacity.
complex than in past decades and
and the policy machinery

However,

is plagued by

the problem is more

has new dimensions.

of the past will not solve

Stopgap measures
current and future

problems.
Both

the

agricultural

sector

Agriculture has become more complex,
burdened;

has fewer

concentrated;

has

participants;
become

international commodity

and

its

markets

have

changed.

more capital intensive,

and debt

is less flexible;

critically

linked

and financial markets;

visible part of the U.S.

economy.

with

has become more
national

and has become

Additionally, U.S.

and
a more

agriculture has

become dependent upon international markets as a home for the product of
two out of every five acres planted.
What Have We Learned?
What

have we

learned from

formulated to deal with the farm
formulated to solve
by (1)
tendency

problem?

experience under

that the

formulate

(Duncan and Harshbarger).

problem is

programs in

policies

The policies that have been

farm problems have been and continue

an assumption
to

decades of

to be plagued

transitory and

response

to

short-run

by (2)

a

phenomena

The result has been SO years of farm policies

designed to solve temporary problems.

Yet, the problems of agriculture

continue with us.
Whether past farm policies receive a
have learned some

passing or failing grade,

lessons from our experiences.

help in addressing current and future problems.

we

These lessons should
While the problems are
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almost sure

to change

and become more

complex and

our goals

for the

sector may change, we still can benefit from our experiences.
Lesson I:

Agricultural policy,

current technological,
hand,

economic,

when implemented,

reflects the

and political climate.

On the other

new policy initiatives require a

implementation.

long time between inception and

For example, depressed farm conditions had existed for

over a decade prior to the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act in
1933.

Further,

conditions now seem to change mar~ quickly than in the

past, in large part because of more rapid technological advances.

In

1973,

farmers

marketplace,

and indirectly

Protection Act,
rapidly

were

given
from the

to expand production.

changed

to

worldwide

the

signal

1973

directly

Agriculture and

They did.

recession

and

the

case,

resource

agricultural

plant to

agricultural

policy with

·of policy.

food

gluts.

Is

it possible

enough flexibility

to

the

As has long

ability

to have

Yet,

of

the

long-range

adjust painlessly

to

Vested interest groups are responsible for the creation

But agricultural policy,

vested interest groups
need for

contract.

retarded

Consumer

We have yet to design such a policy.

short-term needs?
Lesson II:

immobility

the

The sellers market

agricultural programs still were oriented toward expansion.
been

from

them has

that desire to maintain programs

expired.

I will

creates new

once implemented,

leave it to

even after the

others to

point the

fingers.
Lesson

ffi:

Agricultural policies are compromises, both within and

between agriculture

and other

interest groups.

changes in tobacco policy which were viewed
the program.

Witness last

year's

as the only means of saving

As farmers become even fewer and more specialized, will we
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be able to forge effective compromises,

or will we be stuck with trying

to save vestiges of the programs we already have?
Lesson IV:

Agricultural policy has

than on the underlying problems.
serves

as an

illustration.

excessive program
underlying
unneeded

costs,

culprit is
production

The

current debate over dairy policy

The problem

that now

a support
that

focused much more on symptoms

the

is

are over

commonly identified
$2 billion a

price that

is too

government

must

year.

as
The

high--stimulating
remove

from

the

marketplace.
Lesson

V:

Agricultural

increasing output than in
response of U.S.

policy has

reducing it.

been far

more effective

One needs only to

farm production to both

in

look at the

World Wars and to

the badly

misjudged world food shortage of 10 years ago to see that this is true.
Lesson VI:

Specific agricultural

other agricultural goals
years,

the most

policies have

and with other national

glaring example

of

available,
system,
proposals
before,

we

Within

given

have actually tried only
are simply

as in

surely there is

a

rehash of

the case of PIK.

embargoes do not

policy alternatives

and a modified

free enterprise

a handful (Harris).

what has

between

Other examples abound.

the spectrum of possible

a democratic society

In recent

has been

Obviously,

jibe with the goal of expanding farm exports.
Lesson VII:

policies.

this conflict

agriculture and international relations.

conflicted with

been

done several

As we move toward

the need and opportunity to dream

Most "new"
times

the 21st Century,

up new institutions.

The question is, will we be bold enough to try them?
Attempts to address the current farm

problem with the policy tools

of past decades may well be doomed to failure.

The sector has changed,

41
markets have

changed,

interdependencies

have changed.

Policies and

programs addressed to the farm sector also must change.
I will leave the new approaches to
speakers and workshops which follow.
dimensions of

the problem

severe limitations,
SO-year

history of

However, I must reiterate that the

have changed,

and ask if
our

solving the farm problem to the

we have

interventionist

that old

policy tools

learned any lessons
policies.

Can

from the

policies

developed to deal with risks, price volatility, demand enhancement,
supply/demand

balances which

are not

fraught

with age-old

have

be
and

problems?

Must policy maker~ always put new wine in fragile old wineskins?
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THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE AND AGRIBUSINESS
Lester H. Meyers*
Introduction
The initial day's program for this
icy suggests that

Symposium on Farm and Food Pol

the planners consider the

external economic environ

ment to

be of critical importance

sector.

Obviously, I agree with this premise and feel that agricultural

policy objectives

to the outlook for

must implicitly and

the agricultural

explicitly account for

vailing national and international economic structure.
will address the international linkages,

so

the pre-

Professor Schuh

I will confine my comments

to domestic economic issues.
During the past

several years agricultural economists

makers have become painfully aware of
the

impacts to

how problematic it is to evaluate

agriculture resulting

from changes

in those

variables which have traditionally been very stable.
ous and

include energy

Because these factors
terms,

prices,

on agriculture.

interest

have been stable,

it is impossible to
Only now

and policy

rates,

external

Examples are obvi
and

or slightly

exchange rates.
declining in real

statistically evaluate their precise impact
are we

beginning to

accumulate sufficient

observations to begin to accurately quantify the impacts.

However, the

volatility experienced over the past several years will help us to iden
tify these interrelationships and that should

help lead to more finely

tuned policy initiatives.
Policy development implies not only that the macroeconomic-agricul-

*Director of Agricultural Services, Chase Econometrics.

44

tural sector linkages can be measured,

but also that the levels of spe

cific macroeconomic indicators can be forecast with reasonable accuracy.
This is the area I will focus on today.

That is, I will try to lay out

our analysis of the near-term and longer-term economic outlook, followed
by some comments on the implications for agriculture and agribusiness.
Agriculture is

most directly

affected by

the following

economic

indicator variables:

1.

GNP

2.

Consumer incomes

3.

Interest rates

4.

Exchanges rates

5.

Energy price inflation

The outlook

discussion will emphasize

general economy,

recognizing,

these particular aspects

of course,

that

of the

they tend to be highly

interrelated.
Economic Outlook
GNP Growth
The current economic recovery,
characterized as being (a)
(c)

now about

moderate,

uneven across industries,

(b)

and (d)

five months old,

can be

erratic from month to month,
limited by a general desire to

keep inventories low.
The recovery period

performance has been very

tion increases and growth in
bly

weaker than

periods.

growth rates

modest with produc-

other economic indicators being considera
experienced early

in previous

recovery

Real economic growth during the first quarter is now estimated

at 2.5 percent,

annual rate basis.

Second quarter growth is projected
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to be 6.4 percent;

however,

real output is forecast to expand only 2.7

percent for all of 1983 and by 4.5 percent in 1984.
moderate rate

The

of

recovery is

due to

a

variety of

factors

including:
1.

Improvement in housing starts,

already evident,

will be

limited to a level of 1.6 to 1.7 million new units in 1983
and 1984.

This compares to new

million units

in previous

start levels of around 2

recovery periods.

interest rates, broad based job insecurity,
erate consumer income growth will
ery in this sector.

High real
and only mod

prevent a robust recov

Also it now appears that multi-family

units are approaching slight surplus conditions.
2.

Interest rates

are not expected to

decline substantially

from current levels for reasons given later in this paper.
3.

Prospects for increasing U.S.

exports

remain poor as the

dollar shows little sign of weakening.
4.

Private, non-residential investment is expected to decline
2.6 percent in 1983 and increase only 2.2 percent in 1984.
This

is substantially

first

two years

less than

of previous

experienced during

recovery periods,

existing and projected conditions including:
a.

Overbuilding of office space during 1982

b.

Continued high real interest rates

c.

Overcapacity in most industries

d.

Weak corporate profits

e.

Moderate general economic recovery

f.

General emphasis on cutting costs by keeping
inventories to minimum levels

the

several
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5.

Only

modest growth

in expenditures

by

state and

local

governments and in Federal nondefense spending.
Economic activity,

as measured by real GNP,

embodies the behavior

of a myriad of components which are relevant to agriculture.

It is some

of these components which we want to examine more closely in the remain
der of this paper.
Consumer Incomes
On

the domestic

affecting U.S.
changes are
focus on

demand

side,

the

agriculture is real

relatively stable,

there is

primarily with the supply side.

most critical

consumer income.

supply fluctuations and to

eral level of

single

produce can be

Because demand

a tendency in

agriculture to

design policy programs

Yet over the long run,

domestic and export demand which will
marketed at prices sufficient to

factor

which deal

it is the gen

determine how much

cover production costs

and to leave enough profit to stimulate continued investment .
real per capita

Since 1979,

relatively stagnant.

consumer disposable income

has been

While 1981 and 1982 levels were higher than during

1980, the gain berely offset the 1980 loss and 1982 levels were only 0.7
percent above 1979 levels.

The impact of stagnant consumer incomes has

been most evident on the demand for beef and, hence,

on the cattle sec

tor.
In 1979,

U.S.

beef production
consumption is

beef production was 21.3 billion pounds.

was only 5.2
estimated to

Since consumption

percent higher
be 1.3 pounds

levels are largely

relative prices must be used to
period (1979-1982),

and 1982 per
less than

determined by

capita beef

it was

in 1979.

production levels,

measure demand strength.

Omaha choice steer

By 1982,

prices declined 5

For the same
percent and
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retail beef prices increased 7.2 percent.

Taken together, these statis

tics suggest a weak consumer demand picture for beef.
Supporting the weak demand situation is the fact that 1982 per cap
ita consumption of

all red meats and

(1.6 percent) from 1979 levels.

poultry was down nearly

4 pounds

In a simplified way, these numbers sug

gest that consumer demand growth was

not strong enough over this period

to support sufficient consumer price increases,

given relatively modest

increases in beef supplies, to prevent a fall in cattle prices.
While

changes in

trends away

tastes

from beef,

and

preferences may

the fact that

demand was

portend

long-term

very weak

during a

period of static real disposable income suggests that a stronger economy
is a critical factor for improving

the economic health of the livestock

sector which would, in turn, strengthen the demand for feed grains.
Within the past year,

wage and salary income has been considerably

reduced by record layoff levels and by widespread wage concessions.
the same time,

on an aggregate basis,

At

the reduction in wage and salary

income was

being offset by higher

payments.

Late 1982 interest rate reductions and declines in unemploy-

ment benefits resulted

interest income and

in aggregate growth in real

larger transfer

per capita personal

income being only 0.2 percent for 1982.
Compounding the

problem is the fact

managed to maintain gains in real

that many consumers

who have

income are reluctant to spend because

of (a) job insecurity, (b) high real interest rates and (c) other strong
incentives to save, e.g.
significant shift in
middle-income

IRA savings programs.

the distribution of income,

groups toward

those

in

Also, there has been a
away

upper income

from lower- and
brackets.

results in a lowering of the overall marginal propensity to consume.

This
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We

expect

that

underlying

conditions

near-term expansion in consumer spending.
critical to

our outlook for sustained

spending which will have to bridge

are

now

favorable

for

In fact, this expectation is

recovery because it

is consumer

the gap between the initial recovery

period and the nine to twelve month period before renewed business capital investment is expected.

The fundamentals supporting an increase in

consumer spending are:
1.

Increased purchasing
inflation,

power resulting from lower

large tax refunds,

rates of

the upcoming July tax cut,

and stabilized employment levels.
2.

Debt liquidation over the past
all consumer debt burden,

year has reduced the over

making new spending commitments

easier to absorb.
3.

Household net worth has improved due to increases in stock
prices, bond prices and home values.

4.

While still high,

some decline in consumer loan rates has

occurred and real interest rates should decline further as
inflation edges up.
5.

Housing starts

have improved

dramatically and

this will

spill over into the demand for household durables.
6.

Surveys suggest that consumer confidence is rising, a nec
essary prelude to actual spending commitments.

During 1983 we

expect real per capita consumer income

percent and consumer spending to increase 3.3 percent,
dollars.

to grow 1.7

in constant 1972

Combined with the growth in consumer income, the savings rate

is expected to

decline from 6.5 percent

percent over the 1983 to 1985 period.

in 1982 to 5.6

percent to 6.0

This is in response to a reduc-
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tion in real interest rates and improved consumer confidence.
For the

1980s,

we

expect growth

in real

disposable per

incomes to average less than 2 percent per year.

capita

This is substantially

less than experienced during the 1960s and early 1970s.

However,

cur-

rent fiscal policies which encourage investment,

combined with relative

stability of energy

volatility in consumer

prices,

should foster less

incomes than experienced during the 1970s.
Interest Rates
Perhaps the most uncertainty surrounding

the outlook for sustained

economic recovery relates to interest rate expectations.

Interest rates

provide the most direct linkage between current monetary and fiscal pol
icies and the consumer and business sectors.
by the prime commercial bank rate

Interest rates as measured

increased three-fold between 1972 and

1980, with the most volatility occurring after 1978.
The important
rates remained below

fact with

respect to

interest rates

2 percent up through 1980

is that

real

and jumped dramatically

to 8.6 percent and 8.7 percent in 1981 and 1982, respectively.

The rea

sons for the high real rates are fairly well known:
1.

Tight money supply control to curb inflation

2.

Large federal government deficits

3.

Strong demand by businesses for short-term funding

4.

Declining inflation rates

5.

High levels

of uncertainty on

the part of

the financial

community.
The impact of high interest rates, particularly high real rates, is
to stifle consumption (particularly for durable goods),
eign capital,

and to encourage

high savings rates.

to attract forSecondary impacts

so
are reduced inflation as demand slackens, and strong U.S.
relative to other currencies.
tent with the

dollar values

These types of impacts are not inconsis-

objective of "cooling" down an economy

that is operating

at near full capacity and experiencing high inflation rates.
Currently,

we are

experiencing relatively

low inflation

unemployment rates above 10 percent, and declining export demand.
these conditions,

the economic outlook

outlook for interest
and longevity

rates.

of the

is critically affected

Most of the concerns

recovery are

expressed in

rates,
Given
by the

about the viability
terms of

what people

think will happen to interest rates.
Interest rates will be determined by three factors:
1.

Money supply as regulated by the FED

2.

Demand for credit

3.

Risk and uncertainty

Since the FED started the policy

of targeting money supply growth,

weekly fluctuations in the growth of Ml and, to a lesser extent, M2 have
been quickly translated

to interest rate expectations

and bond prices.

Recently the money supply has been growing fairly rapidly, renewing con
cern that supplies will be tightened and interest rates will rise.
monetary aggregates Ml

and M2 grew rapidly during the

first quarter at

annual rates of 14.8 percent and 21.3 percent, respectively.
include credit easing by the FED to
tion of Super

The causes

end the recession and the legaliza -

NOW accounts for banking institutions.

the FED will continue

to be able to provide easie~

because the

the economy

slack in

The

should prevent

We believe that
credit through 1983

upturns in

economic

activity from translating quickly back to unacceptable inflation levels.
The effect

of switching

funds to

Super NOW

accounts should

be about
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spent and we expect net growths of Ml

and M2 to be 9.9 percent and 12.5

percent, respectively, for 1983.
On the money

demand side,

budget deficits.

the critical factor

Our estimates suggest

relates to Federal

the 1983 fiscal

year deficit

will reach $210 billion, up from $128 billion in fiscal 1982.
ing growth of the Federal budget deficit
for many

years to come.

The

deficit-reducing actions,
els in the years
ade,

fundamental problem is that

ahead and begin rising in the second

half of the dee-

This results primarily
(b)

the defense spending

the relatively small cuts in federal nondefense spend

Deficits have never before risen

it is difficult

without new

future deficits will continue at present lev

large tax cuts enacted in 1981,

buildup, and (c)
ing.

will be the major policy issue

even with favorable economic assumptions.

from the (a)

Continu

during an economic recovery and

to see how rising private credit

demands and expanding

Treasury borrowing can be financed simultaneously with a noninflationary
monetary policy .

This concern is a factor embodied in current long-term

interest rate levels.
Assuming

average

economic growth

of

about

4 percent

per

year

between 1983 and 1988, the Congressional Budget Office projects deficits
which steadily grow from

$210 billion in 1983 to $284

billion in 1988.

These levels of expected deficits, would average 5 . 5 percent to 6.0 per
cent of GNP; by far the highest share of GNP in postwar history.
The pressure for funding large deficits
vate credit demands

and for financing the pri

of a growing economy will

in interest rates from current levels.

prevent further declines

After a stable period over the

next several months, we expect some upward pressure late in the year and
that the prime rate will fluctuate between
most of the decade.

9 percent and 11 percent for
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By historical standards,

real interest

rates are also expected to

remain relatively high, but not as high as the past two years.
the decline in

real rates can be

Some of

attributed to a pick-up

in inflation

continues to recover.

Where during

from current levels as the economy

most of the 1970s real interest rates didn't exceed 2 percent, we expect
the 1980s to average in the 4 percent to 5 percent range.
It is our view that the Federal Reserve will continue to make every
effort to

prevent sharply

higher interest

increase in credit demand as much as

rates by

accommodating the

The FED should be able

possible.

to be more accommodative as long as inflation remains at acceptable lev
els.

The danger is that commodity and other prices will rebound quickly

as the economy picks up and that the resulting inflation would force the
FED to once again tighten money supplies.
on interest rates

The resulting upward pressure

could easily stifle the recovery

in renewed stagnation in 1985.

The

and possibly result

risk of this type scenario remains

high, unless the deficit issue is resolved.
Exchange Rates
On a trade-weighted basis,

the value of the U.S.

25 percent between 1980 and 1982.
ative stability which,

in turn,

This follows an 8-year period of rel
followed dramatic declines as a result

of allowing the market to determine
During late 1981 and

rates beginning in the early 1970s.

the first half of 1982,

dollar was attributed primarily to the
in the U.S.

dollar increased

the

strength of the U.S.

high nominal real interest rates

Later in 1982, after interest rates moderated,

remained strong and the reason given was
relatively "safe"

haven for

that the U.S.

currency deposits

international financial uncertainty.

in light

the dollar

was viewed as a
of widespread
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Economic growth and interest rate stability, albeit at a relatively
high level,

underlies our forecast of (a)

trade weighted value
thereafter.
ences from

3-4 percent increases in the

of the dollar through 1984 and

(b)

modest growth

However, the trade-weighted basis masks substantial differcountry to country.

horizon we expect

In

general,

over the next

the dollar to weaken against the

five year

local currencies of

West Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, and Japan.

We forecast it to

strengthen against the currencies of Canada, Spain, Italy and France.
The net effect

is that over the

little export stimulative

next four' or five

impact for the U.S.

years,

we see

resulting from currency

exchange rate realignments.
Energy Prices
During the past decade,

an

important factor affecting agriculture

has been the price and available supply of energy.
ments severely

and directly

three categories,

impacted the

fuels and energy,

Energy price adjust

prices paid

by farmers

for

fertilizer and agricultural chemi

cals.
Given the

current agriculture policy

structure,

the

most direct

linkage between rising energy costs and policy action is through adjust
ments

to the

loan rates

1981/82 crop years,
loan rates

for major

during which

for cotton and

crops.

Between

wheat increased

be very rigid in the downward direction,
result in

and

energy prices increased dramatically,
over 150 percent

corn and soybeans the increase was over 120 percent.

costs can

the 1971/72

loan rates which

while for

Loan rates tend to

therefore reductions in energy
are more

production stimulative

than intended by policymakers.
As we prepare for future agricultural policy directions, it will be
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important to recognize,

as fully as

possible,

the future structure of

the world energy complex and its impact on future energy costs.
During recent years, the sharp recent decline in energy consumption
per unit of Gross Domestic Product, and resulting price weakness, illus
trates the world capacity to absorb and adjust to oil price shocks.

The

current situation reflects structural adjustments on both the supply and
demand sides.
oil supplies

Our

view is that the present situation

is deceptively calm

deceptively weak.

and that

A thorough analysis of

with respect to

the oil price
the oil markets

structure is
suggests a

recurring tight market during the 198Os.
Since 1978,

world consumption of oil has dropped from 63.1 million

barrels per day to 58.1 million barrels per day.
oil's share of total energy consumption
percent.

oil,

and (c)

the general economic

To a large degree, all three are the combined results of the

two oil price shocks of the
and

dropped from 46 percent to 41.3

These two statistics reflect (a) energy conservation, (b) sub

stitution of other energy forms for
downturn.

During the same period

conversions

last decade.

allowing energy

Once conservation techniques

substitution

are

in place,

unlikely that shifts back to oil consumption will occur easily.
the reason that,

in

spite of the present softness in

it

is

This is

oil prices,

oil

consumption continues to decline.

It also

is a factor in our forecast

that oil prices will remain fairly

stable through the fourth quarter of

1984.
Over the longer-time horizon,

oil

prices are expected to increase

at a rate of 2 percent to 4 percent above the general rate of inflation.
Much of the ability to conserve and
been realized

to switch to other energy forms has

and further displacement of

oil and energy will

be more
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difficult to attain.

Thus, as economic recovery takes hold, a recurring

tight market is likely.
A crucial assumption to our outlook
its output low.

is that Saudi Arabia will keep

In fact, the oil price system would have collapsed some

time ago had it not been for Saudi Arabia's flexible output levels.

It

is expected that the lessons of the past will support future supply con
trol and

increasing real oil prices

from 1985 onward.

However,

the

price adjustments are more likely to be frequent and of small magnitude,
rather than the large shocks of the past.
Implications for Agriculture
In summary, our general economic outlook for the next 5 to 10 years
suggests the following:
1.

Modest economic growth

2.

Growth in consumer incomes,

but at rates less robust than

occurred prior to the mid-1970s
3.

Resumption of real oil price increases after 1984

4.

Continued high U.S. dollar value

5.

Lower real interest

rates,

but still high

by historical

standards
The remaining symposium

speakers are charged with

looks specific to agriculture,

presenting out

so I will only generalize a few implica

tions, as we view them.
1.

Consumer demand for total meat will continue to grow,
will be more modest than during

the past and will reflect

more preference for poultry relative
expect

per capita

but

consumption of

to beef.
beef

We do not

to reach

experienced during the 1975 to 1978 period.

levels

l

56

2.

U.S.

grain exports will grow,

than during the 1970s.
additional

66

million

but

For 20 principal crops, it took an
acres to

growth between 1971/72 and 1981/82.
we think export

at a much slower rate

support

export

market

Over the next decade,

market growth will require

only an addi

tional 30 million acres.
3.

Balancing supply with modest demand expansion will require
some level of acreage diversion program during most of the
decade.

U.S. AGRICULTURE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
G. Edward Schuh*
For my remarks today I will draw on the testimony I gave before the
Joint Economic Committee of Congress just

a week ago today. 1 That hear

ing was significant because, given the extent to which U.S.

agriculture

has become integrated into the U.S. and world economies, it is precisely
in that Committee that agricultural policy issues should be discussed.
It is worth
same

noting that about a

Committee with

a paper

year ago I testified

titled "Agriculture

important point I tried to make at

not improve until

in Transition."

that time was that U.S.

faced a severe adjustment problem and

before that
An

agriculture

that the welfare of farmers would

that adjustment problem was resolved.

The need for

adjustment came about because a U.S .- dollar that was quite weak in for
eign exchange

markets during the latter

additional resources

into agriculture,

early part of the 1980s required that

half of the 197Os
while a

had induced

strong dollar

in the

resources be shifted out of agri

culture.
Little has been done over this past year to address that adjustment
problem,

with the result

that the welfare of farmers is

only a little

better today than -it was a year ago.

In fact, over this past year agri

cultural commodity programs became a

serious impediment to agricultural

adjustment,

with

the result

that commodity

*Professor and Head, Department of
University of Minnesota, St. Paul.

stocks burgeoned

further

Agricultural and Applied Economics,

1 See Schuh, G. Edward, "U.S.
Agricultural Policy in an Open World Econ
omy," testimony presented before the Joint Economic Committee of the
U.S. Congress, May 26, 1983, Washington, D.C.
Most of this paper is
taken from that testimony.
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above their year-ago levels.
return to
gain in

a bygone era

that promises

exchange for the

Moreover,

it

This has led to the PIK program, a costly
to give farmers

potential of considerable

does this without in

some short-term

longer-term pain. 2

any way addressing

the longer-term

resource adjustment problem which agriculture faces.
The major problem U.S.
ity programs operate

agriculture faces today is that our commod

counter to the best interests

and of the nation as a whole.
ductive is that they
the U.S.

of both agriculture

The reason these programs are counterpro

do not take account of the

significant changes in

economy, in the international economy, nor in the way the U.S.

economy relates to the rest of the world.

These programs were designed

for an earlier day and an economic system that was significantly different from the one we have today.
they are now conceived,

If we continue with these programs as

we can expect to see a

r~sources committed to agriculture,
high levels and

continuation of excess

program costs that continue at very

general disillusionment with farm programs

on the part

of the body politic.
I would like to divide my comments into three parts:
sion of the

changes in our economy that are

to agriculture,
for agriculture,
perspective for

(2)

a discussion of

and (3)
U.S.

economic conditions it

of particular significance

the implications of these changes

an outline of the main elements

agriculture that
faces.

(1) a discus

is consistent with

At the end I will

of a policy
the changed

have some concluding

statements.

2 See Schuh,
G. Edward, "The Costs of PIK," Department of Agricultural
and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, May 1983.
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Changes in Our Economy
The U.S.
ates,

economy,

and the international context in which it oper

have undergone dramatic changes in the last twenty to twenty-five

years.

Some of

these changes are of very great

agriculture and agricultural

commodity policies.

significance for U.S.
It is

those changes

that I would like to discuss in this section.
Increased Dependence on Trade
The growth

in agricultural trade over

well recognized.

There are a number

the decade of the

1970s is

of ways this increased dependence

on trade can be measured, but my colleague Luther Tweeten recently chose
to measure it

by estimating the share of total

products that is attributed to exports. 3

demand for agricultural

The estimates he developed are

as follows:
1971/72

13.2

1977 /78

23.1

1972/73

17.9

1978/79

22.9

1973/74

22.3

1979/80

27.4

1974/75

21.7

l980/81

26.0

1975/76

22.6

1981/82

22.5

1976/77

21. 7

What we have had is more than

a doubling in the dependence on for

eign trade as a source of markets for U.S. agriculture from 1971 through
1980.

It

is important in

understanding this increased

dependence on

trade to note that this change was not unique to agriculture.
omy as a whole became increasingly dependent on trade,

The econ

and by about the

3 Tweeten, Luther, "Excess Farm Supply:
Permanent or Transitory?", paper
presented at National Agricultural Policy Symposium, March 28, 1983,
Kansas City, Missouri.
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same margin.

Hence, the economic forces affecting agriculture were also

affecting the

rest of the economy.

That means that

that growth in agricultural trade we

in understanding

should leave aside episodic events

such as the difficulties of the Peruvian fish industry, the weather, and
the change

in Soviet

policy,

and search

for more

basic,

underlying

changes in economic conditions.
We also need to recognize that
economy,

this increased openness of the U.S.

or increased dependence on trade,

influence the

economy with strictly

policies are designed so

makes it more difficult to

domestic policies.

as to take account of changes

Unless these
in the interna-

Unfortunately,

tional economy, they can well be counterproductive.

we

don't seem to have learned that very important lesson.
Emergence of~ Well-Integrated International Capital Market
The emergence of a well-integrated international capital market may
be one
This

of the

most significant

capital market

together in

now

ways and to

developments of

links the

national

an extent that are

their linkage through international trade.

these past

economies
every bit as

20 years.

of the

world

important as

Moreover, it links the eco-

nomic policies of individual countries together in ways that are equally
as important.
It is worth recalling that at the

end of World War II there virtu-

ally was no such thing as an international capital market.
fers of capital

among countries as there

ment-to-government

basis and

we called

Such trans-

were took place on
it foreign

1960s, however, there emerged a Eurodollar market.

aid.

a govern

During

the

This market expanded

into a Eurocurrency market, and eventually expanded so as to effectively
link most of the countries of the world.

The value of loans extended in
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this market is now huge, and centrally-planned as well as less-developed
market economies use it.

At the same

time,

transfers of capital on a

government-to-government basis, or foreign aid, have paled into relative
insignificance as a share of the

total transfers of capital among coun

tries.
The inability of Poland, Mexico,

and Brazil to meet their interna

tional debt obligations this past year has made us suddenly aware of the
existence of this capital market.
market may pose

some very real threats

credit institutions.
to

which a

emerged,

link

It has

also made us aware that this

to our own capital

Less seldom, however,

between commodity

or the extent to which

markets and

do we recognize the extent

markets

and

capital markets

has

this capital market provides an impor

tant link between monetary policy and commodity markets.

I will discuss

these additional linkages below.
The Shift to Floating Exchange Rates
At a meeting of international monetary authorities in Bretton Woods
in 1944,

participating countries agreed to

establish a system of fixed

currency exchange rates at the end of World War II.

The motivation for

establishing such a system was a general belief that beggar-thy-neighbor
competitive devaluations

during the 1930s

had greatly

exacerbated the

Great Depression of that decade and spread it on an international scale.
It was believed that adherence to a system of fixed exchange rates would
keep individual

countries from

attempting to

problems abroad

by devaluations of their

dump their

unemployment

currencies and force

them to

make changes in their domestic policies instead.
This fixed exchange rate system served
of the world reasonably well for

both the U.S.

almost 30 years.

and the rest

However,

President
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Nixon devalued the U.S.
solve our

chronic balance

dollar in 1971,

and when that

of payments problem,

didn't seem to

he devalued

again in

1973, closed the gold window, and forced the world to a system of float
ing exchange rates.
This shift in exchange rate regimes
possibly as significant,
markets.

as the

was almost as significant,

or

emergence of the international capital

Looking back to that period, it is amazing how little politi-

cal debate took place as to whether

or not we should change the system.

Similarly, it is amazing how little recognition there is of the signifi
cance of that change in the economic

system,

or of its significance to

agriculture and agricultural commodity programs.
of flexible exchange rates had
commodity programs.

The change to a system

very important implications for domestic

We have not yet fully appreciated the significance

of this development for agriculture.
The Shift to Highly Unstable Monetary Policy
During the

1950s and

the 1960s the

relatively stable monetary policies.

United States

benefited from

Inflation was relatively low, and

there were not many major shifts in monetary policy.
Starting in about 1968, this felicitous circumstance changed.
monetary authorities embarked on zig-zag,
that appear to be still with us

today.

stop-and-go monetary policies
We alternately go from periods

of extreme monetary ease to periods of extreme monetary tightness.
has imposed enormous monetary disturbances
turbances or

shocks have imposed

share of the instability agriculture
ing period.

on the economy.

important shocks on

sector, and as I will argue below,

U.S.

This

These dis-

the agricultural

have been the source of an important
has experienced over the interven
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Implications of the Changes
in the Economy for Agriculture
The changes in

the economy discussed in the

previous section have

very important implications for agriculture and for agricultural policy.
Let me now discuss these implications.
Increased Elasticity of Demand
An import&nt part of the intellectual baggage most economists carry

around with them

regarding U.S.

agriculture is that

the elasticity of

demand for the output of this sector

is quite low.

be true both for changes in price of

the prod~ct and for changes in per

capita income.

In other words,

This is assumed to

it is generally believed that changing

the price of an agricultural product.will have very little effect on the
quantity demanded, nor will changes in per capita income.
When exports of U.S.
these assumptions

agricultural

products were relatively small,

of low responsiveness of

and income were correct and valid.

demand to changes

in price

All the evidence we have is that the

price and income elasticity of demand

for most agricultural products is

quite low, on the order of .1 or .2 in absolute terms .

This is because

in the absence of trade there are few close substitutes for agricultural
products.

Moreover,

with per capita income levels as high as they are

in the U.S., there is very little response to changes in income.
However,

the increased dependency of U.S.

agriculture on interna

tional trade has significantly changed these conditions of demand.
change in

the conditions of

demand is

of very grea t

This

significance for

U.S. commodity policy.
With increased dependence on trade, the total demand for U.S. agri-
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culture is a combination of the
The

presumption is

income elastic.

that the

domestic demand and the foreign demand.
foreign

demand is

relatively price

and

If trade becomes important, then it is likely that the

average elasticity will be greater than it

is under the conditions of a

closed economy.
wby is

there a presumption that

demand will be relatively high?

the elasticity of

In part it is because most importers of

agricultural products are only marginal importers.
an important exception.

However,

when

a close substitute

relative prices

Japan, of course, is

most countries import

proportion of their total food consumption.
tries have

these

only a small

That means that these coun-

for imports readily

change,

foreign import

countries

available.

can easily

Hence,

substitute

domestic production for imports.
Similarly,

individual

countries can obtain their

from alternative sources,

as the Soviet Union

Again,

of

this availability

responsiveness or elasticity

alternative

import supplies

has amply demonstrated.

supplies causes

of demand for the exports

the

price

of a particular

country to be relatively high.
Given the growth
foreign

in dependence on trade,

import demand

for U.S.

slightly greater than -3.0
greater than -1.0.

If

the

agricultural

price elasticity of

output has

for the total demand for U.S.

we export as much as half

to be

only

output to be

of our total produc-

tion, as we typically do · in the case of soybeans and wheat, for example,
then the foreign elasticity of import demand

for our output only has to

be slightly greater than -2.0 for the elasticity of total demand for our
output to be greater than -1.0.
The important point about this issue

is that if the price elastic-
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ity of demand for the total output
the basis of our price policy
cumstances,

a

decline in

income to producers,

of our product is greater than -1.0,

significantly changes.

our price will

not decrease it,

Under these cir-

actually increase

as

the total

is conventionally believed.

The point is that a one percent decline in the price of our product will
increase the

quantity sold

by more than

one percent.

Hence,

total

income will increase.
This important aspect
been largely ignored
need to

of our becoming more dependent

by both policymakers and farm

recognize the

changed conditions.

groups.

Whereas

in the

increase in price actually increased total farm income,
a less than
Hence,
price

proportional decline in sales,

for most

today the

to a

rather than an increase.

reduction

in total

We sorely
past,

an

since there was
reverse is true .

of our commodities that are exported,

actually leads

on trade has

an increase in

income to

agriculture

Unless the government stands ready to acquire

the supplies that are not sold

when prices rise,

farmers actually lose

income in the aggregate.
Similar arguments
demand.

apply with respect

to the income

elasticity of

A larger and larger share of our foreign demand comes from the

low-income less developed countries.

For

elasticity of demand for agricultural

o·u-t put is relatively high.

this is

combined with

these countries,

the domestic component

of demand,

the income
When

the average

income elasticity of demand becomes significantly higher.
Unfortunately,

there

is little recognition

of how

our increased

dependence on trade has increased the price and income responsiveness of
demand for our agricultural output .

Instead, we still tend to think of

this price responsiveness as being quite

low .

This causes us to press
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for higher prices,

when in fact we

should be pressing for lower prices

if we want to increase total income.
Adjustment in the International Economy
Changes in the value of the U.S. dollar in foreign exchange markets
bring about important adjustments in the international economy.
to recognize

these adjustments has

caused our domestic

Failure

commodity pro

grams to be contrary to the best interests of our farmers and the nation
I can best illustrate

as a whole.

that by referring to the experience

of the past two years.
Over that period,

the value of

the order of 25 percent,

the U.S.

depending on

dollar rose something on

how the increase is measured and

the exact period chosen as a basis.

During that same period, the infla

tion-corrected

value

rate

exports--corn,

wheat,

of the

loan

countries that import from us,

trade-weighted basis.

three of

our

principal

and soybeans--remained approximately constant in

terms of our domestic currency.

by approximately the 25

for

However, in terms of the currencies of
the

value of those loan rates increased

percent that the value of the

dollar rose on a

Hence, even though there was virtually no change

in that domestic price as determined by our domestic commodity programs,
there was

a significant increase

in these

prices as perceived

by the

importing countries and other exporting countries.
There are two important consequences of this rise in price .
it choked off the quantity demanded of
tant reason why

the exports of our agricultural

so significantly over the last three
a projected

our exports.

$34 billion in the

First,

This is an impor-

products have declined

years--from $43 billion in 1980 to

current marketing year.

Longmire and

Morey 4 of the USDA's Economic Research Service estimate that the rise in

67

the value of the dollar alone in 1981

and 1982 reduced the value of our

agricultural exports by $3 billion dollars and 16 million tons,
lion of which was corn.

10 mil-

These numbers indicate the extent to which the

foreign demand for our agricultural output

is responsive to price.

also indicates the relative

role of changes in the value

in explaining

our exports and

the slump in

It

of the dollar

the decline in

U.S.

farm

income.
The problem is
prices of

that the story does

these commodities in terms

not stop there.

of the currencies of

The

rise in

other coun

tries is a strong stimulus to increased output in other countries.
increase in supplies in

other parts of the world at

This

the same time that

the quantity demanded of our exports has declined has been a significant
cause of our decline in market share.
of the

European Community's use of

It is in addition to the effects
export subsidies and

effects of the embargo on sales to the Soviet Union.

the lingering

In fact, it may be

the most important effect of the three.
The important thing to recognize is that this kind of an adjustment
is

precisely what

rates.

should happen

with

a system

of floating

exchange

When the value of the dollar rises in foreign exchange markets,

our share of total trade should decline,

other things being equal,

the share of other traders should rise .

Similarly,

decline,

the exports of other countries

other things being equal,

and

and

our exports should

should increase .
It is

for this reason

that it is

so counterproductive for

us to

4 Longmire,
Jim, and Art Morey, "Exchange Rates,
U.S. Agricultural
Exports Prices and U.S . Farm Program Stocks," Economic Research Servi
ces, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. , November 1982.

68

berate the

Canadians and Australians

and other exporters

because they

don't reduce their agricultural output at the same time we do.

In fact,

we must appear rather foolish to them, for the very price signals we are
sending to

the international economy are

strong incentive for

increase the output of their export commodities.

them to

At the same time,

if

it were not for our commodity programs, we would be giving even stronger
signals to our own producers to reduce their output.
the way

international adjustments should

That is precisely

take place under

our present

instituted arrangements.
Current Commodity Programs~ Counterproductive
Our domestic

commodity programs

were designed

for the

most part

back in the 1930s when trade was relatively unimportant to U.S . agriculture.

They were refined in the

essentially adapted for

immediate post-World War II period and

conditions in which trade

unimportant and in which the international

was still relatively

economy operated with a sys

tem of fixed exchange rates. 5
As trade became important in the 1970s, the programs underwent sig
nificant change

with both the

more suitable to an open,

1973 and

1977 legislation to

trading economy.

make them

More flexibility in prices

was established to enable us to remain competitive over a wider range of
conditions, and a reserve program was established,
tem of

deficiency payments,

prices and

farm incomes

to

together with a sys

even out fluctuations

in what was

obviously expected

in agricultural
to be

a more

unstable economic environment.

5 Even
in that earlier period our
effects for agriculture.

commodity

programs had

pernicious
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These programs are still counterproductive, however.
are encouraging production
domestic and

at levels that can no longer

foreign markets

floor established by

at prevailing

our loan rates is providing

an umbrella for producers

result that they can come in and
ket.

be absorbed by

price levels.

The price

strong incentives for

producers in other countries to increase their output .
rates provide

Target prices

Those same loan

in other countries,

with the

undersell us while we support the mar

Unfortunately, if we were to set out to design a system that would

cause us to lose market share, we would be hard pressed to design a better one.

Then

we lose credibility on the international

lecture others to do something different

scene when we

than the very price signals we

are sending out suggest they should be doing .
To summarize, in a world of flexible exchange rates with wide fluc
tuations in the value of the
longer serve us well.
both to

rate.

our current commodity programs no

In fact, they are demonstrably counterproductive

farmers and to

caused the Treasury

dollar,

the nation as

a whole.

costs of the programs

Unmarketable supplies

are

thrust

Moreover,

they have

to increase at a

very rapid

into government

controlled

stocks at the very time that deficiency payments remain quite high.
The Budget Deficit and Agriculture
Agriculture did well during the 1970s when the dollar was weak .
has fared poorly in

the 1980s when the dollar has

been strong.

It

Given

that agriculture is an export sector, this was to be expected.
In attempting to understand what has happened to agriculture, it is
important to

understand what has caused

value of the dollar.
performance both in

this very great change

in the

It is true that other factors affected our export
the 1970s and in

the early 1980s.

What

have not
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received sufficient attention

in my judgement,

large changes in the value of the dollar.

however,

Hence,

are the very

I choose to focus on

this issue.
Two important factors have affected the value of the dollar in both
our energy

periods:

policy and our monetary and

combination of OPEC-induced
and our own failure
the domestic

increases in petroleum prices

to let those price increases be

economy caused

significantly.

fiscal policy.

our import bill

The

in the 1970s

fully reflected to

for petroleum

to burgeon

In effect, we were subsidizing the importation of petro

leum at the very time the
large increase in

cartel was unilaterally raising prices.

our petroleum import bill

The

contributed importantly to

the weakness of the dollar in the latter half of the 1970s.
At the
economy,
it.

same time,

inflation

and there seemed to be

was out

of control in

the domestic

little commitment to do anything about

This further contributed to a weak dollar--a weak dollar which sig

nificantly benefitted agriculture as an export sector.
As we moved into the 1980s, both of these policies changed.
dent Reagan deregulated the domestic petroleum industry,
ing the implicit subsidy on
on the OPEC,
petroleum.

and

imports,

Presi

thereby remov

putting more competitive pressure

eventually contributing to a decline in

the price of

The result has been a very significant decline in our petro

leum import bill,

an important factor contributing to

the strength of

the U.S. dollar in the 1980s.
At the same time,

the Federal

Reserve has taken significant steps

to bring inflation under control at the
cits have

run out of control.

purposes stopped monetizing

same time that our budget defi-

The Federal Reserve for

the budget deficits.

The

all practical
result has been
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very high interest rates.
As long as we continue to incur

large budget deficits and the Fed

eral Reserve does not monetize the corresponding debt,
have a strong dollar.
rise by

In effect, the real interest rate is permitted to

a sufficient amount to

the debt.

generate the savings needed

With a well-integrated

savings come from abroad
inflow of

we are likely to

international capital market,

as well as from domestic sources.

savings and capital

to finance

from abroad

these

It is the

that helps keep

the dollar

strong.
My point is not to argue that
easier monetary
deficits.
ally to
extent to

policy and

the Federal Reserve should pursue an

monetize the debt

generated by

our budget

That would surely lead to rampant inflation again and eventu
another boom
which the

and bust cycle.
problems of

My point

U.S.

agriculture

is to

emphasize the

are rooted

in our

rather than in the agricultural

domestic monetary and fiscal policies,
sector alone.

Monetary Disturbances to Commodity Markets
After two decades
the 1950s and 1960s,

of relatively stable agricultural
these prices

the 1970s and into the early 1980s.
for this increased instability,
that generally tends

prices during

suddenly became very unstable during
There are a number of explanations

but J would

like to focus again on one

to be neglected--the impact of

our unstable mone

tary policy.
As noted above, U.S. monetary policy during the 1950s and the 1960s
was relatively stable.
economic system
policy had little

Moreover,

was such that

during that period the nature of our

such changes

effect on agriculture.

as there were
In

effect,

in monetary

monetary policy
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could be

whatever it wanted

to be during

that period and

there would

have been little impact on agriculture or on commodity markets.
Both of
became a

these conditions changed

great deal more unstable.

changed so

that agriculture

in the 1970s.

And the structure of

suddenly became

bears an important share of the

Monetary policy

one of

the economy

the sectors

that

adjustments to changes in monetary pol

icy.
The

key factors

international

here are

capital market

exchange rates.

the emergence
and the

shift

Under these conditions,

which compete with
monetary policy.
the economy by

of that
to a

well-integrated

system of

export sectors

imports bear the burden of adjustment

flexible

and sectors
to changes in

For example, if the Federal Reserve tries to slow down
slowing down the growth in the

result is an increase in interest

monetary agregates,

rates in the domestic economy.

the
This

increase in interest rates attracts an inflow of capital (or a reduction
in the outflow),

which in turn bids up

eign exchange markets.
our exports,

The rise in the

while at the

the value of the dollar in forvalue of the dollar chokes off

same time causing imports

lower price in terms of the domestic currency.
ing down

of both the export

to come in

at a

The result is a dampen-

sectors and the import

competing sectors.

The Federal Reserve accomplishes what it sets out to do,

but the burden

of the

competing sec

tors.

adjustment is forced onto

the export and import

An important point to note here is that the problems of the auto

mobile and textile

industries are cut in

part from the same

fabric as

the problems of agriculture.
When the Federal Reserve decides to

pursue an easier monetary pol-

icy so as to stimulate the economy, exactly the reverse occurs.

Inter-
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est rates

decline,

declines),

capital

the value

flows out

of the

of the dollar declines,

country (or
our

the inflow

exports become more

competitive in international markets and imports become expensive.

The

result is an expansion of the export sectors, including agriculture, and
an expansion of the import-competing sectors of the economy.
major share of the burden of adjustment

Again,

a

is forced onto these sectors of

the economy.
The important point
economy came about

is that these changes in the

precisely at the same time that

became a great deal more unstable.

structure of our

our monetary policy

Hence, a great deal of the instabil

ity of agriculture over the last decade has been due to monetary distur
bances,
ture,

not changes in the weather
as

an export sector,

as is commonly believed.

has been

monetary policy at the very time that

victimized by a

Agricul

highly erratic

it became one of the sectors that

bore the adjustment to changes in monetary policy.
~

Policy Perspective for the Future

A policy for agriculture must take
economy and in

the way we relate to the

into account the changes in our
international economy.

the extent to which our economy has become internationalized,

solutions

to many of our problems must be sought in the international arena.
will not

likely be found

in policies

designed only with

Given

They

the domestic

economy in mind, to the neglect of the international economy.
Commodity Programs
Commodity programs as

we have conventionally understood

probably outlived their usefulness.
they can probably

Given

them have

the changes in our economy,

bring about more stable prices and

farm incomes only
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at the expense of very high

budget costs.

monetary events continue as they have
grams

are

demonstrably

adjustments that

Moreover,

over the past decade,

counterproductive.

a regime

if international

of flexible

They

preclude

exchange rates

these prothe

very

is designed

to

bring about.
We should also recognize that economic development and deregulation
of the U.S.
grams.

economy has reduced a great

deal of the need for such pro-

We now have well-integrated domestic capital markets, plus com-

modity markets that are also
in both of these
the past.

sonably freely.
credit markets

improvements

and capital

available to them in

in communication and transportation

that information and stocks and resources

can flow rea-

The progressive deregulation of both the commodity and
enable these markets

adjustment to changing
the past.

Farmers can participate

markets in a variety of ways not

Moreover,

have been such

quite efficient.

to bear a

great deal more

demand and supply conditions than

Farmers can forward price, contract,
markets much more

extensively than

And an efficient capital market is

of the

they could in

and make use of credit
they did in

the past.

available to enable private specula

tors to help carry stocks and even out fluctuations in commodity prices.
I would make three caveats to my
the elimination

of domestic

suggestion that we take as a goal

commodity programs

as we

First, the programs do need to be phased out gradually,
programs as

that for

dairy.

That

resources into the dairy sector.
adjustment policies,

are

program has

now know

them.

especially such

induced far

too many

A period of adjustment, plus positive

needed to help bring the

sector into adjust

ment.
Second,

a

case can probably

be made

for a production

or income
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insurance program

for small producers,

internal growth.

Such producers

especially those

will probably

embarking on

find it

difficult to

access credit and capital markets in

the same way that larger producers

can.

available to keep them

some means should be

Hence,

wiped out
lurch.

when natural disasters

strike or

from being

the market makes

a sudden

Such programs should be cost shared, however, along the lines of

the present

all-risk crop insurance

program.

should be kept modest so that resources

Moreover,

the subsidy

are not induced into areas that

would not otherwise be in production, or so as to keep producers in pro
duction who would not otherwise be able· to survive.
Third,

one could probably make a case for a modest loan program at
The purpose of such a program should be to cir-

relatively low levels.

cumvent periods of very tight credit that might coincide with the plantThe biological constraints of

ing season or the marketing of the crop.
agriculture are what

ultimately give such a program

A period of tight money that coincides

with the planting season may not

just delay a crop for a period of months,
sector.

marketing season,

as would occur in the nonfarm

of production for a year.

It may well cause a loss

applies to the

some social value.

when the inability to

time may force a crop onto the market,

The same

borrow at that

causing prices to decline,

only

to rise at a later date.
The loan levels for such a program

should be kept modest so as not

The interest

rates should be subsidized only

to interfere with trade.

in periods of extreme monetary tightness.
Science and Technology Policy
Science and

technology policy

seriously rethought.

for U.S.

agriculture needs

to be

It may now be the key to our remaining competitive
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advantage in

international markets.

And it may

now be

an important

source of income gains for U.S. farmers.
With the exception of the dairy sector,
efits of

technical change

passed on to

in U.S.

the consumer.

a major share of the ben

agriculture in

With international

the past

has been

trade being relatively

unimportant, increases in productivity led to lower prices, and the con
sumer has been the major beneficiary.
With

increased dependence

larger share of the
past.

on trade,

producers stand

benefits of technical change than they

to reap

a

have in the

As the demand for our agricultural output becomes relatively more

elastic,

productivity-induced

increases in output

expansion of sales compared to the decline in price.

lead to

a relative

The producer ben-

efits.
When viewed in this context,

farmers should be paying for a larger

share of the costs of science and technology.
widely used

provides a

convenient means

contributions to such programs and
tions.
interest
1960s.

In addition, however,
in agricultural

of assembling

the producers'

channeling them to research institu-

the Federal government now has a greater

research than

it

had during

the 1950s

and

Maintaining a highly productive agriculture is the key to main-

taining a strong export performance.
in

The check-off system now

the national

interest.

stronger commitment

Hence,

on the part of

tural science and technology.

And a strong export performance is
in the

future we

should have

the Federal government

a

to agricul-

In fact, such a program should become an

important part of our export promotion drive.
Fiscal Policy
The large budget deficits we are

now incurring,

and that are pre-
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dieted to continue into the foreseeable future, are doing serious damage
to agriculture

and are

an important

cause of

These deficits have caused interest rates

current farm

problems.

to be higher than they other-

wise would be.

This

turn has choked

off our exports and translated

has caused the dollar to be

strong,

and that in

international prices of

agricultural commodities into the domestic economy at low levels.
Unfortunately, we have forced the Federal Reserve to bear the brunt
of the battle against inflation.
experience has

demonstrated.

It can
But it

do it,

does it

of course,

as recent

at the expense

of real

interest rates that are unprecedentedly high by historical standards.
more balanced budget would cause interest
decline would come a
agricultural,

rates to decline.

decline in the value of the

dollar,

textiles and automobile industries.

probably nothing

more important to

With that
and help our

In fact,

helping these important

A

there is
sectors of

our economy than to get our budget more nearly in balance.
Monetary Policy
An easing

of monetary

policy would

But that should be done only as

undoubtedly aid

agriculture.

the budget is brought into balance,

or

we will be back on another inflationary spree.
However, there is at least one aspect of monetary policy that could
be changed with considerable benefit to
this policy into a more stable mode.

agriculture.

That is to shift

The stop-and-go monetary policies

of the last fifteen years have imposed large monetary shocks on agriculA great deal of agriculture's

ture.

tary policy were more stable.
ods

of feast

years.

and famine

that

problems would disappear if mone-

We would not have these alternating peri
have characterized

Asset values would not be bid

these last

fifteen

up during periods of easy money,
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only to

be wrenched downward when

a policy of monetary

tightness fol-

lowed.

And farmers would be able to plan more effectively,

and there-

fore to make more efficient use of their resources.
Reforming International Institutions
The monetary and

trade institutions which serve

the international

economy were largely created at the end of World War II.

Those institu

tions served both the U.S. and the international economy reasonably well
for a while.

But many of them have

broken down with the crush of eco-

nomic forces, or have grown largely irrelevant.
international institutions

were never

In some cases, adequate

in place

and still

need to

be

established.
In terms

of furthering the

interests of agriculture,

attention. 6 The first is the need

need to receive serious and immediate
to establish an

International Central Bank.

For all

intents and pur-

poses the U.S. now serves as central banker for the world.
essentially on a dollar standard.

two issues

Hence, what the U.S.

The world is
does about its

monetary policy is of central importance to the world economy.
Although the U.S.
the world,

reaps certain gains from being central banker to

it does so only at

selected sectors of the economy.
to overvalue
world.

An

its currency

the expense of imposing certain costs on
These costs arise because the U.S. has

if it is

to be the

over-valued currency is an

central banker

implicit tax on

for the

export sectors

6
For more detail on this set of issues, see Schuh, G. Edward, "Towards
Reform of Our International Monetary and Trade Institutions," presented
at Invited Seminar Series, "Current Issues In and Approaches to Interna
tional Development," International School for Economic Development Stud
ies, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, December 3,
1982.
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such

as agriculture.

discriminates against

It

is also

an

implicit

import-competing sectors

import subsidy

such as

that

the automobile

and steel industries.
The main elements of an International
converting
(SDRs)

international dollar

and giving

Central Bank could be had by

reserves into

Special Drawing

the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

keep the stock of these SDRs growing at a constant rate.
full central bank as we understand it,

a mandate to
Although not a

the IMF would have the principal

mandates of an international central bank.
Reserve Bank would

Rights

then be left with the

Moreover, the U.S.

Federal

essentially technical problem

of adjusting to conditions in international monetary markets.
I believe the creation of such
reduce or

even eliminate a

have experienced

an International Central Bank would

great deal

these past 15 years.

of the monetary

instability we

It would also remove

the onus

from us of having to overvalue our currency in foreign exchange markets.
And this would benefit agriculture (as

well as the automobile industry)

in a very significant way.
The second
level is the need
(GATT).

issue needing

serious attention

to reform the General Agreement on

Here, a number of things are important.

cultural products

was largely

when it was originally created.
discuss domestic
sessions,

at the

excluded from the
That,

Trade and Tariffs

First, trade in agribenefits of

the GATT

combined with the reluctance to

commodity programs in later

has kept agriculture from

international

multilaterial negotiating

benefitting from the general trade

liberalization that has occurred during the post-World War II period.
The second thing to change in the GATT is to broaden its membership
base.

The GATT was created in large part to serve the interests of the
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industrialized countries of the

West.

The centrally-planned economies

and the less-developed countries were not
the beginning.
years,

the

signatory to the agreement in

Although membership in the Agreement has grown over the

centrally planned

largely outside the

and less

developed countries

reach of its provisions.

those countries that

Yet it

our agricultural trade has

international institution which

is precisly with

expanded.

we have so carefully

are still

Hence,

an

nurtured over the

years is less and less effective in protecting us from trade distortions
and interventions.
Now is not a particularly good time to renegotiate the GATT.

How

ever, as the world economy recovers, we should make a serious attempt to
renegotiate the
its place.

GATT or to establish

High

a comparable new

priority should be given to

these negotiations,

organization in

including agriculture in

to including as many countries as possible,

establishing rules for

distortions in foreign exchange

and to

markets as well

as in trade markets.
Adjustment Policies
Adjustment policies are
term,

there is

important for two reasons.

the need to bring agriculture into

current market opportunities.

This applies not

In the short

adjustment with its

only to dairy,

export commodities such as wheat, corn and cotton as well .
lar remains strong,
the short run,

and

there is little reason to expect

but to

If the dolit not to in

resources need to be adjusted out of agriculture if pro

duction is to be brought into balance with demand.
The other kind of adjustment is
conditions in domestic

that needed to respond to changing

and international markets over

If prices are permitted to flex both

the longer pull.

in the domestic market and abroad,
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these kinds of adjustments should

come about relatively easily,

unless

we should continue to have large monetary disturbances.
In addressing the

adjustment problem it is important

under current conditions
than it was in

it should be easier for

the past.

In the first place,

agriculture to adjust
some

63 percent of the

income of farm families now comes from off-farm sources.
the extent

to which

employment.

agriculture has

become an

to note that

That indicates

industry of

part-time

It also indicates the extent to which economic activity in

the U.S. has become decentralized.
In any

case,

the agricultural labor

grated into the nonfarm labor market.
labor should
Moreover,

not be

the

as difficult

force is already

well inte

Making additional adjustments of

as it

was in

agricultural labor force as

force is much smaller than it once was.

the 1950s

a share of the

and 1960s.
total labor

That in itself should make the

adjustment easier.
Similarly,
from the nonfarm

agriculture is much more

dependent on inputs purchased

sector than it once was.

the use of these inputs changes accordingly.

As

relative prices change,

To the extent these inputs

are important sources of output, as in the case of fertilizer, a decline
in commodity

prices which causes a

decline in fertilizer

usage brings

about a corresponding adjustment in output.
In dealing

with the short-term

cient solution may be by means of
gram.

Incentives for

adjustment problem the

most effi

something like the old Soil Bank pro-

participating should be designed

to remove from

production that land that is subject to greatest wind and water erosion.
Such an approach will enable the program to attain both resource adjust
ment and soil and water conservation objectives.
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Concluding Comments
I have sketched out a rather unconventional policy agenda.
tically,

I suggest that we move away from commodity programs as quickly

as we can deal with the corresponding adjustment problems.
time we need to reduce our budget
ble

Domes

monetary policy

so we

macroeconomic policies.

no

At the same

deficits and work towards a more sta
longer victimize

agriculture with

our

On the international scene, we need to work for

an International Central Bank so we no longer need to overvalue our cur
rency, and for a reform of the GATT so as · to have a more efficient appa
ratus for dealing with trade conflicts and trade problems.
Our economy has changed dramatically over
changes have

altered in

agricultural policy.
up with

unhappy

dramatic way

we are

farmers,

doomed to have commodity
and a body politic

disenchanted with farmers and farm programs.
with the times!
I thank you.

the context

The

of U.S.

If we don't change our perspectives so as to keep

these changes,

don't work,

an equally

the past 20 years.

programs that

that is increasingly

It behooves us to catch up

POLITICAL REALITIES AFFECTING AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION
Herman E. Talmadge*
I always enjoy
look like

farmers,

speaking to all of
farmers.

speaking to a group
but you are

of farmers.

Not many

involved in agriculture,

those who are involved in agriculture

and

of you
I enjoy

as well as to

Of all of the things that I have ever done in my life, I think

I have gotten

the most genuine soul-satisfying pleasure

and have made

the least money at

it of anything I

think there is something about farming that
are dealing with nature.

out of farming

ever undertook.

appeals to all of us.

You can have too many bugs,

a new weevil,

new pestilence of some sort, and lose the result of a year's labor.
can have a failure
labor .

in the market price and lose the

You
a
You

result of a year's

You can have a perishable commodity that's ready to harvest and

you can't get into

the field because of weather or

at the time and you lose the results

you can't get labor

of a year's labor.

more hazardous than anything I know this
Nevada.

I

But in dealing with agriculture,

So farming is

side of shooting dice in Reno,
you are dealing with nature.

And in dealing with nature, you are dealing with God.
I've read a good deal of history
rise and decline

in my life.

I've read about the

of many countries and many governments,

one thing that has always been perfectly obvious to me.
have been the greatest bulwark and
any population

from the dawn of

but there is
The people who

have given strength and stability to
civilization to the present

been those who have tilled the soil.

time have

I think their closeness to nature

*Former U.S. Senator from Georgia and former Chairman of the Senate Com
mittee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
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is one reason, and then, too, they're well-balanced.
and they are capitalists.
in the dairy

farms,

They work seven days a week in the fields and

in the poultry houses,

their capital is the land,
of that nature.

They

They are laborers

their equipment,

and

everywhere else,

and

their livestock and things

have a good balance that many

other segments of

our population do not have.
I have lived a

good while.

I grew up during

the darkest days of

the depression in Telfair County on a farm near McRae, Georgia.

I have

seen whole families go barefooted 12 months in the year because they had
no shoes.

I've seen whole families

the only clothing they had.

wearing gunny sacks because that's

I've seen grown men beg with tears in their

eyes for a

job plowing a mule in the

50¢ a day.

I came through those days.

of my voice remember those days.
But the agricultural

hot sun about 14 hours

a day for

Many of you here under the sound

Some of you are too young to remember.

situation today is more critical than

at any time

that I have known since the darkest days of the depression.

Inasmuch as

Georgia and South Carolina are quite
cultural crops,
cally in

think that the situation is about

both states.

heels in debt.
present time,
they owe.

I

similar and produce the same agri

Most

of the farmers

the same economi-

in Georgia are

head over

If they were called upon to pay all of the bills at the
I doubt that their

assets could be liquidated

And that's a tragic situation.

for what

I wish I could give you the

remedy for it, but unfortunately, I can't.
When Dr.

Fleming invited me to come and speak to you this evening,

I couldn't turn him

down for a number of reasons.

turn down any invitation that had

First,

I couldn't

Strom Thurmond's name attached to it.

Second, I really wanted to come back to South Carolina for many reasons.

85

My mother

left here

to go

to Georgia.

I was

attracted to

Clemson

College.

I got to know many of your farm leaders during the period when

I served

on the Senate Agriculture

Committee,

years that I served as Chairman thereof.

specifically in

the 10

So I wanted to come back and

visit this great state .
You know that the Congress of the United States is composed of politicians.

Most politicians live and breathe 24 hours a day in the hope

of getting

re-elected.

They're

Re-election

politically motivated.

means more to them than anything on the face of the earth except a death
in their immediate families .
not too close,

And sometimes I think that if the family's

the family would be secondary.

Political pressure is

what motivates the Congress of the United States.
if somebody

offered a resolution in

You know,

the Congress of the

today to pass the Ten Commandments,

the

organize a

Is that good or bad?"

pressure campaign to pass

you'd probably have

ture Committee,

I haven't heard
You'd have to

the Ten Commandments.

substantial opposition to it,

environment in which we live today.

United States

majority of the members of the

Senate would say, "What is this Ten Commandment thing?
from any constituents about that?

I believe

And then

particularly in the

When I was Chairman of the Agricul

realizing that and realizing also that the agricultural

population in America today is something less than 3 percent, I tried to
design something like
fish.

We needed something that would

the people
would be

you do when you

who were

concerned.

an omnibus bill,

put traps in the

creek to catch

be attractive to all segments of

When we'd

we wouldn't dare

write farm

legislation it

let anything come

out on

tobacco alone, or cotton alone, or peanuts alone, or milk alone, or any
thing like that.

We got everything we could think of in agriculture and
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we put it

in the bill,

schools and food

and then

we'd add a nutrition

stamp bills and put

all that in one

program for the
mammoth package.

And then we'd have something that would fly and would be appealing.
we hadn't done that,

If

we couldn't have gotten a thing passed through the

Congress of the United States.
Despite the fact that farmers have such a minimal percentage of the
population,

agriculture is far and away

the United States.

In my own state for instance, we have about the same

percentage of farmers as the nation as

a whole,

of 3 percent plus or minus a little.
is substantially

the most important business in

the same.

Georgia accounts for about

But

something on the order

I would think that South Carolina

that 3

percent of the

60 percent of all the jobs

you think of agribusiness and agriculture together.
gia,

where you couldn't read one

if you got
for it,

agribusiness.

in the city are

in agriculture or

That's how important it is.

People who live in the cit-

That's the reason that you have to

everything that you can possibly think

agricultural bill passed through the Congress.
House of Representatives.

based on geography,

or three farmers,

and

gressional districts

in the

of to get an

That's particularly true

know the Senate
each state.

is represented

And every state in

I suppose little Rhode Island has two

so it is with the other

down to congressional districts,

residing in them.

You

two Senators from

the union has some farmers in it.

Geor-

your life looking

ies don't know anything about that.

in the

In Atlanta,

spent the rest of

percent of all the jobs

bait the trap with

in my state when

thing in the papers about agriculture

a magnifying glass and

30

population in

the

states.

When it boils

overwhelming majority of the con

United States don't

That's a political reality.

have a

single farmer
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Now let's look at some of these crops.
grow about the same crops.
the feedgrains wants to

Take

can get it.

cheap as he can

feedgrains.

The fellow who produces

get a good price for his

the fellow who uses the feed?
as cheap as he

Georgia and South Carolina

get it.

crop,

but what about

The poultry producer wants his feed just
The swine producer wants

So you've got a direct

his feed just as

conflict among your 3

percent of the population who are engaged in agriculture.
want high corn
let's go

prices,

down to the next

some dairy production in
have.

and some of

them want low corn

enterprise--dairying.

Some of them
prices.

Now I guess

every state in the Union.

In

Well
we have

fact I know we

But then it boils down again to a conflict between the South and

the Midwest.

Here in the South,

in South Carolina and in Georgia,

we

contribute little or nothing to the huge surplus inventory of cheese and
butter in the United

States at the present time.

Midwest contribute to that surplus,
the people in the dairy business.
small 3

percent of the

wheat producers.

One group against another within that

population.

Go down

a little further

some wheat in

virtually every

wheat production in

virtually every

Again, the farmers want a good price for the wheat.

Consumers want to buy bread as cheap

as they get it .

wheat just as cheap as they can get it.

The millers want

So there is a conflict.

It never ceased to amaze me when I was governor of the state,
if the

milk control

to the

Wheat is a big crop in some states, a minor crop in

But there is some

state in the union.

dairymen in the

we have a direct conflict among

I suppose we produce

state in the union.
other states.

so

But

board raised

the price

of milk

just one

that
cent a

quart, there would be screaming headlines in the Atlanta newspapers, and
you would think the

world was going to war.

But if

the price of Coca
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Cola or beer went

up,

or liquor went up,

or

the price of advertising

went up, or the cost of circulation of the newspaper went up,

they were

just as quiet as a church mouse .

Now, come

down a

little further

Southeast,

to soybeans,

the fastest

major agricultural export
cotts.

But that's the way it is.
the fastest

growing crop

growing crop in the United States,
crops,

until we started

in the

one of our

tampering with boy

And when we put the embargo on soybeans to Japan, what happened?

The Japanese

and the Germans

money in Brazil,

went down

and now Brazil is

tion and export of soybeans.

Any

to South America

and invested

our major competitor in the productime we tamper with these relations,

we sort of shoot ourselves in the foot.
The White House and the Secretary of Agriculture called me when the
Soviet Union
embargo on

invaded Afghanistan .

They were

the export of agricultural

commodities to the

and asked my advice and recommendation.
studied the history

of embargoes,

considering placing

an

Soviet Union

I told them that I had seen and

and I had never

without the gun powder to enforce the boycott.

seen one successful

When Napoleon controlled

the whole of Europe, his continental system failed .

The whole world has

been boycotting little Rhodesia for 25 or 30 years.

They are surrounded

by black countries in Africa.
little Rhodesia has survived.

They don't even have a seaport,

I said the Soviet Union now is the second

major producer of gold in the world .
virtually anything he wants.

I said, now, what would the Soviet

They would order grain to be shipped to Hong Kong or to Paris

or to Buenos Aires,
very large.

I said anyone who has gold can get

In Atlanta, Georgia, if you have gold, you

can get a man killed if you want to .
Union do?

and yet

or somewhere else,

and the oceans of the world are

They can transship it overseas.

But they didn't follow my
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advice, they put an embargo,
agricultural products
Afghanistan.
and we're

and we lost our exports of grain and other

to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets are

still in

We're still trying to pay bills that the embargo created,

still suffering from

it until this

good day .

So

much for

embargoes.
Now what about

tobacco.

You mention tobacco on the

floor of the

United States Senate today and you can almost get into a fist fight.
remember the

first time that

issue arose on

Ted Moss was a Senator from Utah,
don't smoke and don't drink,

Mormons

or at least they are not supposed to,

He conceived

electorate by abolishing

the Senate.

and Utah is a Mormon state.

I've known a lot of them that didn't.
for re-election.

the floor of

I

and

Anyway, Ted had a tough campaign

the idea of

the tobacco program.

appealing to

that Mormon

He offered

his bill to

abolish the tobacco program, and I took the lead in helping kill it, and
I think at that time he got 12 votes.
ever since,

But the battle has been going on

and they get stronger every year.

battle on the floor of the United
vote's increasing all the time.

They have to fight that

States Senate twice a year.

And the

They have a long list of people now who

are opposed to tobacco; they've got environmental groups involved in it,
and they write each other, and wire each other.
today is

the greatest problem

advise anyone to smoke.
not good for my health.

I do.

on the face

I wouldn't

It's expensive, nasty,

Doctors tell me that cigars are

They say cigarettes are worse.

ple are going to smoke whether we like
legislation in Prohibition.

of the earth.

I smoke cigars.

I know that.

not as bad as cigarettes .

You would think tobacco

it or not.

What happened?

But some peo-

We tried some moral

It was a failure, created

gang warfare, murders, and everything else, and people still drank boot-
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leg whiskey and a lot of them died from it.
from drinking whiskey,
as did when they

but not as

many die from drinking whiskey today

had the bootleg whiskey.

they never tell you about tobacco.

also

it provides a

provides about

$2

And here

is something else

The governments, local, state,

federal get about $11 billion a year
tion to that,

And a lot of them still die

year in

foreign

currency that

wouldn't get if we didn't have the tobacco program.
smokers?

Do you think they'd quit?

now saying, "don't smoke,

In addi-

in income from tobacco.

livelihood for 500,000 farm families.

billion a

quit.

we

No, we've got labels on cigarettes

it's dangerous to your health."

But people

It

Now, how about the

Every day or

so, some federal official comes out and says smoking will kill you,
God's sake

and

and if we

still smoke,

for

didn't produce

tobacco in South Carolina and Georgia, we'd be importing it from Turkey,
importing it from Brazil,
balance of payments
farm families?
support them.

or somewhere else,

deficit .

Then what would happen

They'd move to town, get on welfare,
That's the

and rougher every year.

There are about
in peanuts.

farmers who

What do we have there?

produce peanuts

We have about

10 Senators out

in seven

wish I could

We have a lit

or eight

states.

are seriously interested
of 100 who

So that's the mathematics.

it doesn't amount to very much.
ther.

I

but the tide gets rougher

25 Congressmen out of 435 who

interested in peanuts .

and you'd have to

So much for tobacco.

Now we get down to peanuts.
group of

it,

add to our

to these 500,000

battle we've had to fight.

tell you we're going to continue winning

tle

and it would

are seriously

In voting strength,

Then let's divide it a little bit fur-

The people up in North Carolina and Virginia war with South Caro

lina and Georgia and Florida about the difference between what they call
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a

baseball peanut

and the

geographic division.

peanuts we

So

we have

And then let's take it another step.

Mexico and Texas where they produce
division.

produce.

another

Out in New

the Spanish peanuts we have another

The peanut growers of the U.S.

alone are divided into three

warring factions.
Now that's what you have when you deal with farm legislation.

Not

only a woeful minority of the population, but divisions within that woeful minority.
straints,
to put a

And then confronting you

with the President of the

also are your

budgetary con-

United States now seriously trying

cap on federal spending.

When you roll all

of those things

into one, you've got virtually an impossible situation .

So that's what

farm people are confronted with in

passing legislation through the Con

gress of

when Congressmen and

the United States.

they don't think
whether it
country.

Now

about what is good

is good for

my state or

is it good

Their primary interest and

effect it will have on the next
farm organizations and
cally.

for the country.

Senators vote,
Not

even about

for the future

of the

their primary motive concerns the

election.

That means this:

the farm population must be

that the

very active politi

Get to know your Congressmen, get to know your Senators, so that

you can talk with them on a first
what you're talking about.

name basis,

And then when

and so that they'll know

you do that,

you'll be more

influential.
I grew up in

south Georgia at a time when

much greater in Georgia than it is now.
cent during my boyhood.

Now it

the farm population was

I suppose it approached 50 per-

declines every year.

Every economist

that I know of is always projecting a bright future for agriculture, and
I've been thinking

that all my life.

But that bright future

has not
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come to pass
expanding,

yet.

The population of

the world and of

and farm population is declining.

our country is

Still that bright future

has not arrived.
I do want to pay tribute

to American agriculture.

American agri-

culture feeds and clothes not only more than 200 million Americans,
hundreds and hundreds

of millions of people throughout

the world.

but
We

have saved innumerable countries and people of the world from starvation
time after

time.

Our agricultural

balance of payments.

exports contribute greatly

For the last 8-10

years we've had to

horrendous blackmail prices for imported petroleum.
American agriculture,
have been much

those deficits,

more horrendous.

the

to our

pay these

Had it not been for

balance of payments,

If American industry

one third as productive as American agriculture,

would

today were just

we wouldn't be worried

about German and Japanese automobiles and imports.

We'd be selling them

not only here, but we'd be selling them in Germany,

and we'd be selling

them in Japan, and we'd be selling them worldwide.
By its productivity American agriculture really has created some of
the problems that we face in our huge surpluses.

I don't know how we're

going to bring our farm production in line with demand.
do it

with some success

we're

down to

only

two

restriction on production .
are in difficulty and

with acreage
crops in

the

United

States that

we don't know what's going to

how important those crops are.

cannot.

but now
have

any

Both of them

happen.

You from

and tobacco for economic survival know
We might lose them.

I wish I could be more optimistic
but I

allotments and quotas,

These are tobacco and peanuts.

the areas that depend on peanuts

farm problems,

We've tried to

in bringing you an answer to our

I've given it to you

as plainly and as
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clearly as I know how.

And I'll be happy to try to answer any questions

that any of you may have.

RESOURCE POLICY IN THE FUTURE:
GLIMPSES OF THE 1985 FARM BILL
Sandra S. Batie*
If you glance through the program today, you may note that in a two
day meeting approximately thirty minutes
icy.
ago

are dedicated to resource pol

This is an improvement over a similar symposium held a few months
by the

University

of Missouri

devoted to resource policy issues.
cism of the planners
symbolic

of the

which did

not

States Department of Agriculture . .

sessions

I am not mentioning this as a criti

of these two conferences,

traditional place

have any

of

rather I

resource policy

mention it as
in the

United

For the most part, resource policies

have not been integrated into other agricultural policies.
Even the soil
the fact
tion.

conservation programs owe their birth

that they have supported
The initial

vehicle to
provided

goals in addition to

193Os legislation,

for example,

provide payments for reducing
increased employment

Later soil conservation

and growth to
soil conserva-

provided a legal

acreage devoted to

opportunities

in

a depressed

programs aided farmers in

crops and
economy.

improving yields and

provided financial incentives to remove surplus land from production.
The Farm

Bill of

1981 also

reflects the

resource policy into other agricultural policies.
policy legislation placed near the end

lack of

integration of

Not only is resource

of the act (separated from other

programs and policies), but also the legislation has, for the most part,
not been implemented.

Recently members of Congress have criticized the

*Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University.
Helpful comments on this paper were
given by Randall A. Kramer and Leonard A. Shabman.
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Reagan administration and

the USDA for failure to implement

ingful way the Special Areas Conservation

in a mean

Program and the Farmland Pro

tection Policy Act portions of the Farm Bill.
Perhaps

a

better

resource policy with

illustration

of the

lack

of

integration

other agricultural policies can be

of

drawn from the

recent experience with the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program.

The PIK pro-

gram has diverted 82 million acres from agricultural production.

Given

that USDA data indicate nearly 70 percent of the excess erosion (erosion
greater than 5

tons per acre)

occurs

on less than 8.6

percent of the

crop land (Ogg and Miller, 1981), it would have been possible to achieve
considerable (although short

term)

conservation if these

acres were also the highly eroding acres.
part of the

PIK program;

diverted PIK

"Targeted diversion" was not

nor were committees examining

the whole base

option farm bids allowed to select a higher bid for a contracted payment
on a higher eroding farm over a lower bid but lower eroding farm.
the opportunity

for obtaining soil conservation

at little or

Thus,

no addi

tional cost was lost.
A response

to explain this

failure to consider

soil conservation

goals in the design of the PIK program might be that PIK was enacted too
quickly to enable its designers
modifications.

to consider such conservation enhancing

This defense, however, only illustrates my point.

Part

of the hopes for the Soil and Water Resource Conservation ACT (RCA) when
it was enacted in 1977 were

that it would redesign various agricultural

programs so more conservation objectives could be achieved.

In December

1982--before the PIK program was announced and after millions of dollars
and five years

of effort--the final program report was

phase of the RCA process.

issued for this

Clearly, if the PIK program was not designed
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with cognizance of the soil erosion

implications,

the RCA had not been

successful in achieving program compatibility.
We

could

debate

resource policy with

for

some time

whether

failure

other agricultural policies is

to

integrate 1

inappropriate.

A

more interesting question for this symposium is whether or not this lack
of integration will
of the 1985

continue and be reflected in

Farm Bill.

that there are

My argument

in the remainder of

some fundamental changes occurring which

recognition of resource goals in the
cies,

structure and content

perhaps as early as 1985.

the paper is
may force more

design of other agricultural poli-

In order to develop this argument,

I

will first examine why resource policy has not in the past been included
in a meaningful way in other farm programs.
why I think there

I will then examine reasons

are changes in these past conditions.

This will be

followed by an examination of possible

changes in farm and other legis

lation at feneral and state levels as

a response to these changing con-

ditions.

My illustrations will be those of soil conservation and water

quality policies, and my focus will be mainly on USDA policies.
~

Resource Policy Has Not Been Integrated
Into Other Agricultural Policy
Resource policy, and particularly soil conservation and water qual

ity policies have not been well integrated into other agricultural policies for a variety of reasons:

the perceived lack of importance of the

1 As used throughout this paper,
"integration" does not refer to achiev
ing a synthesis of resource policy goals with other agricultural goals.
Rather, it refers to a situation where non-resource programs are either
constrained by natural resource management objectives or the design of
non-resource programs reflects a recognition of these objectives in a
meaningful manner.
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resource problems,

the lack of

potential payoff,

conflicts with other

program goals, the nature of the USDA mission, and the lack of data.
For most

of the

history of agricultural

maintaining farm income
serving soil.

policies,

were seen as meshing reasonably

Because crops

were in surplus,

reduce the number of acres devoted to crops.
erally meant less erosion.
erosion purchased

nearly as

much as could have

with income

ception that the two objectives

was deemed unimportant relative to

during

there was an excess

the

last

maintenance programs

urgency.

was not

conservation been

this does not negate the per-

not well met,

Even when

conservation of soil

other objectives.

of resources in farming

in this atmosphere,

decade

paid to

Fewer cropland acres gen-

were reasonably compatible.

the goals of soil conservation were

ceived as an issue of

well with con-

farmers were

been achieved had soil

the chief goal (Boggess and Heady, 1981),

overflowing silos;

goals of

While recent studies have concluded that the

amount of

of years,

the

For the majority
with resultant

soil conservation was not per-

Still,

suggested that

program evaluations undertaken
more

conservation

could

be

achieved with the use of cost effective methods, with substantial reduc
tion of production enhancing practices and reallocation of funds between
states and
1977).

between counties within

states (U.S.

Political opposition to instituting

stantial, however.

Comptroller General,

such changes has been sub-

And, it has come in part from the conservation com-

munity such as the National Association of Conservation Districts (NACD)
as well as some program managers within USDA.
The reasons

for such opposition

soil conservation programs,

are reasonably clear.

The past

while a relatively inefficient and ineffec

tive method of reducing erosion,

were politically popular because they,
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for the most part,

lowered farmers' operating costs.

Even though less

than 19 percent of the soil conservation practices were installed on the
most erosive

lands and over

one half were

less than 5 tons per year (USDA, 1981),
lar and were widely spread.
uency which lobbied

placed on lands

eroding at

the program benefits were popu

Thus they built a strong political constit

for preservation of program benefits

in their his

toric distributional pattern.
Also,

other farm

programs throughout the last 50

years have pro

duced a commercial agriculture sector that is not very conducive to husbanding the soil
agriculture,

resource.

The price instabilities

the dependence on export

crops (monoculture),

the reliance on

the returns on land as an

markets,

that characterize

the reliance on single

chemically based production,

inflation hedge all produce strong incentives

to reduce conservation investments.

These incentives are strengthened

by the existence of risk insurance, commodity price supports,
tal gains taxation (Batie, 1983).
patible with

and

and capi-

These programs are frequently incom-

conservation goals,

and

they have operated

to encourage

economic pressures to

deplete the

soil depletion.
The farmer
soil.

thus has had strong

The gains from the depletion of the soil--and in most cases it is

profitable to
cropland.

deplete the soil--are capitalized
These are

erode--that are

property

valuable.

rights--the right

Farmers

remove these property rights and
is not

the agency to encourage

compensation to farmers.
protect the

into the value
to

let one's

understandably resist

Indeed,

farm sector from such

it is USDA's

land

attempts to

thereby devalue their property.
such devaluation--at least

of the

USDA

not without

historical mission to

reduction of property

value.

And,
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declining real budgets have limited

consideration of the alternative of

compensation for such actions.
Because USDA has had the mission of representing farmers' interests
in

the political

process,

policies such

through reduction of agricultural non-point
mainly outside USDA.
obvious agency

as

improved water

quality

sources have been generated

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

to look

for the generation

of such

policies.

is the
USDA's

stance has been more that of protecting farmers' interests against those
who think of the farmer as the

villain in water quality control and who

would regulate improvements.

While USDA has cooperated

grams,

with EPA pro-

the concentration has been on subsidies to farmers to induce the

desired "clean-up" and not on regulations.
Another reason that resource policies have not been iutegrated well
with other

agricultural policies is the

lack of data.

Only recently

have data been available to determine which land is eroding.

Thus,

it

is only recently

that policymakers have had data

which highlighted the

possibilities of

achieving more conservation by

concentrating expendi 

tures and technical assistance on the more critically eroding areas.
Furthermore,

there remain many knowledge

of soil in future production technologies.
culture's impact on water quality.
long run impacts of herbicides,
rients,

or

Little

fungicides,

sediments on water bodies

live around them.

There is not

gaps concerning the role

Little is known about agri is known about the short or
insecticides,

and the plants and

animals that

even conclusive evidence on the amount

of these materials that are present in

water bodies nor the amount that

can be traced to agricultural production practices.
tion does link

excess nut

soil erosion to reduced cropland

While some informa

productivity and water
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quality,

there remains considerable uncertainty as to the exact nature,

magnitude,

and

significance of

these impacts

(Crosson and

Brubaker,

1982, pp. 104-152).
The result of these factors
has been
grams.

little attempt

influencing policymakers is that there

to consider resource

goals within

other pro

There have been few political levers, few incentives, and little

information to change the status quo of resource programs.
Changes in the Political Environment
There is considerable evidence that changes in farm legislation are
eminent.
roads.

USDA Secretary Block refers to
Joseph A.

farm policy being at a cross

Kinney, National Governors Association staff advisor

on agriculture stated:
We're in the process of restructuring our policy, developing a
There is a recognition that things have
whole new one.
changed, a recognition that our policy tools have failed us.
The need for PIK program demonstrated that. (Sinclair, 1983)
Farm Bureau President Robert Delano has called for an "all-out drive" to
alter federal

farm programs.

meeting of 60 farm and food

Secretary

Block has scheduled

industry leaders.

a summer

Iowa Senator Jepsen has

scheduled a series of farm policy hearings at the Joint Economic Commit
tee.

The Democratic

National Committee is planning

a nationwide farm

policy forum and the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and For
estry is publishing a committee print

on farm policy issues in prepara

tion for the 1985 farm bill (Sinclair, 1983).
What is all the ferment about?
tural programs be after
farm programs

PIK?

Simply put--what will the agricul-

There is much concern about

in general and the

PIK program in particular.

subtly hidden in the close examinations of

the cost of
Not too

farm policy is the fear that
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the PIK program has been a case of "sow in the wind, reap the whirlwind"
(Staff,

1983).

nations to

The fear is

that the

take advantage of any

PIK program will

resulting increase in

enable other
U.S.

domestic

prices and undercut U.S. sales efforts, that consumers will view the PIK
program in the

unfavorable light of paying farmers not

to plant,

that

rural agribusinesses and economies will blame reduced agricultural sales
for high

unemployment and depressed local

economies and that,

in the

words of one farm press journalist;
If the American public begins to perceive PIK as another
Administration "shot from the hip" that failed to help any
population segment significantly, while further increasing the
budget deficit,
a full fledged national scandal will be in
full flower by November 6, 1984. (Staff, 1983).
What does this concern with PIK
to do with resource policy?

and future commodity programs have

It is reasonable to assume that eventually

public discontent over the PIK program will focus on the distribution of
benefits.

If 60 Minutes interviews a so-called "representative" farmer

who brags

about receiving

than visiting

his local

millions of dollars
coffee shop--newly

for doing

renamed the

nothing more
PIK cafe--the

popularity of assisting the farmer will most certainly wane.
Also,
finding that

there

are now numerous

farm legislation is

influence wildlife habitat,
well as the quality of future

conservation organizations
of interest

water quality,

(Brown,

1979).

amenities.

Most

In addition,

the rural

farm residents comprise only 15

percent of the total rural population and
val of rural population growth--almost

that farmers

and farmland conversions as

soil resources.

population is no longer mainly farmers;

to them in

who are

there has been a recent revi

all of which is non-agricultural

of these new residents relocated

to enjoy rural

They are sensitive to environmental quality and recreational
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opportunities and are therefore more aware of the off-farm costs of soil
erosion.

Because these new residents feel

"back-to-the-land" movement (and

they have participated in a

because it is not

usually their lands

which are eroding), it is reasonable to assume that these residents will
also be less supportive of the concept

that the right to let land erode

is an absolute property ownership right.
There is also

widespread recognition that the

of fishable and swimable water will
agement practices

directed at

water quality goals

not be obtainable without best man

non-point pollution--most

byproducts of agricultural production.

of which

are

In Virginia, for example an EPA

funded five year, $28 million Chesapeake Bay Program concluded that con
trol of agricultural non point pollution should be a top priority of any
new water quality program (Va.

Water Resources Research Center,

In another example, Senator David Durenbergr (R-Minn)

1983).

proposed that the

Clean Water Act include restrictions so that farmers who had lands which
contributed to water pollution should
ernment subsidies (Anonymous, 1983).

be restricted from receiving gov
Thus, there are people influencing

legislation which will impact on farmers

who are not traditional actors

in the farm legislation arena.
There is also legislation to change
tural program benefits

regardless of farming practices.

Colorado Senator William
which

would prohibit

those

individuals who

the rights to receive agricul

Armstrong has introduced the

payments of

certain

produce certain

For example,
"Sodbuster Bill"

agricultural incentives

commodities

on highly

to

erosive

lands.
Finally, while there is still much yet to know, we now have a "rev
olution" in our knowledge concerning

resource conditions,

past program
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effectiveness

and

program

conflicts

in

achieving

compared to what was available before the 1977 RCA.

resource

The availability of

this information means program improvements can be fashioned.
more,

persuasive

changes.

arguments can

This is

be made

to gain

Further-

support for

particularly true since some of

provides insights for

the development of both low

goals,

program

the new information
cost and cost-effec

tive methods of achieving conservation.

The argument that we should be

careful

in the

with the

use of

our resources

absence of

dependable

knowledge of the future is most convincing when the costs of being care
ful are reasonably low.
New Directions?
Thus,
program

there

and the

are many events

traditional commodity

equity perceptions,

improvements,

These events may ultimately

sider resource
impetus for

programs as

goals as

a part of

attendant

provide the catalyst to con
policies.

be from actors

farm legislation and who may

reason to protect the farmers' interests.

the

and the improved resource

other agricultural

such integration will probably

traditional sphere of

well as

the PIK

the changing composition of rural populations,

new interests in water quality
information.

occurring--reexamination of

The

outside the

therefore have less

Indeed, some may classify the

farmer as the abuser and not the steward of the land.
While much negotiation will no doubt take place,
bly be increased

emphasis on water quality concerns

such as the 1985 Farm Bill.
-Providing benefits

there will proba
in new legislation

Specific changes may include:

from various

federal loan

and commodity

programs contingent on farmers practicing effective soil con
servation.
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-Targeting
education,
yield the

public

conservation

investments

and technical assistance)
highest returns in

(cost-sharing,

to the lands that will

terms of

on-farm productivity

and off-farm environmental quality improvements.
-Designing future supply control programs so that they include
the retirement of the more seriously erosive acres in periods
of surplus harvests.
-Developing a long-term reserve of the more critically eroding
acres.
Making the receipt of benefits

of various federal programs contin

gent on farmers' conservation behavior
pliance."

Landowners

is frequently termed "cross-com

either receive no

or lower

benefits if they do not meet conservation standards.

agricultural program
Alternatively,

a

cross-compliance strategy may be designed so that farmers receive higher
program benefits if they conserve to

soil loss standards.

These types

of programs are most effective when the farmers whose lands have erosion
problems are also those receiving

deficiency or price support payments,

acreage diversion payments, or are participating in loan programs.
The targeting of public conservation
will yield the

investments to the areas that

highest returns in terms of improvements

off-farm benefits requires knowledge of the
these impacts.

achieved with the

and conservation investments as best

available information.

investments, through cost-sharing, education,
can be targeted
with severe

linkages of soil erosion to

But, the lack of precise details of these linkages does

not preclude reallocation of funds
can be

in on-farm and

and technical assistance,

at both productive (but shallow)

agricultural related

Public conservation

water pollution

topsoils and regions
problems.

Variable
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cost sharing _payments could be established
practices would
sive.

be available to farmers

This targeting approach is a

distributions.

so that more cost-sharing of
whose lands are the

break with past program investment

According to USDA data, less than 19 percent of the soil

conservation practices cost-shared by ASCS have
erosive lands,

more ero

and over

been placed on the most

one half were placed on lands

eroding at less

than 5 tons per acre per year (USDA, 1981).
A low-cost

method of achieving

conservation is that

of targeting

any acreage diversion programs so as to obtain as much soil erosion con
trol as possible when croplands are
surplus .

removed from production in times of

If this is coupled with the long-term removal from production

of the most critically eroding acres, .considerable reductions in erosion
could be
This might

obtained at

low cost relative

be achieved by the

to past

program expenditures.

federal government renting the

acres in

question through long-term leasing

arrangement and redirecting Agricul

tural

payments

Conservation Program

(ACP)

for cover

crops to

these

areas.
Other

resource

program

changes may

through traditional farm legislation,
islation.
example,

This is
Maryland

subsidize farmers

occur--but

quality programs.

$6 million cost-sharing

adopting practices

Virginia has a PIK-i-Back Program that
their . idled PIK acres are those

necessarily

nor even necessarily federal leg

particularly true of water
has developed a

not

that reduce

For

program to

agricultural runoff.

pays farmers additional funds if

bordering tributaries of the Chesapeake

Bay.
Summary
Recent polls reflect broad public

awareness of resource issues and
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a willingness to support conservation efforts (Harris, 1980).
many,

perhaps most,

land,

there is still a large discrepancy between attitudes and behavior

(Napier and

Forster,

environment is
tion.

farmers perceive themselves

And while

1982).

The

concern over maintaining

gaining legitimacy and

Furthermore,

it is clear

to be stewards of the

is powered by

a quality

improved informa-

that agricultural legislation is cur-

rently undergoing considerable scrutiny.

This is, in part, recognition

that the PIK program was a •~ate~• placed on an agricultural sector that
was generating too many bushels and not enough income.

As we revise our

programs, it will not always be possible to have conservation goals mesh
harmoniously with
balance of

trade,

expenditures,
weapon,

or

other goals such
stabilization

as improved farm
of prices,

low food prices to customers,
the maintenance of a

reduction of

achieving conservation,

competitive position in

government

world trade.

Nevertheless, there is

which suggests various cost-effective
and these are

improved

use of food as a political

After all, many of these goals are in conflict.
information available

income,

methods of

forces to encourage the adoption

of these methods, in part through program integration.
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PROSPECTS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR FARM POLICY>~
Ronald D. Knutson'~
In 1985 the Congress once again
writing a farm bill.
preparation for the
past two decades
to a

Producer organizations are developing positions in
1985 farm bill debate.

once every four years

tually an annual basis.
new farm

Yet the

experience of the

indicates that debate over farm policy
occurrence.

cantly modify our farm program have

of a

undertakes the quadrennial task of

In this

bill is not

is not limited

Rather proposals

to signifi-

been introduced and debated on vir
setting some suggest that the writing

that critical since

Congress may,

in the

interim, make substantial modifications.
I beg

to differ.

The four

opportunity to evaluate
spective.

year farm bill provides

and modify farm policy from

What are the major issues?

1981 farm bill?

quences of a

a longer-term per

Have the issues changed since the

What are we trying to accomplish?

programs performing?

What changes are needed?

change in policy direction?

How well are current

What would be the conse-

It is

from this perspective

that I want to speak about farm policy in the future.
the major policy options will be outlined.
perspective of what

an important

we know concerning policy

In my discussion,

This will be done from the
impacts,

our experience

with different policies and the economic conditions under which the pol
icies will be expected to operate.
I want to make it clear from the outset that from a policy perspective I have
alternative.

no axe to grind.
My job is

I

am not an advocate

of any particular

rather to make sure that you

,',Professor and Extension Economist, Texas A&M University

are aware of the
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alternatives and

their consequences

Some comments will

in the

also be made on the

current economic

setting.

perceived political feasibility

of particular alternatives.
Recent Policy Exposure
Our current

farm policy

early 1970s when

has its roots

in the

the initial programs separating

farmers.

were designed to make up

market determined prices and a
returns.

The initial mecha-

this was direct payments from

Payment levels

or the

government support of

farm income from farm prices were enacted into law.
nism for accomplishing

late 1960s

the government to
any deficit between

politically acceptable level of producer

This politically acceptable level of producer returns was des

ignated the target pri_c_e in the 1973 farm bill.
The target price made it
to implement what he coined a
ity,

the policy

politically acceptable for Secretary Butz
"market-oriented" farm policy.

was market-oriented only in the sense

In real

that it allowed

market prices to adjust to market clearing levels or the loan rate, whi
chever was higher.

Producer returns were protected from the - full impact

of this price adjustment by the

target price.

This protection is,

fact, a contributing factor to our current farm problem.

That is,

in
the

target price prevented the market

signal of increased supplies combined

with a reduced rate of growth in

domestic and foreign demand from fully

impacting the producer.

The result was

production in excess of market

needs.
The target price - loan rate mechanism worked as long as:
government was

willing to

make up

price and the loan rate, and (2)
to allow the market to clear.

the difference

between the

(1) the

target

the loan rate was set sufficiently low

Without a sufficiently low loan rate, the
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United States would

be priced out of the rapidly

gr-owing export market

and government stocks would build through the nonrecourse feature of the
loan.

To prevent this occurrence the 1977 farm bill contained a provi-

sion for wheat and feed grains allowing the Secretary to reduce the loan
rate if the average market price came within 5 percent of the loan rate.
The amount of
year.

In

this reduction was,

reality,

the

however,

limited to

Secretary of Agriculture

10 percent per

has seldom

had the

political fortitude to exercise the option of lowering loan rates in the
face of being priced out of the world market.

Cotton and rice contained

no loan adjustment provision,

loan level was keyed to a

although their

formula off the world price.
For each
the loan

of the major commodities

rate.

The

an absolute minimum was

world market adjustment

feature was

set on

modified by

action setting the grain reserve loan rate (entry price) above the regu
lar CCC

loan rate in response

to the ill-fated Russian

grain embargo,

and the 1982 Budget Reconciliation Act. 1
The result of
in

surplus stocks

expenditures.
ditions has

these policy errors has been
and a

record

increase in

the inevitable buildup
government farm

program

An additional factor contributing to current surplus con

been the 1981 farm

prices for 1982 through 1985,

bill provision setting
as

specific target

opposed to t~ing target price changes

to the cost of production.
The payment-in-kind program
not for:

would not have been

necessary were it

(1) the discentives for exports provided by the use of food as

1 The Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982 set
a higher loan rate for a one
year period only.
This higher loan rate, however, occurred at a time
when export demand was falling and thus had the direct impact of pricing
the U.S. out of the world market.
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a tool of diplomacy,

(2)

monetary

policy that maintained the value of

the dollar at high levels, (3) loan rates established above world market
prices and (4) target price production incentives.
Commodities without
versy of

target prices have

a varied but interrelated

forced to face up to the reality

also faced

nature.

policy contro-

Milk producers

that price supports based on parity do

not accurately reflect changes in the cost of milk production.
tion,

it is likely that the

production may well

be greater than the benefits

peanut allotment owners have come to
program may not

In addi 

adjustment costs involved in reducing milk
obtained by producers

while prices were maintained at 80 percent of parity .

to their

have been

Both tobacco and

recognize that the greatest threat

be the outside

critics,

but may

instead be

those within the industry who must rent allotments for the right to pro
duce and market.
Perhaps the most improtant lesson

from our experience with govern

ment programs is that government programs have a strong tendency to cre
ate unique

sets of new problems.

government expenditure problem
previous programs.
loan rates and

a strong dollar,

reduced

exports.

the result of economic

and the economy.

today's industry.

the magnitude of which did

created a

not exist in

The Russian grain embargo, combined with inflexible

problems are themselves
the program

The target price program

It is

They

forces operating within

reflect the economic

these realities that

must be

developing future policy.
Policy Options for the 1985 Farm Bill
Four broad policy options exist for the future:
· Moving to a free market.

These interrelated

realities of
considered in
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Developing a system of mandatory production controls.
Fine tuning the current policy.
Establishing a

stabilization and

cost sharing

partnership

between producers and government.
The consequences

of each of these

policy options will be

evaluated in

terms of four criteria:
Impact on

the level

and stability

of producer

prices and

incomes,
Impact on exports,
Impact on the level of government expenditures, and
Political acceptability.
Free Market
The free market alternative
in agriculture.

implies minimal government involvement

Target prices, the farmer owned reserve, and all forms

of production controls would certainly be eliminated under the free mar
ket alternative.
tool,

but

The CCC loan program might be retained as a marketing

the nonrecourse feature

would be

eliminated as a

encouraging farmers to market their commodities
price supports would
International

through forums such as GATT
would also need

out of the loan.

likewise be reduced to world

efforts to

negotiate

reductions

Milk

market price levels.
in barriers

would be intensified.

to be provided that food

means of

to

trade

Increased assurance

would no longer be

used as a

diplomatic weapon.
For producers,
With

the free market

current surplus

conditions,

alternative is particularly harsh.
farm

reserve stocks are released on the market.
production by the PIK,

set-aside,

prices would

fall sharply

as

Most of the land held out of

allotment,

and quota programs would
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initially

go back

into

production but

would

likely subsequently

forced out of production by low farm prices and producer incomes.
ficient producers,

marginal production areas,

be the first to go.
having the greatest

Larger,

Inef

and tenant farmers would

better leveraged,

marketing expertise would be

Farm numbers would decline abruptly,

be

more efficient farmers
the likely survivors.

as the industry became more highly

concentrated.
After this

initial 3-5 year period

and structure of the agricultural
economic characteristic of
ity.

production plant,

the capacity

the most important

American agriculture would be

The combination of a highly

products means

of adjustment in

its instabil

inelastic supply and demand for farm

that relatively small shocks

in terms of

quantity pro

duced, consumed, or exported have relatively larger price impacts.
magnitude of increased

price variability is probably

The

best indicated by

the fact that farm prices were nearly 6 times more variable in the rela
tively

free market

conditions from

1972-1978

than in

the much

more

highly controlled period, 1964-1971. 2 Those farmers who are best able to
deal with this increased price risk

through devices such as contracting

and futures market hedging would be the most likely survivors under free
market conditions.
Free

market policies

would foster

exports

in those

commodities

where the United States producers have a comparative advantage.
other hand,
expected to

imports of beef and
increase.

manufactured dairy products

The net impact

on the agricultural

On the
could be

balance of

2 Ronald D. Knutson, J.
B. Penn and William T. Boehm, Agricultural and
It
Food Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983) p. 195.
is important to recognize that this increased fluctuation occurred
despite the existence of the loan program.
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trade

would

depend

on

U.S.

success

in

negotiating

reduced

trade

barriers.
Government farm program

expenditures would quite clearly

to zero under the free market option.
tion of the

CCC loan program.

be close

The main cost would be the opera-

With loan rates

being maintained below

market prices, CCC commodity acquisition would be minimal. 3
Free market

policies would likely

both producers and consumers.

The

unacceptable to

The decline in producer numbers combined

with the increased price and income
cally intolerable.

be politically

uncertainty would likely be politi-

political pressure to depart

from free market

policies when farm prices are low would be irresistible--particularly in
the years of national elections.
toward their peaks,
to

freeze prices

even stronger
or embargo

Likewise

when farm prices are rising

consumer pressure would likely exist

exports.

These

pressures were

evident

forces periodically

lead to

throughout the 1972-1978 period.
Mandatory Production Controls
A variety

of economic

and political

sharply increased interest in mandatory production controls as the solution to low and unstable farm prices and incomes.
period.

We are now in such a

These forces include the political unacceptability of the price

instability associated with the free market alternative, high government
costs of current

programs,

and the destabilizing impact

of changes in

foreign and general economic policy on agricultural prices and incomes.
The features of mandatory production controls are relatively simple

3 The loan rate would
have to be set very low in the first 3-5 years to
weed out inefficient producers and allow CCC stocks to clear the market.
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conceptually

but complex

administratively.

raising market prices by restricting
experience that

such as wheat or cotton,
move the

production.

the only effective

through marketing quotas.

The

concept is

one

of

We have learned from

means of controlling

production is

In addition, controls on one major commodity
requires

surplus problem to

controls on all commodities--lest we

those commodities without

controls.

The

existence of effective production controls should eliminate the need for
both target prices and price supports.
generally accompanied

However, production controls are

by price supports

that exceed both

domestic and

foreign market clearing levels.
Production controls

stabilize prices,

because farmers

produce in

excess of their quota to hedge against a production shortfall.
zation also

occurs because loan

rates are frequently

Stabili

set sufficiently

high to establish an effective price floor.
Land owners who are in the industry at the time production controls
are established receive a one time

windfall gain as the income enhance

ment effects of production controls are capitalized in the value of real
assets.

Higher

compete for the

real asset values result

as new or

right to produce and market their

quota is negotiable,

a separate value

expanding farmers

production.

If the

is created for the quota itself;

if not negotiable, the land increases in value.
Interestingly,

the accumulation

of these real asset

values has a

distinct tendency to cause production control policies to self-destruct.
Increased asset values

become a very real cost to

the original producers or their heirs,
cost

that is

reflected

in

required return on investment.

new producers.

For

it is an implicit or opportunity

either higher

rental

rates

or a

higher

New producers and tenant farmers, there-
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fore,

tend to

policies.

become political adversaries against

production control

We see this happening in peanuts and tobacco now.

The impact of production controls on

exports is much debated.

practiced, production controls reduce exports.
effect results
level (loan

from the combined inclination

rate)

above

allotments and/or quotas.

the world price

In the short run,
to set the

and to

As
this

price support

freeze the

level of

In the longer run, it results from the incen

'tives for other countries to increase

production provided by the higher

U.S. price and reduced supplies.
It is theoretically possible to utilize

quotas as a supply manage

ment tool designed to obtain only the level of production that is needed
by the domestic and export market.
have called

for a reduction

anticipation

of reduced

recessionary economic
would need
demand.

to be

Such a strategy would, for example,

in cotton production

domestic

and

increased in

Unfortunately,

foreign demand

However,

conditions.

in 1981 and

in

response to

present have not operated in this manner.

resulting

1983 and

from

1984 quotas

an anticipated

production control policies

1982 in

rebound in

of the

past and

Maintaining a fixed allotment

and/or quota has become a goal in and of itself.

As a result,

exports

have generally decreased sharply, except where highly subsidized.
Government
program would

expenditures under
be limited to the

peanut program
programs involve

a well

cost of administration.

advocates are thus able
the lowest

of controlling

to rightfully argue

taxpayer outlays

result is that policymakers frequently
means

managed production

farm program

of any

control

Tobacco and
that their

commodity.

The

endorse production controls as a

spending.

Recognition,

however,

increasingly exists that the main cost of production control policies is
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built into the price consumers pay for the commodities.
sector economist

recently placed

the full

cost of

Thus a private

current government

programs including their consumer price impact at $50 billion--more than
twice government outlays on these programs. 4
The political acceptability of production control programs is likewise much debated.

Producers are most willing to accept mandatory pro-

duction controls when incomes are low and threaten to fall even further.
Regional differences are, however, evident.
likely to

accept mandatory controls

The southern farmer is more

than the midwest

producer.

Once

controls are established they develop a strong political constituency in
those

who own

the

production and

removal of controls
producers,

marketing

is thus limited to

rights.

Agitation

those who would like

tenants who pay inflated rents

for

to become

on marketing rights and con

sumers who ultimately pay for increased commodity prices.
In the

end,

however,

economic

policymakers may be

stumbling block to acceptance of production controls.
sider the
tion,

impact of production control

our balance of trade,

the

the greatest

They have to con

policies on the rate

value of the dollar,

of infla

our comparative

advantage, and our image as a leader in meeting world food needs.
Fine Tuning
The current target price,
been in effect since 1973.
These policies have,
target price-loan

loan

The

until 1980,

rate,

and set-aside policies have

grain reserve was established in 1977.
performed quite satisfactorily.

framework allowed exports

to expand

The

while providing

4 James C. Webster, Food and Fiber Letter (Washington, D.C., Webster Pub
lishing, May 16, 1983) p 7 . - -
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politically acceptable levels of income
stabilized

supplies

and

prices

protection.

while

providing

The grain reserve
the

potential

improved producer earnings after free supplies were marketed.
aside program

provided a voluntary

means of modestly

for

The set

reducing produc

tion.
The surplus conditions of the 1980s can be argued to have been,
indicated in my introductory remarks,
ment or

understanding of

problems with the
line relative

and effect

substance of the programs.

world market prices in the face
trols were not

more a result of errors in judge

program cause

to production costs;

loan

relationships than

Target price

got out of

rates were allowed

of reduced demand;

effectively enforced.

to exceed

and production con-

This reasoning

agricultural interest groups and policymakers

suggests to some

that current policy tools

are sufficient if fine tuned.
Such fine tuning would have the following basic features:
Target prices

would be adjusted

production adjustment.

to provide

incentives for

Certainly target price

should not

increase when surplus conditions are already evident.

That

simply

even

provides

a

counterproductive

greater overproduction.
production

would be

stocks.

When

to tie

stimulus

for

The most direct means of achieving

adjustment incentives

system

within

target price

stocks increased

the target

levels to

above some

price

carryover

trigger level,

target prices would preferably be reduced or at a minimum be
frozen.

Alternatively,

national average
that target

costs of

as

target

prices could

production with

price increases would

be tied

to

the stipulation

be foregone in

any year
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where stocks exceeded a specific level.
would

be applicable

for

setting

Similar procedures

the milk

price

support

level.
Loan rates would explicitly be set
tive to the

world market with no

.formula for setting

months when

Accordingly,
months of

a

world

prices

period such

computing the loan rate.

The

be an average

but rather an average price for
normally reach

as the

the lowest three of

within year

prescribed minimum.

the loan level would not

price for the full year(s),
the

on a formula basis rela

their

average of

low.

first five

five years would be

used in

The potential would also exist for

adjustments of

the loan

rate if

world market

conditions warrant.
Further curbs

would be placed

diplomatic weapon.
bilateral long
need basis.

on the

use of exports

Willingness should exist

term trade agreements
Legitimate danger

on a

does,

as a

to negotiate

competitive and

however,

exist that

bilateral trade agreements, themselves, can become a signif
icant barrier to trade.
Flexibility

would be

adjustment tools
and PIK.

provided for

a

including set-aside,

diversion payments,

be provided for its

In addition, steps need to be taken to make voluntary

controls more effective in reducing production.
ties

production

Legal questions surrounding PIK make it imperative

that specific legislative authorization
use.

range of

include reducing

actual cropland acres,

the

cropland

base to

Possibilithe

farmers·

requiring rotation of retired acres,
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reinstituting cross-compliance,

and

excluding certain land

uses, such as turnrows and skiprows, from retired acres.
Restraint needs to be placed on
grain reserve
intent

as a price

of the

enhancement tool.

reserve was

as a

Political pressures, however,
of price enhancement.

the use of the farmer owned
The original

supply assurance

soon converted its use to one

The higher reserve entry

the reserve release provisions curbed exports.
into the reserve would not be
alternative.

device.

price and

Direct entry

allowed under the fine tuning

Release prices would be sufficiently staggered

that supplies would be consistently available to the market.
Recognition would have to exist,
economic policy,
between the use

in designing overall U.S.

that an improved

of monetary and fiscal

administration has used the money
trolling inflation.
deficit spending,

balance must

When

be struck
The Reagan

tools.

supply restraint for con

combined with tax cuts

the result has

and high

been high interest rates.

This has made the dollar

a particularly attractive currency

A high dollar

value has had a disproportionately

to hold.

adverse impact on exports as well
farmers.
tools

Better balance in the

would

significantly

as the cost of capital to
use of monetary and fiscal

reduce

this

adverse

sectoral

impact.
The main effect of such policy changes
mote

adjustment of

production to

on farmers would be to pro-

market needs.

increased substantially relative to the

free market.

would be much greater than under mandatory controls.

Stability would

be

Producer freedom
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Exports would
increased supply

receive a substantial
assurance to

boost under this

foreign customers

and loan

that retain competitiveness in the world market.
would likely exceed the free market

option with
rate levels

In fact, export levels

option inasmuch as the target price

is, in effect, a subsidy to both domestic and foreign markets.
Adjusting target prices to the level of surplus stocks,
the effectiveness of

production controls,

and opening

increasing

foreign markets

should reduce the vulnerability of a tine tuned farm program to the high
cost levels that characterize the current program.
While
rates

potential downward

would make

increased overall

a

adjustments in

fine tuned

program

target

less

attractive to

price stability should offset

this negative effect.

The favorable

prices and

at least a

loan

farmers,
portion of

government cost impacts make this

alternative more attractive to taxpayers and policymakers.
Self-Help Partnership
Many people recognize the need
culture but

would like

responsibility for

for government involvement in agri

to see farmers

assume a

program costs and industry

greater share

stabilization.

of the
Sharing

program costs is an innovation in farm policy. 5 Many of you are far more
knowledgeable of the
idea is that
the program.

tobacco and dairy assessments than

producers would pick up
The effect

of the

a certain portion of

assessment is

The basic

I.

the cost of

an implicit

downward

adjustment in the level of price and income support for the commodity.

5 Some
historical similarities might be noted with the processor tax
assessment contained in the initial Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
(declared unconstitutional)
and the producer assessment to cover the
cost of administering marketing orders.
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Producers

would

not

go

In both tobacco and dairy,

voluntarily.
the wall.

obviously

It was a concession they

for

the

ass·essment

idea

they had their backs against

had to make to reduce criticism in

an attempt to save their programs.

For dairy,

it was more politically

palatable than an overt reduction in the price support.
Several extensions of the self-help cost sharing concept are possi
ble.

In Australia, farm program costs are reduced by assessing the pro

ducers when

prices are above average

Such a plan is similar to

are below average.
plan used
could,

in some

milk marketing

for example,

Credit Banks.

orders.

be turned over to

USDA could

storage function might

The

CCC lending

larger responsibility

the event of

the workload of the ASCS

A larger share

of the commodity

be turned over to cooperatives as

the Form G loan authority.

function

an institution such as the Farm

In the process,

materially reduced.

when prices

the seasonal adjustment

still stand behind the loan in

forfeiture of the commodity.
offices could be

and paying them back

is done under

Dairy cooperatives might be made to assume a

for storage

and inventory

management under

the

milk price support program.
If the

desire is that producers

the industry stabilization
accomplish this objective.
sis on cooperatives,

functions,

ment, integration, and pooling.

policy would include;

they must be given

share of

the tools to

The clear implication is for greater empha-

marketing orders

sophisticated marketing.

overtly assume a larger

The

and agreements,

market develop

These are the tools of more orderly and
government program attributes of

more Farm Credit

such a

Bank inovlvement in CCC lending

functions; increased cooperative management of CCC stocks; strengthening
the Capper-Volstead and

Agricultural Fair Practices Acts

to reduce the
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free

rider

problem;

commodities;

expanding marketing

order

authority

to

major

expanding the checkoff concept and making it available for

cooperative market

development activities (including domestic

and for

eign markets);

and providing increased research, education, and techni

cal assistance

to cooperatives desiring

to develop

integrated produc

tion-marketing systems.
For producers,

the self-help concept

assuming greater responsibility and gaining
bilization activities.

offers the

opportunity for

experience in industry sta-

It may be a method of gradually moving out from

under the hand of government influence and control.

It holds the poten

tial for increased automatic adjustment to changing industry conditions.
At the

same time it provides

process.

the opportunity to temper

the adjustment

The opportunity for increased producer returns clearly exists,

but would be only through

increased understanding and sophistication in

marketing.
Producer-controlled exports would grow

under the self-help option.

Whether total exports would grow depends on the strategies employed.
Government costs would fall initially to the extent of program cost
sharing.
decline as

In

the longer

run the

need for

producers develop more highly

government support

should

sophisticated production-mar

keting systems.
As in the case of

mandatory production controls,

bility is the major question with self-help options.
icymakers

would readily

They would likely
for stabilization.

consent to

producers

Taxpayers and pol

sharing program

be less willing to give producers
The

political feasi

costs.

the tools required

strongest resistance would come

from the pro-

prietary agribusiness marketing sector which would fear the consequences
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of an effective cooperative and marketing

order system.

clear that even producers (or cooperative managers)
accept the responsibility implied by

Yet it is not

would be willing to

the self-help alternative.

Maybe

it has been too easy to get help from Uncle Sam!
Concluding Remarks
policy tools

The

I have

discussed

People are increasingly looking for

are relatively

conventional.

new alternatives--much like PIK was

to production control. 6 The truly new devices that have surfaced to date
do not appear

to be realistic substitutes for

current

programs .

One

such alternative involves the use of futures market put and call options
as a private

sector combination risk reduction

device.

This alternative would require

ducer in

futures market use than

all,

and price stabilization

a much more sophisticated pro-

I perceive currently

exists.

After

only 5 percent of the farmers currently use the futures market and

70 percent of
large scale

them are speculators. 7 The main beneficiary
producers who already spends

likely because they have
second

the most time

the most time to spend and

frequently mentioned

new

alternative

would be the
on marketing-

still survive.

is income

(or

A

revenue)

insurance.

Such insurance would allow the producer to select a percent

age of his

normal price and yield

It seems

apparent that the cost

for which he desires
of such insurance would

to be insured.
be unbearably

6
It is recognized that the payment in kind program was tried at least
once previous to 1983.
But it was not pursued with the same vigor or
incentives.
7
Cornrnodity Futures Trading Commission, 1977 Report on Farmers' Use of
Futures Markets and Forward Contracts, (Washington, D.C., CFTC, Feb. 15,
1979) p. 1 and Table 2.
While these data are 5 years old, futures mar
ket use by farmers has certainly no more than doubled.
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high.

Even with a 30 percent premium subsidy,

the farmers
ance.

are currently willing to

Even

then,

insurance program
replaced.

I hear

subscribe to federal

talk that the

may already

less than 15 percent of

government cost of

be higher than

the disaster

program it

University emphasized in his teach

ing that rarely is there a major farm policy innovation.

It is

the crop

How could revenue insurance be better than crop insurance?

One of my colleagues at Purdue

learn from

crop insur-

the mistakes of the

also important

evolve gradually.
expectation for

to keep

past and build on
in mind

The need is to

the accomplishments.

that policy

has a

tendency to

Major changes in policy direction seldom occur.
the 1985 farm

effort to fine tune,

bill is therefore

and hopefully

that we will

My

make an

improve,

those policies that exist

In closing, from a strategy perspective,

it is very important that

today.

agriculture avoid

the political confrontation situation

over the 1981 farm bill.
was the political

that developed

Two events were particularly disturbing.

battle that developed over how

tures were to be divided among

commodities.

farm program expendi-

The second was a conflict

between the North and South over the tobacco and peanut programs.
conflicts were
through early

highly divisive.

The only

discussion within and

well as in Washington with our
interaction we have

way they can be

between our farm

through forums such as this,

the

Both

avoided is

organizations as

Senators and Representatives.

flicts within agriculture can be avoided.

One

The more

more likely con

FOOD POLICY PROSPECTS AND PERSPECTIVES IN 1985
G. William Hoagland*
The food policy debate surrounding
ture and

Food Act

in 1985

will likely

atmosphere of "feast or famine."
reemergence of
same time

hunger in

reauthorization of the Agricul
be fraught

emotional

Even today the popular press depicts a

America and Sub-Saharan

the federal government embarks

supply adjustment program.

with an

Africa while

on the largest

at the

ever domestic

The extent of this emotional debate will be

a function of domestic and international economic recovery, particularly
as that relates to a lowering

of unemployment from current unacceptable

levels.
The purpose of this paper is to

briefly review this and other per

spectives on food policy formulation over the next few years.
the paper examines the broadening arena
Part II of

the paper,

I briefly

tional food policy debate:

Part I of

of the food policy debate.

review three elements of

In

the conven

(1) food prices, (2) food security, and (3)

domestic food assistance programs.
~

Prologue of Concern

A few comments are proferred as a prologue to the paper.
many good things that can be said
tem.

about our current food and fiber sys

The list of accomplishments is well-known.

duces and exports

more food than any

United States dominates
all the

The United States pro

other nation in the

the world food supply to a

nations of OPEC combined

There are

The

greater extent than

dominate the world's oil

*Senior Analyst, U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget

world.

supply.

A
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mere

2.5

percent of

all

American

surplus and at the same time provide
tic

consumption.

overfed)

The

people in

workers produce

substantial

low-cost food and fiber for domes-

American people

the world,

this

remain

the best

and this with the

fed (if

not

lowest percentage of

disposable income being expended on food of any country.
The late Rene

Dubas,

Nobel Laureate in

nutrition,

has expressed

clearly the strength of our food system:
In reality, the immense majority of people in the countries of
Western civilization now have a diet that is far better bal
anced, and freer of toxic effects, than was the case at almost
anytime in the past ... (Dubas, p. 21).
However a number
domestic food and

of inconsistencies and inefficiencies

farm programs today.

thing ironic in our

I contend that

farm and food policies when,

as

plague our

there is some-

is happening this

year, budgetary outlays for farm price supports will be an unprecedented
$21.1 billion,

and

at the same time the largest

tance program--the food

so-called food assis

stamp program--will reach a

participation high

of 23.9 million persons.
I contend that there is something very inefficient and inconsistent
in our

food and

acquires surplus
month, (b)

farm programs

today when

dairy products at the

the federal

government (a)

rate of 165 million

pounds per

supports federal-state cooperative research for developing a

new super-cow breed,

(c)

food item

child nutrition

in federal

monthly 25 to
to individuals,

does not permit yogurt to
programs,

30 million pounds of the acquired

and

be a "creditable"
(d)

distributes

surplus dairy products

many of whom have experienced a reduction in their food

stamps and public assistance benefits.
I contend that there is something fundamentally illogical with fed
eral child nutrition food program regulations that permit a cookie to be
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credited toward federal

meal patterns if it

is served as a

snack in a

child care food program, but it is not credited if served at lunch in th
national lunch program.
These are only a few of the inconsistencies of our current farm and
food programs.

Other examples abound, as Lee has suggested:

The natural outgrowth of attempts by the body politic to
respond to individual problems and constituents separately and
at various times, with no context for thinking of the individ
ual policy responses as components of a broader fabric. (Lee,
p. 136).
Food Policy,~ Ubiquitous Policy
Broadening Perspectives on Food Policy
Numerous individuals have written recently
food, farm, and nutrition policy.
(1981, 1983),

Gardner (1981),

on the relationships of

Paarlberg (1980), Daft (1981), Schuh

Farrell (1983)

knowledgeable thinking on these issues.

and others have provided

I conclude from reviewing these

writings and from recent legislative and executive experience, that food
policy is a ubiquitous policy.
It is an axiom that food is basic.

As one historian has written:

In the last analysis, of course, food is not only inseparable
from the history of mankind but essential to it. Without food
there would be no history, no mankind. (Tannahill, p. 388).
It is

also an accepted

tenet of

civilized government that

no citizen

should be without the basics of food, shelter, and clothing.

That basic

tenet has been transformed into a

generally accepted set of food policy

objectives that include the provision of an adequate,
and

reliable food

supply to

all

Americans at

safe,

stable and

nutritous,
reasonable·

prices.
Food policy is

a ubiquitous policy in that the

stated objectives will

be directly influenced by

achievement of ·the

much broader economic
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and social policy agenda.
Act reauthorization

The outcome of the 1985 Agriculture and Food

will impact

on this

country's ability

some of the accepted food policy objectives.
case with farm policy,

food policy

to achieve

However, as has become the

has become directly integrated into

the country's general economic fiscal policy--including issues of infla
tion, employment, environment and water policies,
of trade,
cies.
just

foreign policies,

As such,

food

the Agriculture

addresses

some

of

and

international balance

particularly health and welfare poli-

policy is a matter of much
and

these

Food Act

of 1985.

other issues

broader concern than
How

will

the body

directly

politic

influence

the

nation's ability to provide a stable, adequate, safe, and nutritous food
supply at reasonable prices to all Americans.
Finally I note that changing demographics and changing food prefer
ences will directly impact future
fore,

food

production.

emphasis being
products.

These

food demand,
changes will

placed on fresh

produce and

and indirectly,
probably result

less emphasis on

therein more
red meat

Changes will also occur in marketing and packaging,

such as

smaller packages for the trend toward one and two-person households, and
greater emphasis on low-sodium products.
tional information,

food safety,

The trends toward more nutri-

and health related food products will

continue and not lessen.
Prospects on Three Elements of the Food Policy Debate
Food Prices
For the

consuming public

element of farm

the most

visable and

and food policy formulation is

widely understood

food prices.

cally, consumers spent over $350 billion for food last year,

Domestior 16 per

cent of their total disposable personal income, (equivalent to $1.00 out
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of every $6.00 after tax income).

Despite the fact that U.S.

consumers

spend a relatively small share of their income on food compared to other
countries of the world,

the level and variability of food prices can be

a critical factor influencing farm and food legislation.
Food prices as well as food
cally since the

price variability have slowed dramati-

last reauthorization debate.

farm bill

mark-up,

about 8.0

percent.

increase of 8.3

food prices
This

had been rising

experienced extremely wide swings in

cent increase.

of the 1981

at an annual

was fairly comparable

percent for the 1970s.

14.5 percent in 1973,

At the time

to an

However,

rate of

average annual

during

the 1970s we

food prices--food prices increased

followed shortly thereafter in 1976 by a 3.1 per

Most importantly, real food prices increased slightly in

the 1970s.
During the 1985 reauthorization,
concern of consumers.

food prices should not be a major

Most major forecasting firms including USDA fore

see a modest increase in food prices beginning in 1984, following a projected 1983

rate of less than

4 percent.

Should the

forecasts prove

accurate (food price forecasts even in the short-run are very volatile),
1983 will mark
and the

the fourth straight year of declining

eighth out of

been less than
contrast with

the last nine years

real food prices,

that food price

the general inflation rate.
the conventional wisdom espoused

gains have

These statistics markedly
by Lester Brown

in the

late 1970s that:
" ... inevitably real food prices will rise ... rising food
prices may become more or less a permanent feature of the eco
nomic landscape." (Brown, p. 41).
In some

ways it is unfortunate

that food prices will

not receive

the same degree of the law makers' attention in 1985 as they did in 1977
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and 1981;

for just as we might have overstated the long term food price

situation during the
it.

1970s,

in the early 1980s

we probably understate

Further, although the current forecasts suggest otherwise, it seems

to this analyst that a domestic farm

policy that is becoming more inte

grated into the world market economy,
plantings on 80 million acres,

and

at the same time is reducing

will increase the probability of greater

food price instability .
To moderate

food price

responsibility for their

swings,

producers

could take

own marketings or federal

farm policies could

err on the side of high target and loan price levels .
ers have been reluctant
the high

in the past to police their

Commodity Credit

Corporation outlays

year may be

a cost the public is

stable food

prices when

domestic spending in the federal budget .
sion that very little has changed
in addressing food

bility is a given.

own supplies,

demands are

and

current fiscal
maintain low and
being placed

on

This leads me to the conclu-

since the last reauthorization debate

price instability .

classic Agriculture in an Unstable

However, produc-

for the

unwilling to pay to

other competing

on greater

It may simply

Economy suggests ,

If given, however,

be,

as Shultz's

food price insta-

current farm and economic poli-

cies appear to guarantee no less instability, and even possibly more.
Food Security
Food security may

be defined as the ability of

food deficit coun

tries, or households to meet a minimum level of consumption.
ent variability in world food
lence,

and disease

maintain buffer

production influenced by weather,

has always been a basis for

and emergency

international food security.

The inher

grain stocks to

pesti

civilized societies to
meet both

domestic and

132

The 1985

farm reauthorization debate will

when world grain

stocks are expected to

world consumption.
it is still

Even with these
attention is

being given

to the fact

in the U.S.,

total world production.

which

58 days of

low reached in 1974
levels,

that 58

of 39 days .

more legislative

percent of

world grain

accounts for only 22.2

percent of

What impact such large U.S. stock levels has on

farm prices and incomes,

and therefore food prices,

Their impact

addressed.

a time

a peak of 76 days in 1968,

somewhat minimal world stock

stocks are held

to be

be able to support

While this is down from

significantly up from the

be conducted at

on domestic food

legitimately needs
assistance policies,

however, is just beginning to be felt.
The Emergency Jobs Appropriation Act (P.L.

98-8)

enacted early in

this Congress, included in Title II (Temporary Emergency Food Assistance
Act of 1983) authority to tap 300,000 metric tons of wheat from the Food
Security Wheat Reserve established in 1980, and to make it available for
domestic donations.

Legislation recently passed

ture Committee would

extend this authority for another

therefore have

begun to

see an

security thinking--domestic U.S.

important turn

by the House Agricul
two years.

in international

We
food

food concerns have become claimants to

the world grain stocks.
An international food

security component to our

food policy is as

important today as it ever has

debts,

billion,

over $600

countries.
not to

World

mention the

unexpected

are concentrated in a

economic recovery could be
serious human suffering

weather-induced shortages

from maintaining liquidity.

further

national farm and

been.

Large foreign

number of developing

significantly curtailed,
that would

occur,

prevent these

should

countries
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My fear is,

however,

that the farmer-owned

security reserve, and feed grain disaster reserve,
1985

to reflect

short-run

farm price

reserve,

could be modified in

enhancement

expense of future global food security objectives.
tionist sentiment in the U.S.

wheat food

objectives at

the

The current protec-

Congress does not argue favorably for the

real solution--internationally linked food security policies.
Domestic Food Assistance Program
An emotional

debate concerning hunger in

America is likely

revisited with the 1985 reauthorization of food stamps.
my

perspective on

that subject

and various

to be

Before I review

legislative options

that

could be considered, a brief historical digression seems necessary, par
ticularly since so much of that history began here in the South.
It was in
Employment,

the spring of 1967

Manpower,

Public Welfare visited
they judged
poor.

to be

that members of the

Subcommittee on

and Poverty of the Senate Committee on Labor and
the Delta area of Mississippi

widespread hunger and

A surge of national publicity

and reported what

malnutrition among

the black

followed and domestic food assis-

tance became a major component of the nation's food and agriculture pol
icy agenda.
It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to answer whether or
not

the growth

in

federal food

assistance

programs

since 1967

altered the state of domestic poverty related malnutrition.
notable nutritionists .a nd medical personnel

has

A number of

will disagree with the lim

ited scientific evidence on this subject.
My own

cursory comparison of data

and Nutrition Examination

compiled from the

Survey (HANES I:

1971-1974)

released data from HANES II covering 1976-1980,

first Heafth
with .recently

finds selected nutrient
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intake for

individuals below poverty improving

not declining

as much as)

threshold (see Table 1).

individuals

more than (or

with incomes above

at least

the poverty

As to whether the current administration poli

cies since 1981 have worsened poverty related malnutrition,

no national

scientific data will be available at the time of the 1985 authorization.
Congress will have to rely on impressions,

anecdotal reports,

and con

flicting claims from partisan sources (Congressional Quarterly, p. 882).
What

is factual

resources that
hunger.

and

clearly visible

have been

directed toward

No place in the federal

is

the

amount of

federal

redressing malnutrition

and

budget better represents the sweeping

expansion of government programs in the 1970s than does the area of fed
eral food and nutrition assistance programs.
Beginning in 1970,
billion on

the federal

domestic food assistance

government was spending about $1.6
programs.

primarily limited to the school lunch
tion program to
Over

the

expanded,

needy families,

decade,

new

program,

This

a direct food distribu

and an embryonic

programs were

intervention was

established

food stamps program.
and

old

programs

all ostensibly for the purpose of meeting the particular uni

que nutritional needs of the participants.
on a special role,

The food stamp program took

designed to replace the older,

distribution program

for needy

families.

It

country's indirect answer to welfare reform.

more cumbersome food

eventually became

this

The program today (despite

media impressions to the contrary) is at the highest participation level
ever, 23.9 million persons.
gram available to

It remains the major counter-cyclical pro-

all Americans,

providing direct

food assistance and

indirect income assistance.
With growth

in programs

came increasing

administrative complica-

Table 1.

Selected nutrient intake for males and females aged 6 months - 74 years, by income level, 1971-74 and
1976-80.

Sex:
Nutrient intake

All incomes
1971-74
1976-80

Diff.

Incomes above Eoverty
1971-74
1976-80

(%)

Diff.

Incomes below Eoverty
1971-74
1976-80

(%)

Diff.

(%)

Male
Calories
Protein (gm)
Calcium (gm)
Iron (mg)
Vitamin A (IU')
Vitamin C (mg)
Thiamine (mg)
Riboflavin (mg)
Niacin (mg)

2,393
93
1,018
14.15
5,138
90
1.49
2.26
20.15

2,381
92
979
15.54
5,680
108
1.56
2.27
23.89

-0.5
-1.1
-3.8
+9.8
+10.5
20.0
+4.7
+0.4
+18.6

2,434
95
1,033
14:39
5,173
93
1.51
2.29
20.67

2,410
94
986
15 .80
5,745
110
1.58
2.29
24.41

-1.0
-1.1
-4.5
+9.8
+11.1
+18.3
+4.6

1,618
64
725
9.88
4,431
83
1. 07
1. 61
13.59

1,578
60
679
10.61
4,637
93
1.06
1.53
15.45

-2.5
-6.3
-6.3
+7.4
+4.6
+12.0
-0.9
-0.5
+13 . 7

1,624
64
736
9.97
4,483
84
1.08
1.62
13. 75

1,582
61
687
10. 72
4,765
96
1.07
1.55
15.67

+18.1

2,108
80
914
12.51
4,597
73
1.37
2.03
16.49

2,214
84
956
14.04
5,197
93
1.48
2.12
20.52

+5.0
+5.0
+4.6
+12.2
+13.1
+27.4
+8.0
+4.4
+24.4

-2.6
-4.7
-6.7
+7.5
+6.3
+14.3
-0.9
-4.3
+14.0

1,571
59
672
9.16
4, 198·
71
1.04
1.51
12.15

1,557
57
642
10.00
3,966

-0.9
-3.4
-4.5
+9.2
-5.5
+8.5
+1.0
-3.3
+18.3

---

Female
Calories
Protein
Calcium
Iron
Vitamin A
Vitamin C
Thiamine
Riboflavin
Niacin

77

1.05
1.46
14.37

Source: Caloric and Selected Nutrient Values for Persons 1-74 Years of Age, First Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey, 1971-74, U.S. Dept. of Health and Welfare, Vital Health Statistics, Series 11 - Number 209 (June 1979); and
Dietary Intake Source Data: United States 1976-80, U.S. Dept. of Health and Welfare, Vital Health Statistics,
Series 11 - Number 231 (March 1983).
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tions and opportunities
erroneous payments in
to $1

for program abuse.

Conservative

the food stamp program alone are

billion today

(8 percent

direct federal feeding

of total

programs,

costs).

all with different

estimates of

placed at close

Fifteen

different

eligibility rules

and financing mechanisms add to the nearly 40 different payment schemes,
making good administration improbable at best.
the federal

In total,

government spent

these programs in fiscal year 1982.

billion on

Current projections for this fiscal

year show an increase to $17.6 billion.
tion,

nearly $16.3

Even after adjusting for infla

the rate of growth over the period 1970 to 1983 will be 11.9 per The food stamp program alone will have a real growth of

cent annually .

14 . 2 percent over this same period;

and even adjusted for participation

increases, still will show nearly a 10 percent annual growth rate .
Such rapid increases in federal expenditures are unmatched anywhere
in the

budget (they

even exceed

the growth

expenditures over the same period).
federal

budget that

period 1970~1981,
four times greater .

showed 3.7

food

real rate

fact

that

of annual

and nutrition program growth

growth over

the

rates were nearly

Total non-defense outlays similarly increased annu

grew over twice as fast.

simple

and Medicaid

Compared to the total outlay in the

ally at only a 6.2 percent real rate;

real rate of growth

in Medicare

The economy

over this period.
domestic food

slightly over a 2 percent rate in

again food and nutrition programs
itself only showed a 3.0 percent
But even more

production,

revealing is the

increased

this time period.

annually

at

It seems obvious,

but federal transfers to increase food consumption can only be sustained
so long as the food is produced.

The imbalances in rates of production

and transfers typifying the 1970s cannot long be sustained.
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It is somewhat ironic,

but despite the much publicized Reagan cuts

in domestic social programs and
in 1981 and

1982,

programs will

despite Congressional budget reductions

I confidently predict that

show an increase

domestic food assistance

in expenditures

for all four

years of

this administrations' term.
Domestic Food Assistance Options in 1985
There are
1985.

at least four

These include:

policy options

that could be

(1) Comprehensive Welfare Reform,

debated in
(2)

the New

Federalism approach, (3) increased direct commodity assistance,

and (4)

incremental reform of existing programs.
Comprehensive Welfare~:

Federal food assistance programs are

a major component of our domestic income security programs.
stamps have

long been advocated to

more flexible income
(at least in

support system,

the near future)

President Nixon's

be "cashed-out" into a

is

the likelihood

quite remote.

Family Assistance Plan

(FAP)

Program for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI),
between,

the

simple fact

is they

Given the large projected federal
significantly

reduced

increases in federal

funding
taxes.

While food
broader and

of this happening

Whether it
or

had been

President Carter's

or any of the many variants

all cost

money in

the short-term.

deficits such proposals would require
in

other

federal

programs

Neither can realistically

or

major

be expected to

happen.
New Federalism:

The current administration

cept of swapping federal and state

has advanced the con-

programs with the eventual return of

federal revenue sources to fund new state responsibilities.
internal administrative discussions included
grams being returned to states.

Initially,

all federal nutrition pro

The first formal proposal in early 1982
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included only the

food stamp program in the

food stamp program was deleted,

swap.

Subsequently,

the

and the administration's recently sub-

mitted new proposal for 1983 excludes any such swap.
The concept of federalism is an important precept in our democratic
form of government.

It is unfortunate

by many as a budgetary gimmick and
Nonetheless,

that current porposals are seen

not reviewed for their policy merit.

the last two years of

attention to federalism has clearly

established the principle of domestic food assistance programs (particularly food stamps)
unlikely

as a direct federal responsibility.

any such

proposal

will be

seriously

It is highly

considered that

would

change this reaffirmed principle.
Increased Commodity

Assistance:

grain stocks as well as dairy stocks

As

has already

been discussed,

are now being used to provide sup-

plemental food assistance to needy Americans.

On April 27,

1983,

the

administration announced that to the current distribution of CCC surplus
cheese and butter would be added rice, cornmeal, nonfat dry milk, flour,
and honey.
This is

a clear

programs, I believe,
programs.
ation,
ble.

example of where

Clearly the administration finds

However,
Direct

and most

like the PIK program,

this should only be a temporary

food distribution programs

are expensive to administer,
importantly lest we

itself in an awkward situ-

distribute such commodities is understanda-

ability to target needy individuals,
tance,

price support

have a negative impact on domestic food assistance

and the decision to

program.

misdirected farm

are

are inefficient

in their

not universal in their assis-

have limited nutritional benefit,

quickly forget,

were phased out

mid-1970s in favor of the current food stamp program.

in the
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An

example

of

the

difficulties

of

distribution program was recently evidenced
statement

that reduced

because of reduced
year's

the

monthly

a

This decision

program was

direct

in an administration policy

cheese distribution,

commercial sales.

cheese distribution

administering

either not

apparently

suggests the past
targeted to

needy

individuals, or if it was correctly targeted then the cheese substituted
for what

would have been purchased,

and if so then

such individuals'

welfare would have been enhanced by a simple reduction in the commercial
price of cheese.
Incremental Reform of
where we began.

for

This brings

us back to

One pundit has suggested, "we know that the future will

be similar to the
to the past."

Existing Programs:

past because in the past the

This captures what I

domestic food

assistance

future has been similar

believe will be the

programs'

basic setting

reauthorization in

1985

and

beyond.
The programs have developed a very strong,
set

of advocates.

changes should be
trative

While a

number of

intelligent,

very necessary

made to improve the program's

efficiency,

most

of these

changes will

and vocal

administrative

targeting and adminis
not be

accomplished

through legislation but administrative regulatory reform, if even then.
Both recently passed Senate and House First Concurrent Budget Reso
lutions for Fiscal Year 1984 and
for these

programs,

and in

child nutrition program

beyond assume no reduction in spending

fact both

and the special supplemental

women, infants, and children (WIC).
new initiatives
activities.

assume new initiatives

for the food

for the

food programs for

The House passed resolution assumes

stamp program and

commodity distribution

These differences will be resolved in conference.

Never-

140

theless,

the initial legislative signal sent

is not one of incremental

reform to reduce program costs through Fiscal Year 1986, but to the con
trary to increase these activities.
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A "SEMI-NEW" FARM PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR 1985
John F. Marten*
~

personal

Biases should be of

immediate concern to

always comfortable if audien·c es (readers)
egorize speakers or writers.

you.

It's

can "label" or otherwise cat-

Prepare to be uncomfortable.

I represent

no university, farm organization, government agency, or commodity group.
I don't even represent Farm Journal--at least not in any official capac
ity as concerns the views expressed below.
What I do represent is one voice among many,
requisite credentials
1985 and

beyond.

to comment on· the

My biases are

with (hopefully)

shape of U.S.

those of a realistic

economist who is also a moderately

farm

policy in

market oriented

leveraged farm owner.

grams which raise or lower crop prices

the

So farm pro-

by 10 percent are a serious sub

ject to me.
My introduction in order, let's proceed to the issues at hand.
Learning From History means at least

two things today.

prefer "semi - new" over new for this paper's title.
are rare.
straight.

And second,

I

Really new proposals

a brief look backward might help set the record

Our first question:

in farm policy?

First,

Are we_ really in need of a new direction

Three other alternatives could be that:

fine-tune the tools being used;

(a) we need to

or (b) we need different people operat

ing the tools; or (c) the recent disaster which gave birth to PIK is the
result of temporary factors.

It wouldn't surprise me if thinking folks

concluded that each of the four positions has some merit.

*Staff Economist, Farm Journal.
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A Blueprint for Disaster
It's fair to ask just how we

managed to re-accumulate a 1961 size,

or larger, surplus of crops in just 2 crop years.
corn

and

wheat combined

have

jumped

from

5.0-plus billion since 1981--up 250 percent!
8.3

billion bushels

and used

7.1

Carryover totals for

2.02 billion

bushels

Put differently,

billion bushels

of corn

we grew
annually.

Quite a feat!
How'd we manage it?
1.

A restrictive

Here are the 4 key ingredients.
monetary policy shift which

helped produce

lower inflation, higher nominal and real interest rates, a
severe recession here and overseas, a stronger dollar, and
weaker demand for U.S. crop exports.
2.

A very expansionary fiscal policy of tax cuts coupled with
increases in
The resulting

government spending--especially
deficits of

ously, be financed.

huge proportions

on defense.
must,

obvi

As funds flow in to do this, the dol

lar firms and exports get still weaker.

Odd as it sounds,

our current monetary and fiscal policy are working against
each other, rather than in concert as would seem logical.
3.

Relatively favorable
the surplus--yields

weather did contribute its
averaged about 5 percent

share to

higher than

trend for 1981 and 82.
4.

Congress, O.M.B.

and U.S.D.A.

combined to send producers

and users alike, the wrong signals.

By using the reserve

mechanism backwards, the trigger level (at least for corn)
became the market clearing level.

to

Only the low final com

pliance levels for the 1982 programs kept crop prices from
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zooming to
months.

"sub trigger levels"

and remaining

there for

In a nutshell, we moved away from a market orien

tation .
By now, any serious observer is aware of these key items.
course,

And, of

each could add his or her favorite items--lengthening the list.

What too few seem to realize is how close we came to an even bigger dis
aster with the 1982 farm programs.
The
U.S.D.A.

Trigger Trap

I'll use corn as the example.

came within

an

eyelash of

caught squarely in its jaws.

"stayed in"

rather than the

snapping shut

with

Had 50 percent of corn farmers

25 percent

who did,

the

following would

likely have occurred:
1.

Prices would

have been "sucked

up" toward the

$3. 15 and

$3.25 triggers--averaging $3-plus last December instead of
$2.15.
2.

Demand would have been even

weaker,

supply response even

stronger.
3.

Non-compliers would

have completed

all sales

just under

the trigger, leaving U.S.D.A. holding the entire carryover
along with no interest income, heavy storage payments, and
only

light

forfeitures

from those

farmers

who

didn't

understand the "rules of the game."
Why didn't farmers spring the trap?
lated.

With 80 percent initial signup,

stay- -pushing prices above the target

Mainly because they miscalcu
most figured 40 percent would

levels (no deficiency payment for

idled acres) and giving them trigger prices for full production.
The point:

We have increasingly deviated from a market orientation

for farm policy in recent years.

Believing that deeds speak louder than
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words, one has the legitimate right to peruse this evidence and question
those in charge who~ they
all the wrong levers
Farm Journal at

favor a market oriented policy.

were pulled in the spring of 1982

that time.

In addition to spawning

the PIK mechanism first used in the

30's and 60's,

Clearly,

as we warned in
another return to

it should serve all

current and future farm policy students with a classic model of "how not
do do it!"
With this perspective,
with interest,
dismounting."
lined above

I watched the administration's 1983 choices

knowing that "He who rides a tiger should have plans for
PIK was

and the

apparently it.

Considering the

options available,

it was

situation out-

a reasonable

choice.

Expensive and complicated, but a correct turn away from the "reserves as
a cornerstone" tiger, and back toward market realities.
PIK isn't a

bad "patch" to use until

Warts and all,

we have time to build

a new farm

program that works.
What Are the Goals?
The current policy debate concerning
and farm
goals.

income assumes

some (usually

sagging exports,
unwritten)

set

crop prices

of conflicting

They might include:
1.

Stabilize prices.

2.

Increase farmers' incomes.

3.

Reduce government outlays.

4.

Pressure other

countries to

allow more

export subsidies.
5.

Expand export markets.

6.

Subsidized exports for poor countries.

7.

Lower food costs to consumers.

imports or

cut
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8.

National defense considerations.

9.

Maintain our competitive position in world agriculture.

10.

Make re-election easier (politicians

write and interpret

farm policy!).
To this nominal list,
notion:

I urge the addition of the following general

The 1985 farm program should

be flexible enough to work effi

ciently in an unstable monetary and fiscal environment.
What is the Working Environment?
A major cause

of our current low price/high stocks

failure to build a policy package
ther problems

resulted by poor

debacle is the

which was flexible enough.
estimation of economic,

But fur

political and

weather conditions.
For 1985, I suggest we assume that:
1.

Yields will continue their upward trends, reaching 120 bu.
corn, 40 bu. wheat, 34 bu. soybeans, etc., by 1990.

Yield

plateaus occur only in the minds of the short-sighted!
2.

Sunspot

cycles

will

weather

throughout

persist,
the

giving

80's--then

relatively

returning

good

in

the

mid-90's to a periodic drouth cycle.
3.

Farm enlargement

will continue,

leaving fewer,

larger

farms.
4.

Food as a weapon will continue as a defense consideration,
in control of the State Department-- not U.S.D.A.

5.

Monetary and fiscal policy will remain somewhat unstable-
though
period.

hopefully

less

bothersome than

in

the

1980-83
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Revolution or Revision?
Ah, yes--the battle lines are being drawn.
plete revolution in

Those who favor a com

farm policy argue that the old

crop commodity pro

grams just won't work in an unstable economic climate; that both produc
ers and users get all the wrong
high;

etc.

They say:

signals;

that government costs are too

throw out the bad ideas and start over.

They

What I'll term the "revisionists" take a different approach.

Basi-

have a point.

cally,

they believe that:

the available

tools will work if made more

flexible; that the problem has been one of using the wrong tools for the
wrong purpose; and that no policy kit would have worked very well in the
recent economic climate.
Ultimately,

I'd prefer a set of policies that were revolutionary--

where revolutionary means they work!
that affect, or focus the debate.

Let's examine several key issues

We'll begin with my favorite issue.

Real Farmers Can't Get Target Prices!
Apparently, imaginary farmers in Washington,

academia,

etc.,

produce commodities and get the target price level for them.
caught up in this fantasy,

please listen

If you're

to how it really works.

following statements are accurate:
1.

Target prices have little if any direct impact on the real
market price.
tion

$1. 70.

to the

Cash corn in Iowa paid absolutely no atten
$2.70

target price

last

fall--it went

to

So, target prices pass the first test of a market

oriented analyst,

they don't interfere in any significant

way with the market clearing or rationing process involved
in "price discovery."

can

The
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2.

Target

prices are

thus

pn

outstanding income

tool.

They relate to bushels, pounds,

transfer

acres,

costs and

prices in an almost (as you'll see later) ideal way.
3.

There is no such thing as an "unpaid setaside" (A.R.P.) in
the real world.

idles productive land without

No farmer

Deficiency payments constitute

payment.

a major portion

of the "potential" payment farmers budget for A.R.P. seta
side.

They also add potential loan benefits and (in 1982)

the direct

entry premium

and first

year storage

income

plus free interest.
4.

Target prices are

not paid on what

deficiency payments are the same
5 bu/acre or 50!

Actual

you produce.

whether your wheat makes

So, contrary to what some think,

there

is no way to add fertilizer to produce for target prices.
5.

Target

prices

receive.

bear

no relationship

to

the

price

~

Deficiency payments are based on national aver-

age prices and loan rates.

Somewhere,

the 82 program failed to set

up a qualified storage situ-

ation for
$1.83.

reserve entry.

Perhaps

the

he sold his

corn for

His neighbor took the $2.90 reserve plus 16~ storThen he bid 20 percent

age to May--that's $3.06 so far.
in

a corn farmer in

PIK

purchase

option

$3.00--that's another 60~/bu;

and
his

sold

the

bonus

for

total is $3.66/bushel.

Each get the same 15~/bu. deficiency payments, even though
one farm got twice as much
is how it really works!

for his actual 82 crop.

This
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6.

Only in rare circumstances (when there is not unpaid seta
side required) has any farmer received deficiency payments
without experiencing

an offsetting

deficiency payments are
land diversion.
farmers do)

cost .

In

used as "maybe money"

Clearly,

U.S.D.A.

to idle land--farmers

the programs.

don't do it to

to procure

calculates

the potential deficiency payment

acre idled when setting up

practice,

(as all

amount per

It costs money

be patriotic.

But

since the idled acre payments (deficiency payments) aren't
guaranteed,

farmers are forced to

do lots of mental gym

nastics--the payoff is probabilistic and uncertain.

Obvi

ously, this confuses the "program signal" and thus reduces
compliance.
7.

target prices--really

In practice,

ciency payments--have
Farmers

aren't

intended.
duction,
payments,

the resulting

taken the place of

getting the

income

defi-

paid diversion.

transfer

originally

The resulting confusion tends to increase prolower farm income,
and

reduce government deficiency

increase (sharply)

government costs

for

loans, interest, storage, etc.
I will remain a staunch

Summary:
someone develops

those who profess

a better income

advocate of target prices until

transfer mechanism.

to favor a market orientation attempt

I

shudder when
to "throw out"

such a good tool.
To me,

being politically realistic and market oriented means keep

ing the "target price sandpile" for the
to play

in!

Otherwise,

"we must help farmers now" cats

we'll gravitate

toward ever higher

loan and
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reserve rates .

It doesn't take much

sophistication to figure out that

we're now in a period where the market clearing price that keeps us comis below the desired income

petitive and productive

levels in agricul-

Nor that the most efficient way is to pay cash directly to those

ture.

damaged by the economic and defense policies being followed at present.
I'm sure the

Canadians and Argentinians are

in hopes

we'll discard

option.

They've already expanded production in response to the massive

umbrella we've

target prices and

watching us carefully

raised on

grower in Saskatchewan. .

their behalf.

go with

the high

Imagine the

loan rate

joy of

a wheat

His dollar is now just 80 percent of ours;

so

effectively, his price umbrella has been raised from $3.60 to $4.50.

If

he's lucky we'll continue stumbling into protectionism, trade wars, ever
higher loan rates, etc.
This "fortress America" mentality could
And those

who oppose it

There's a rumor

most,

could

going around that a

golden age of growth and achieve a

be just around the corner.

give it birth!

Not convinced?

country once set out
balanced budget,

to promote a

but that some mis

calculations produced a minidepression and

budget deficits that tripled

the previous

to worthy objectives

direct,
ronment.

record!

So yes,

involves compromise,

the path

is not

and will be approved in a political envi -

We aren't in fairyland!

Whither Loan Rates?
Unlike target prices, loan rates aren't (or shouldn't be) an income
transfer device where the political process determines the level.
opinion, loan rates should be:

In my
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1.

Flexible enough

to adjust up

and down as

market signals

dictate.

This means

guidance.

Congress could easily write a law that set loan

rates automatically

looking at soybeans and

at 90 percent

of the

cotton for

average market

price for the first half (6 months) of the last three mar
keting years.
2.

A source of financing to

farmers to smooth out marketings

and stabilize prices -- at least to some degree.
3.

Beyond

the control

O.M . B.

of the

Secretary

of Agriculture

or

Our past 2 years experience demonstrates that the

short run "fix" of reduced

budget outlays for paid diver 

sions and export promotion can cause billions to be wasted
later and

interfere with

It happened.

the market

clearing mechanism.

This still leaves plenty of options,

while

preventing a repeat of this year when our response to huge
surpluses was to raise (should, of course, lower) the loan
rate!
Summary:

That's it.

from being in

Just pass legislation that precludes the U. S.

the position of the non-competitive

outsider looking it!

We'd guarantee that:
1.

Users would get the "correct" signal.

2.

Other producing nations (and U.S.

farmers)

would get the

correct signal.
3.

If we

are the lowest

cost producers,

we

would (eventu

ally):
a.

dominate the market;

b.

run our agriculture at full throttle; and thus

c.

stimulate demand and the world economy through trade.
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Are Reserves Worth Having?
Having fully established
consider the
always had

myself in the "revisionist"

existing reserve
reserves,

but

framework.

we used

opposed on grounds that they overhang

Cynics

to call

camp,

tell me

that we've

them surpluses.

the market,

let's

They're

that they inevitably

become politicized and are used for direct income support as in 82,

and

that they are very expensive.
Support for the concept comes from those who:
1.

View reserves as a price stabilizing mechanism--collecting
grain in low

priced times and releasing

it when supplies

are short.
2.

Think reserves are
rectly,

to

if used cor-

a valuable policy tool,

temporarily reduce

or delay

income transfer

payments to the farm sector.
3.

Worry about protecting consumers (and livestock producers)
against "wild" and unstable commodity price fluctuations.

4.

Think we need solid inventory levels to promote confidence
in the U.S. as a reliable supplier of farm products.

As with

the target

price concept,

the "sanctity"

of the

reserve concept has taken a terrific battering when placed in use.
other farmers,

I've been

astonished at

how easily

could be "changed."

Changing rollover rules,

selling reserves (as

bonus bushels)

year contract,

etc.

Farmers,

using

Like

reserve contracts
reserves for PIK,

just months after agreeing

as you would expect,

grain

to a 3

have lost most of

their zest for reserves since the rules keep changing almost monthly.
To stimulate thought, consider the possibility that Congress passed
reserve provisions in 1981 that were precisely backwards.

They allowed
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"caps," but only above 700 million· bushels
els of corn.

of wheat and 1 billion bush

Had they reversed this rule, it would have been impossible

to accumulate 3 billion bushels of corn and sorghum.
If we choose to

keep the reserve concept in 1985,

we should con-

sider the following guidelines:
1.

A specific cap level by crop which approximates a "comfortable" level of buffer stocks--unlike Joseph in the Bible,
I doubt we need a seven-year supply!

2.

No direct entry--this

to prevent abuse as

an income sup

port mechanism.
3.

No (or

low)

premiums

for entry--they

aren't needed

to

entice entry.
4.

Storage payments at commercial rates adjusted annually.

5.

No

interest charges

for reserve

grain unless

it is

in

release status--farmers would still owe the initial inter
est for the nine month regular loan period.
6.

Release or trigger levels set at 140 or 150 percent of the
current loan rate without regard

to what year the reserve

was entered.
7.

Legal sanctity of the
tinuation of

reserve contract--including discon

any rollover provision except

where quality

deterioration is confirmed by A.S.C.S.
Summary:

the

On paper,

reserve notion

tool--it certainly could be, and has been.
it's used only as intended,
At present it

I'd

sounds

!:!Y

point:

useful

Legislated tightly to insure

guess broad support would materialize.

looks pitiful--just like any cross-cut saw

used to pound nails.

like a

that has been

It can be re-sharpened and will still

cut wood in the hands of a good carpenter.
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Structure, Payment Limits, Target Prices and Cost Curves
You guessed right,

these four items are all

Let's see

related.

why, going one at a time.
Family farms

we are told,

should

maintain the structure of agriculture,

have their income
keep

out the corporate and for

eign "bad guys" and promote what's right in America.
our hands and

organize studies to locate

from profiting from federal largesse.
to subsidize inefficient
into bankruptcy.

Annually, we wring

the "bad guys" and

stop them

As of yet, no way has been found

farmers to prosperity,

But the search will

supported to

go on!

nor

efficient farmers

Our society believes it

should.
Payment limitations (now $50,000 if it's cash)
social goal of protecting structure.

were born from this

Further, Congress desired politi-

cal avoidance of appearing to subsidize rich land owners.
ble.

But, as fate always dictates, reality wins out when "people rules"

conflict with "economic
ducers to produce.
farms

Understanda-

rules."

Taken to the extreme,

producing and

all small

approach used by Congress~ be
to stop!

Such

Payment limits just

irony.

cohorts for finding

force bigger pro

we could end up with all big

ones clipping

setaside.

Oddly,

the

accelerating the trend they are trying

Here a personal salute to

a way around the

Secretary Block and

social rules this year.

goal is to idle land, everyone should get with it!

If the

Not just the little

farmers.
Cost curves, economies of scale,
economists, apparently.
ing to the right

etc.,

are interesting only to us

We know (I think) that they are downward slop-

with respect to volume;

that it's

cheaper to produce
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the 500th

acre of grain

farmers

grow 80

income;

and that

than the 50th;

percent of

that

the crop--and

about 20 percent

make

all of

the profits achieved at the margin

of the

the net

farm

from an efficient

volume generate the cash to buy still more land.
Why has farm policy never recognized this?
els promote the "less farms" trend.
tive.

Fixed target price lev

Which is fine, if that's the objec

But it also pushes up land prices and cash rents.

ing with averages
Bruce Bullock

is particularly dangerous.

pointed out in a

I think work-

Missouri

paper delivered to an

Economist,

earlier national

agriculture policy symposium in Kansas City (March 28, 1983) that,
average farmer lost money in 1981.

But on the other hand,

unit of product was produced at a profit."

Bravo!

J.

"The

the average

The cost curve does

slope downward in the relevant range.
The next step is to get this practical fact into the policy appara
tus.

We know averages won't fix

what's ailing us.

(Be reminded that

the average person has one breast and one testicle!!)
Target prices could serve as an appropriate ve ~Lcle.

Why not shape

target prices (perhaps diversion payments also) like the cost curve?
output rises, target prices would decline.
get price might be $4.50 for the

For example:

As

the wheat tar

first 200 acres or 6,000 bushels,

and

then decline by 10~/bu. for each added 100 acres.
Some of the consequences of

adopting this "semi-new" concept might

be:
1.

Congress could

do away with

tion.
2.

Affected larger farmers would:
a.

Complain loudly,

the $50,000

payment limita
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b.

Come to understand the concept over time,

c.

Scurry

to

adjust

business

organization

to

regain

higher benefit levels if loopholes existed,
d.

Be less competitive in bidding for land,

e.

Cash rent some of their land to a smaller operator who
qualified for higher levels of income transfer.

3.

Government outflows would decline--perhaps substantially.

4.

Social goals

as concern

the "family

farm" would

be met

more closely.
5.

Land prices

would be less likely

to ratchet higher

as a

result of income transfers.
It seems clear then, that policy objectives of providing price sta
bility and supporting

low farm income must be

handled separately.

If

income supports are pegged at levels which meet the costs of small farm
ers,

then larger farmers are stimulated to over-produce and have excess

profits which are bid into land.
From the standpoint

of economic efficiency,

income

support would

cost least if it were paid directly to each qualified farmer.
that policy be politically acceptable?
payments,

an

excellent "second

I doubt it.

best" choice

But would

In lieu of direct

is the

graduated target

price support system outlined above.
Who Will

the Bill?

~

A recent public opinion survey by Cambridge Reports,
tesy of the Monsanto folks)

shows 78

protecting

at government

farmers' income

higher levels.
crops.

But,

And,

Inc.,

(cour

percent support for the notion of
expense--and

at current

or

65 percent supported minimum price guarantees for

64 percent opposed cash

payments for not planting crops.
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Apparently,

the public

increased exports,

favors a policy of

relatively full production,

and a safety net when prices are too low.

I agree,

as would a slight majority of farmers.
A Summary of the "Semi-New"
Whether

you consider

these thoughts

minor

revisions or

leaps will depend on your biases and alternative proposals.
case you're hooked on one or more of the ideas developed;

quantum

But just in
here are some

added thoughts which would round out and restate the package:
1.

Soybeans (and other oilseeds)
see it.

2.

are in good shape now as I

Why fix them if they aren't broke!

Foodgrains,

Feedgrains and Cotton

would (could)

all be

treated similarly--or, left with today's differences.
3.

Reserve rules would

be tightened considerably and

specified--without these
dangerous to

safeguards,

have around"

reserves

and will--when

a cap

are "too

the political

heat comes--be abused again.
4.

Loan

rates would

This insures

be set

at

a competitive,

market determined
efficient farm

levels.

sector and

heavy exports.
5.

Sale of CCC stocks might be precluded.
used up as fL-480 gifts,
"enhancers."

They could all be

PIK payments,

In any event,

or export volume

stocks accumulation wouldn't

be a serious problem .
6.

Supply control
with one

remain as

they are

exception--potential deficiency

no longer be
side."

options could

allowed as "currency" to

today

payments would

buy "unpaid seta

The law, for example, could set a statutory upper
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limit of idling 20 percent of base acres and require that
25 percent of

the maximum deficiency payment

advance for each 5 percent
ed--and with

be paid in

of "unpaid setaside" request

no refunds due

A.S.C.S.

if

prices rally!

(This latter case applies in 1983.)
7.

Diversion payments,
for supply control.

then,

would remain as a backup tool.

It seems

whether payments come in cash

to make little difference
or kind.

Farmers respond

to the level of benefits--if they're good,

the land gets

idled!
8.

Target Prices
mechanism.
level

the central

income transfer

The public (and politicians) would decide the

of transfer

would then
you

would become

that was

appropriate.

be automatically graduated (or

prefer)

to

match the

typical

Such

levels

discounted if

cost

efficiencies

related to volume of output.
9.
10.

The $50,000 payment limitation would be scrapped.
Export financing

options and promotion would

still need

special funding.

Direct export subsidies would no longer

be needed since our prices would be world prices.
Signing Off
Some might conclude that adjusting to market prices is too severe a
move at this time.

Or, that no changes are needed,

will soon drop and the dollar will then weaken.
won't fund the deficiency payments.
I started

with the notion of

Or,

since the deficits
that the taxpayer

But what are the alternatives?
a market oriented farm

policy,

and

then added the pieces necessary to (maybe) bring the package to the edge
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of political acceptability.

There must obviously be compromise--meaning

that some pain along with pleasure is involved for consumers, producers,
and taxpayers collectively.

But do note that only pain is proposed for

other exporting nations!
Each of us has

something to gain by policies which

petitive, producing U.S. farm sector.
nomic growth will result.
have to accept

Trade will expand and world eco-

Given the current situation,

the political necessity of inco~e

prices) even though it leaves a bad taste.
of getting
again.

loan rates back to

Once having faced this

reality,

And this for the bigger goal
and

exports moving

formulating separate programs

for price stability and income support will

more years.

some of us may

support tools (target

competitive levels,

biting the bullet--it will be easier to

promote a com-

be easy.

The hard part is

just sit sucking on it for four

A "SEMI-NEW" FARM PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR 1985:

DISCUSSION

Richard Goodman*
Dr.

I believe,

Marten provides a good and,

correct swnrnation of

mistakes made in the provisions of 1982 commodity programs--reserve loan
premiums, direct entry into the reserve,
I agree with his thesis

too high.
good a

that the target price concept is as

market oriented income transfer

devised.

Also,

I agree that target

deficiency payments
payments when

and reserve trigger prices set

mechanism as has thus

far been

prices and the resulting possible

are appropriately

characterized as

the Secretary of Agriculture

loud diversion

calls for some level

of an

acreage reduction program (ARP).
However the Secretary should have
get prices from year
have provided.
pliance in

more flexibility in setting tar-

to year than the 1973,

and 1981 Farm Acts

1977,

There can be years when USDA would want substantial com

an ARP program

calling for

a more attractive

target price

level and other years when compliance should not be so compelling.
I don't

agree with

Dr.

Marten about

prices--that they don't stimulate production.
ciency payments,

target

price

-fertilizer and
county ASCS

regarding target

Target prices,

or defi-

are based on permitted planted acreage times the indi-

vidual farm's proven yield.
the

one thing

in

Good smart

decisions

farmers will take into account

regarding

other chemicals--because a

office this year means

yield

enhancing

imputs-

higher proven yield

higher potential target

at the

price pay

ments next year.
Otherwise I commend John Marten for a very thoughtful and stimulat-

*Vice President, Continental Grain
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ing paper on farm
loan rates,

programs for 1985.

I agree with

reserves for reserve purposes

his views on lower

only--not as a price support

mechanism--, payment limitations, and "degraduated" target prices.
latter

might also

reduce

or eliminate

the

incentive

to farmers

increase yields to maximize later years' target price payments.
wise proven farm yields
year farm act and
year farm act.

should be frozen at the beginning

adjusted only at the beginning of

The
to

Other -

of each four

the following four

POLICY ISSUES FOR U.S. COTTON
Keith Collins"'
This paper surveys recent past
the U.S. cotton market.

The methods used to implement the policies are

The genesis

also examined.

and upcoming policy developments in

of commodity market

issues can

often be

found in a market's balance sheet; the further a market variable is from
its historical

trend,

the

more prominent

related to the ~ariable become.

and pressing

Accordingly,

the questions

this paper opens with an
Because excess

overview of a balance sheet for the U.S. cotton market.
supply is the dominant issue,

the rest of the paper discusses how three

primary policy instruments--loan rate, target price,
relate to the
changed.

excess supply problem and how these

Two demand issues,

textile

and base acreage-
instruments might be

imports and export subsidies are

also discussed.
A Perspective for Policy
Supply/Demand Prospects
The current

situation and future prospects

define a set of feasible policies.
put too high

However,

for a market

care must be taken not to

a probability on projections and thereby

choices available to policymakers.
the Agriculture

and Food Act of

The

limit the policy

policy variables prescribed by

1981 have some

limitations (discussed

later) when markets face excess supplies and low prices.
the role of forecasts
stated by

An example of

in setting policy parameters in the

the Chief Economist of

can help

the Senate Committee

Nutrition, and Forestry, concerning target prices:

,',Agricultural Economist, Crops Branch, NED, ERS, USDA

1981 Act was

on Agriculture,
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... they are not established in a mechanistic manner.
In the farm
bill, target prices were set below the forecast season average
price for 1982-85 crop years.
In this manner no deficiency pay
ments were forecast to be made, and budget exposure was reduced.
(Bailey, p. 966.)
In Agricultural-Food Policy Review:
1981 USDA publication
the 1981 farm

bill,

Perspectives for the 1980's, a

intended to provide background

for discussion of

the following conclusion was drawn

on the opening

page:
The long period of overproduction,
burdensome surpluses,
and
depressed farm prices now seems behind us, although there may still
be occasional years of excess production. (USDA, p. i.)
The conventional wisdom in early
first half of the
the 1981 Act.

1980s,

1981 foretold scarcity during the

and this view played a role

in the design of

Although too much reliance on forecasts is hazardous, the

concept of using forecasts is desirable.

Policy must be sensitive to a

market's prospects so that the instruments needed to move from prospects
to achieve policy objectives will be available.
Prospects for U.S.

cotton during

the next several years,

1983/84

through 1985/86, point to a stagnant market, with total demand below the
boom period of the late 1970s (Table 1).

This view is contained in the

current Economic Research Service baseline,
a year

which projects crop

market variables

(also see Starbird and Collins) .
ometric simulations

an exercise conducted twice
10 years into

The numbers are a combination of econ-

and analysts' judgements.

The forecasts

and the assumed policies do

official USDA numbers,

the future

are not

not represent USDA

Obviously, the policies for 1984 and 1985 have not yet been

decisions.
determined.

On the demand
from the

side,

SO-year low

domestic mill use is expected

of 5.3 million

bales during

to rise slowly

1981/82.

Cotton's
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Table 1.

A cotton market baseline:

1982/83-1985/86
Crop year

Item

1976-80 avg.

1982

1983

1984

1985

-million balesBeginning stocks

3.8

6.6

8.0

5.3

5.0

Production

12.3

12.0

8.8

11.5

11. 8

Supply

16.1

18.7

16.8

16.8

16.8

Mill use

6.4

5.5

5.8

5.9

6.0

Exports

6.3

5.3

5.8

6.0

6.2

Total use

12.7

10.8

11.6

11. 9

12.2

Ending stocks

3.6

8.0

5.3

5.0

4.7

-cents per poundTarget price

71

76

81

86

Loan rate

55

55

55

55

Area planted

13.4

11.5

8.1

10.9

11. 1

Area harvested

12.5

9.9

7.8

10.4

10.6

471

582

540

530

535

Yield (lbs./ac.)

-percentAcreage reduction program

0

Cash diversion program
PIK program
Participation:

0

all programs

15

20

30

30

0

0-5

0

0

0

10-30

0

0

78

95

73

70
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share of total fiber use has stabilized in recent years,

and at retail,

it has

such

gained in several important

shirts and slacks
blend" fabrics

apparel categories,

and women's apparel.

(at least

60 percent

The marketing
cotton)

durable press seem to have sparked the gains.

and

as men's

of the "natural

high-cotton content

On the other hand, there

are other markets, such as sheets, where cotton is losing share.
over,

the nanmade fiber industry

with

ever-increasing cotton-like

continues to develop polyester staple
properties.

enough market strength to pull mill use
as total fiber use grows.
key factor constraining
account for nearly

More-

However,
growth.

Cotton

seems to

have

toward the 6 million bale level

cotton textile imports will be the

They have doubled since

25 percent of cotton

sold at retail in

1975 and now
the form of

textiles.
Exports led the boom of the
in 1975 to

1970s,

9.2 million in 1979.

growing from 3.3 million bales

The sustained

scarcity scenarios for

the early 1980s--now fairly unlikely--were based on an expected continuation of this trend.
the

emergence of

bales--a fifth

The export growth of the 1970s

China as

a huge

of world trade in

number of exporting areas:
the early 1980s it

cotton importer
1979)

can be traced to
(nearly 4

million

and production slowdowns

Turkey, Pakistan, Sudan, and Nicaragua.

seems clear that China intends to

in a
In

be as self-suffi

cient as possible through increased cotton and manmade fiber production.
Changing government policies

have turned production around

in Pakistan

and Sudan, although Central America remains a question mark.
The best way to project U.S. exports may be to examine foreign production and use trends,

excluding the USSR and China .

tries impart the greatest uncertainty to projections.

These two coun
With area stabi-
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lizing in the USSR,
country appears

and China tending toward self-sufficiency,

to be

a source of

imports in the early 1980s.
duction gap,
increase

in

200,000 bales

excluding the
the gap--a
a year.

major changes

in world

neither

exports or

Figure 1 shows the foreign consumption proUSSR and

measure

of

China.

needs--of

Table 1 allow for

some

mies recover from current recessions,

trend suggests

foreign cotton

Projections in

into the world market for China,

The

an

around

some reentry

growth in demand as world econo
and

some gain in Soviet exports,

suggesting an initial export spurt from current low levels,

then annual

increases in U.S. exports of 200,000 bales.
So,
1985/86.
acres,

Table 1 indicates that total use reaches 12.2 million bales by
But

this demand is capable

far below

of supporting around

the 14.3 million averaged

this year's base of 15.4 million.
even less acreage must

12 million

during 1980/81-1981/82 and

Moreover, current high stocks suggest

be planted between now and 1985,

if weather is

normal and stocks are to be worked down.
CONCLUSION:
prices,

Potential acreage for

is between 13.5 and 14.5

the underlying demand
to be planted from

million acres.

given current target
With normal weather,

trends indicate substantially less

now through 1985,

move toward balance.

harvest,

if the U.S.

Given a policy goal of

acreage ought

cotton market is to

protecting farm incomes,

the primary policy issue is how to simultaneously accomplish income pro
tection and acreag~ control.
Immediate Issue:

~

Policy for 1984

The policy agenda for 1984 starts

with the USDA analyzing alterna-

tive policies during the spring and summer

of 1983.

A set of policies

under consideration will then be published in the Federal Register prob-
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ably in July,

and comments from the

public o~ the alternatives will be

In late summer and fall, the comments

accepted during a 60-day period.

will be considered, 1983 yield estimates and 1984 use forecasts refined,
and a final policJ formulated and announced.
Although the stock

One policy objective will be to reduce stocks.
objective is certainly
level that

an issue,

is viewed as adequate

protection against low yields,
prices.

4 million bales is

The 1983

and cause

farm prices to be near target
program was

but not to reach

required some 55 to 60 percent of
tion uses,

designed to move

To reach it

it.

would have

total base acreage to be in conserva

while the 1983 limit was set at 45 percent.

August 1, 1984,

afford some

to meet pipeline needs,

payment-in-kind (PIK)

toward this objective,

a widely accepted

projected at 5.3 million bales,

With stocks on

another acreage reduc

tion is needed for 1984.
Under the

provisions of the

the likely choices

1981 Act,

are a

large acreage reduction program alone or one combined with either a cash
diversion or PIK program.
a

program,

large

Having no program is not an option.

expected deficiency

expected allocation factor

payments (even

of 70 to 80 percent)

acreage and increasing stocks.

Without

after using

an

would cause excessive

At the least, a large acreage reduction

program seems a foregone conclusion because policymakers can expect high
participation,

as

the deficiency payment rate

like it could be quite high

at this point.

ages larger than 25 to 30 percent

on the 1984

crop looks

Acreage reduction percent-

wou~d likely be ineffective in reduc

ing acreage further, as declining program participation would offset the
higher required percentage reduction.
The choice of whether to add a

large PIK or a large cash diversion
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to the

acreage reduction

program is

difficult.

PIK

distributes CCC

recoverable outlays--loans that could be repaid by growers or CCC stocks
that could

be sold.

requires strong

But,

for the

market prices.

acquiring the PIK needs

CCC to

Even though

for 1983,

recover the
the USDA

another PIK is a

loan outlays
has a

problem

candidate for 1984

because it has proved so effective in reducing acreage, and growers generally like it.

An important factor is that it is exempt from the pay-

ment limit of $50,000 per person.
A large cash diversion faces

participation problems,

because many

growers in the mid-South and West would reach the payment limit.

A PIK

offer rate of 80 percent of program yield is equivalent to a cash diversion rate of
needed to

about 40 cents a

pound.

offset the large expected

A large cash

diversion rate is

deficiency payment a

sacrifice by participating in a cash diversion.

grower would

Clearly, a cash diver-

sion program would be expensive.
It is possible to run both the added PIK or cash diversion programs
under a bid system.

Such a program would likely be somewhat less expen

sive than having USDA set a fixed PIK offer rate or cash diversion rate.
CONCLUSION:
for 1984/85.
sion or PIK

Table 1 shows a

30-percent acreage reduction program

Stocks are reduced only slightly.
could reduce stocks to the 4

but increase the risk associated with

Adding the cash diver-

million-bale stock objective,

a bad 1984 yield.

Compared with

the 30 percent acreage reduction alone, adding PIK would probably reduce
Commodity Credit Corporation

outlays on the 1984 crop,

cash diversion would probably increase them.

but adding the
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Broader~ Issues
Loan Rates
The loan rate is generally accepted as a price that enables growers
to avoid cash flow problems caused
kets in

order to prevent
Simultaneously,

tion.

production.
ous market

by the instability of commodity mar

resources from unnecessarily

leaving produc-

the loan rate should not attract resources into

Because the cotton loan rate is based on percent of previprices,

it

probably does

a better

job of

not distorting

opportunity costs than do the loan rates for other crops,
are discretionary.

For example,

its 55-cent-a-pound floor,
raised 10

many of which

the 1983 loan rate for cotton fell to

but loan rates

cents above their floors,

for wheat and corn were both

even though those

crops suffered

from the same excessive supplies and low prices as cotton.
issues are:

(1)

are loan rates

Two current

too high relative to production costs

and (2) are loan rates inhibiting export sales?
A suggestion for preventing loan rates from interfering with oppor
tunity costs is to
tion of

set them to cover variable cash

previous years' income

Groenewegen and Clayton
income available for
four-year average.

available for fixed

jected U.S.

cash expenditures.

suggest that a reasonable portion

fixed cash expenses is 50 percent

to cover the

of the previous

Fifty percent is used because it was about the U.S.

average income available to cover fixed
during 1977 to 1980.

outlays plus a por 

cash expenditures for all crops

Using this suggestion for cotton with a 1983 pro

variable cost (less ginning)

and the 1979/80-1982/83 U.S.

of 45 cents a pound (Table 2)

average of income available for fixed cash

expenses of 21 cents a pound, suggests a loan rate of 55.5 cents a pound
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(45 + .5 x (21)).

So this computed rate turns out to be about equal to

the actual 1983 loan rate.
Another loan rate

issue is its effect on exports.

can reduce exports in two ways .
loan rate
falling,

can be underbid by

price

prices

prices supported by the

high

U.S.

prices

share of world trade.

are a major determinant of the

a loan rate that is set
will cause

U.S.

foreign competitors without

leading to a loss in the U.S.

because U. S.
prices,

First,

The loan rate

Second,

structure of world

well above the free market equilibrium

world prices

and reduce

the

volume of

world

imports.
Figure

2 shows

the difference

prices in Northern Eruope.

between U.S.

The U.S.

and foreign

cotton

price is for Memphis Territory M

1-3/32-inch cotton and the foreign price is

the Outlook A index for the

same quality (an average of the 5 lowest priced growths quoted in Northern Europe).

A rule of

thumb for

the difference between

prices and the Northern Europe price is
rate is causing loss of market share,
U.S.

cotton is

cents--the price

15 cents a pound.

If the loan

crop U.S.

loan rate

plus 15

widen because

the price

of U.S.

cotton is held artificially high through
differential does widen,

farm

when the Northern Europe price of

below 72 cents--the 1982
differential should

U.S.

the loan rate mechanism.

but only very slightly,

The

and this implies some

loss of U.S. export share.
Econometric analysis suggests that the
price for U.S.

cotton could have been

1982/83 season average farm

about 45 cents a

price supports, 13 cents less than it will likely average.
ton demand is price inelastic.
cent,

or

22 percent,

drop in

pound without
Foreign cot

Assuming the elasticity to be -0.1, a 13
world price

caused by

eliminating or
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greatly reducing

the loan during

1982/83 might have

increased foreign

consumption by 1.3 million bales (.22 x .1 x 60 million bales).
ing that

this rise increased

took about a third, U.S.

imports by the

same amount and

Assum
the U.S.

exports might have risen by as much as 400,000

bales.

CONCLUSION:

Because the loan rate is set at less than 100 percent

of market prices in earlier years (which in an inflationary period would
be an

even smaller percent

of the

current trend price),

it probably

causes less resource misallocation than loan rates for many other crops.
The loan level

seems defensible on the basis of

cash production costs,

but it is high enough to be likely causing a loss of export sales.
Target Prices
Target prices have long been
on the role of culprit,
view is that
tion.

or

controversial and recently have taken

flaw,

they are now set

in current commodity programs.

high enough to encourage

The

excess produc

This is reflected in the Secretary of Agriculture's recent propo-

sal to freeze 1984 targets at 1983 levels.

The major issues are (1) do

target prices encourage excess cotton acreage,

(2)

how should they be

determined, and (3) what volume of production should they cover?
Table 2 shows cotton target prices
through 1985 crop

years.

floors in the 1981 Act.

and variable costs for the 1975

The projected target prices
The

are the minimum

projected cost and deflator were obtained

from the USDA baseline exercise.

The table indicates steady increases

in both the nominal and the inflation-adjusted (deflated) per-pound dif
ference between the target price and
deflated difference in
averaged during 1977-79.

variable cost.

1985/86 is over 13 percent
When applied to

For example,

the

above the difference

the higher yields assumed in
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attractive crop.

In four of the

deficiency of payment.

years,

there was an expected sorghum

For cotton there were only two years of expected

payments, and these had small payment rates.
efited in 1978 and

Cotton may also have ben

1979 because there were 10 percent

set-aside and 10

percent -cash diversion programs in effect for sorghum.
Although target prices
cotton area

expansion of

exceed market prices
years suggests
volume of

may not have had a significant
the 1970s,

the expectation

and grow faster than

that the method

production they

used to

-should cover

Target prices are an equity concept;

role in the

that they

costs in the next

couple of

establish their level
will become

will

and the

important issues.

they exist to provide income sup-

port to narrow the gap between farm and non-farm income when crop prices
are low.

Prior

based on parity

to the 1973 Act,
prices.

the level of guaranteed

Target prices were established

prices was

with the 1973

Act and their level was based on the index of prices paid for inputs and
on yields.

Starting with the 1977 Act, target prices were based on per

acre production
aimed

costs and yields.

at establishing

a level

Clearly,

that assured

these concepts
the grower

were all

some sort

of

"fair" return.

In the 1981 Act,
prices,

the Secretary

was given discretion to set target

and the cost of production formulas were eliminated.

However,

minimum target prices were established, and these reduced the ability of
policymakers

to let

market

prices clear

markets

when supplies

were

excessive.
But,

it is not the level of the target alone that is critical,

is also the production level on which it applies.
the 1977 Act was to make

it

A critical feature of

deficiency payments cover production from cur-
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rent plantings,

rather than from allotments.

When there is no acreage

control program and market price is below target, the grower's effective
price becomes the target price for whatever is produced.
get prices applied

to current plantings can combine

So, high tar-

to completely dis

tort the resource allocation signal of market prices.

There is no flex-

ibility

levels,

to

reduce

target

policymakers no alternative
The issue now is:

prices

below

minimum

but to implement acreage

leaving

control programs.

should flexibility be increased further by eliminat-

ing or reducing the minimum target prices?
even the target price itself,

Alternatively, the floor, or

could be made a function of market prices

through a formula, or set at a percent of the loan rate,

which is based

on a market-price formula.
Such proposals emphasize market efficiency,
lower target prices when market prices fall,
at the time

cept,

many

they reduce income support

when many persons would view support

emphasis on equity rather than efficiency.
persons prefer a

but because they imply

as most desirable--an

Because it is an equity con

cost-based definition for

target prices.

However, as pointed out by Sharples and Krenz and Pasour, costs are dif
ficult to measure,

measurable input

expenditures likely do not reflect

opportunity costs,

and costs tend to

follow prices because profits get

capitalized into the price of inputs such as land.

CONCLUSION:

The target price issue is not that they have been set

artificially high encouraging expansion of cotton area in the 1970s, but
that they may
1980s.
prices.

As a

hold this expanded land
result,

base in production in

greater flexibility is needed

the early

in setting target

This may mean lower minimum levels, market price formulas,

applying target prices

to only a small

percent of base--50 to

or

60 per-
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cent--or a fixed level of

planted area--400 acres--with production from

remaining acreage sold at market prices.
Cotton Acreage Base
Current cotton base--the concept used to determine how much land is
to be idled and how much

production is eligible for deficiency payments

and loans under acreage reduction programs--is 1981 acreage or the aver
age of 1980 and 1981, whichever is larger.

The issues are:

is base out

of control, and if so, what should be done to bring it under control?
Consider the data for
base acreage that differs

1983 PIK crops in Table 3 .
the most from area planted in

were used to calculate current bases.
could have

been too

established bases.

Cotton has the

It would appear that cotton base

liberally awarded
Further,

the years that

to growers

the Omnibus

who appealed

their

Budget Reconciliation Act of

1982 set 1983 bases equal to 1982 for wheat, feed grains, and rice,

but

for cotton only program participants and growers certifying zero acreage
in 1982 had

the same base as

in 1982.

Nonparticipants in

the cotton

program in 1982 had their 1983 base set equal to the average of 1981 and
1982 cotton acreage.

This provision, combined with additional appeals,

caused an estimated increase in the 1982 cotton base of 140,000 acres.
So,

the USDA has not been very

strict with cotton base,

increases the difficulty of effective acreage control programs.

and this
If, as

argued in the first section,

12 million acres is an equilibrium acreage

for the

would take a 25-percent

next few years,

it

program applied to the 1983 base
plantings to 12 million acres.
tions

based on

the

current law

acreage reduction

with 90-percent participation to bring
With target price/market price expecta
and today's

market

prices,

such

response to a 25-percent acreage reduction program is questionable.

a
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Table 3.

Crop bases and recent plantings
Acreage

Crop

U.S. planted: higher
of 1980 or 1981

1983 base
(estimated)

Column 2 divided
by column 1

-million acresWheat

88.9

90.9

1. 02

Corn

84.2

85.2

1.01

Sorghum

16.0

16.0

1.00

3.8

4.0

1.05

14.5

15. 4

1.06

Rice
Upland cotton
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Another issue with base is adjustment;
allotments.
period,

this is also a problem with

If acreage control programs are in effect over a multiyear

how is base adjusted to reduce it or to redistribute it so that

resources can move to their most productive
the concept

of National Program Acreage

adjust the base

of all farms by

use?

One method is to use

to establish a U.S.

the same percentage amount

total they are equal to the U.S. base.

base and
so that in

Farms underutilizing their base

would have the unused portion put into a pool which would be reallocated
across all other farms.
CONCLUSION:
will likely

Cotton base

lead to continued

appears to be liberally
annual increases and

tiveness, or slippage, in acreage control programs.

awarded,

which

increased ineffec
There are no mecha

nisms to reduce or reestablish program participants' base in a period of
sustained excess production capacity, but there probably should be.
Demand Issues
Cotton Textile Trade
Domestic consumption of cotton textiles

(mill use plus cotton tex

tile imports less cotton textile exports) has declined as manmade fibers
have increased during the 1960s and
stopped,

and cotton

recession-caused drop

1970s.

use stabilized at 7 million
in 1982.

Even

stabilized, mill use continued to drop.
sharp increase in

Recently,

the decline has

bales--except for the

though cotton used

by consumers

The reason, of course,

is the

In 1980,

cotton

the cotton textile trade deficit.

textile imports exceeded exports by 0.6 million bales, but in 1982, this
deficit grew to 1.4 million.
Imports alone account for the equivalent
damaging effect of these imports on mill

of 2 million bales.

The

use was recognized in the most
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recent

trade agreements

Growth

rates for

year--about the

negotiated under

import quotas
growth rate of

the Multifiber

were lowered
total fiber

to

1 to

Arrangement.
2 percent

consumption.

per

Previously,

quotas were permitted to grow up to 6 percent a year.

CONCLUSION:
enough and

It is

the new

likely that the quota levels

growth rates

large enough

imports a continuing threat to U.S.

mill use.

from countries not covered by trade agreements.
and calls for rollbacks are emerging.
ponsors,

was

introduced in

are already high

to make

cotton textile

Also, imports will grow
"Buy America" campaigns

House bill H.R. 172, with 40 cos

April calling

for a

rollback on

imports until they are 25 percent of retail apparel sales.
estimated at 40 percent.
ers have a

They are now

The protectionism issue will continue.

stake because only a

made of U.S.

apparel

quarter of cotton textile

cotton (see Glade),

Grow-

imports are

and net imports--less than 10 percent

of domestic consumption a few years ago--are now over 20 percent of cot
ton textiles consumed in the United States.
Export Subsidies
Government-financed exports

of all

agricultural commodities

dropped from 50 percent of total exports
percent by the late 1970s.

in the early 1960s to about 10

With huge surpluses, more attention has been

given to increasing government-financed exports.
response.

Blended credit was a

An export PIK program has been suggested.

CONCLUSION:

Export subsidies will continue

Because subsidies

are costly,

"additionality," or market
who

have

would buy

anyway

blended credit for

many want

expansion,

(this is

cotton).

to be widely debated.

such programs to be

rather than giving

why South

Korea

aid to those

was recently

Others argue that it is

aimed at

denied

not equitable to
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punish our regular
given.
our own.

customers;

they deserve subsidies if any

Still others believe it is unfair

are to be

to aid foreign mills and not

Such aid only helps to put out textile mills at a further dis

advantage in world markets; they argue that if subsidies are to be given
to foreign mills,

they should also be given to U.S.

with equalization payments to U.S.
that debate for

mills

the 1985 farm bill

for two-price commodity markets.

mills (as was done

in the 1960s).

will include a number
These will

of the European Community's variable

It is likely
of proposals

likely be along the lines

export subsidy,

system of the U.S. peanut program, or an export PIK.

the two-loan rate
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POLICY ISSUES FOR U.S. COTTON:

DISCUSSION

Wes Wannamaker"'
Before

responding

to Keith

Collins

I

think it

appropriate

to

respond briefly to some of the talks I've already heard.
It particularly disburbs me when it
duce for less so
farm losses?
him to sell

they can export more.

Where is

the room for further

As we all know, the producer's lack of market power forces
for an offered price

for government farm programs.
August

is suggested that farmers pro-

1982

issue,

Forbes

and this is perhaps

the prime reason

Farmers are in financial trouble.
magazine

stated

that farm

In its

incomes

have

declined or stagnated in seven out of

the last nine years--a 50 percent

Farm debt is II to

13 times that of farm net income,

drop since 1979.

and this net income does not cover the interest on that debt.
Just six months ago prices received for most major crops were below
These prices when adjusted

50 percent of

parity.

1933 levels.

"Parity" as I understand it,

for inflation reach

remains a fair yardstick of

the farmer's economic status and should not be kicked around as an unreliable measure.

Again,

where is the

boost exports?

Agriculture is

room to further reduce prices to

in trouble,

and these

troubles were

brought about in the main by the market oriented concepts of the Acts of
1977 and 1981 coupled with other governmental actions.
I.

Suspension of allotments.

2.

Encouraging fence row to fence
additional acres in

To name a few:

row planting - 174 million

production since 1972 -

increase.

*Cotton grower, St. Matthews, South Carolina

a 43 percent
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3.

Easy credit.

4.

Embargoes of 1973 and 1980 - although not directly affect
ing cotton.

Let's add to these the weather,
sion.

the strong dollar,

and the reces

I feel that given "freedom" and "easy credit" farmers will plant

and plant until they are "broker than broke."
Some people say
wrong time.

Often,

that perhaps these were the wrong
in moments

of frustration,

totaled to a policy of the farmer
offset the rising price of oil,

policies at the

I feel that

providing very cheap raw materials to
in an effort to wage the battle against

inflation on the backs of the farmer.

Does open-ended planting, embar-

goes, and easy credit lead to economic prosperity on the farm?
not.

it all

I think

These ingredients lead to production in excess of market needs and

devastating prices for

the farmer - but conversely good,

in the short

run, for the consumer.
A proper
perhaps never

balance in farm policy
will be when you

Despite our problems,

take into account

we farmers do

policy and appreciate the

is most difficult to

achieve and

political realities.

recognize the complexities of farm

work of those who wrestle with

them on a day

to day basis.
In response to the presentation by Keith

Collins,

I feel he has a

good understanding of the supply-demand issues, the textile-import prob
lem as well as the other important issues in addressing cotton farm pol
icy.

I would like to comment on payment limitations, PIK,

loan rates,

target prices and the cotton base.
Payment Limitations:
of payment

Keith has a full appreciation for the effects

limitations on program

participation.

Payment

limits,

a
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political reality, not only serve as a wedge dividing farmers,

but also

hinder participation in efforts to reduce supply.
A great deal of the success in

reducing acreage through PIK can be

attributed to the fact that it is free

of limits and also has a feature

to partially offset limits on deficiency payments.
Loan Rate:

The floor of

55¢ seems

reasonable so long

means of income protection remain in place.

as other

Perhaps further considera-

tion should be given to the regional loan concept if we wish to continue
having cotton (as well as other

major crops)

planted widely across the

southern United States.
Target Prices:

The Secretary's proposal to freeze target prices at

1983 levels should be of grave concern to producers.
As pointed out by Keith,

target

prices do serve as income protec

tors but of even greater importance to producers they:
1.

Encourage the Secretary to use

his discretionary tools of

production controls--the acreage reduction and paid diver
sion programs.
2.

Further encourage the Secretary to promote exports through
PL 480, blended credits, etc.

Why freeze target prices?

Why not go all out for increased market

prices, thereby precluding price deficiency payments altogether?
The

Another point.

threat of continued high

deficiency payments

played a major role in the implementation of the PIK program.
Cotton Base:
for

The cotton base of over 15 million acres is too large

current needs.

adjustments necessary.

Failure to

increase

Some suggestions:

demand would

tend to

make
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1.

A return to allotments or base reduction.

2.

Free access to world markets for all commodities.

3.

Removal of payment limitations to increase program partic
ipation.

4.

An export PIK program.

5.

In-depth study of the feasibility of regional loans,

as a

trial balloon.
J join

my fellow

Department of
for making

producers in

thanking Clemson

Agricultural Economics and

this symposium

possible.

extended to all participants.

My

the Strom

University,

the

Thurmond Institute

appreciation is,

likewise,

IMPORTANT POLICY ISSUES FOR THE DAIRY INDUSTRY
Albert J. Ortego, Jr.*
Policy

issues that

are important

to

placed into three general categories:

the dairy

industry can

general policy issues,

tural policy issues, and dairy policy issues.

be

agricul-

Some general and agricul

tural policy issues will directly impact on the dairy industry.
General policy

issues include such

things as fiscal

and monetary

policies that affect the general economy through the inflation rate, the
interest rate, the unemployment rate,
culture and dairying, etc.

EPA policies as they affect agri

I will not comment on these even though they

are important to the dairy industry.
important area of general policies.
culture and dairying,

International trade policy is an
Because of its importance to agri-

I will comment on this issue.

not comment on the structure of U.S.

Likewise,

I will

industries even though policies in

this area are important to agriculture and the dairy industry.
Agricultural policy issues are numerous.
as:

These include areas such

farm credit, trade policies, price and income policies, energy pol

icies, tax policies, crop or disaster programs, etc.

I will not comment

on any of these except as to their relation to a specific dairy policy.
Industry policy

issues of particular

concern between now

enactment of 1985 farm legislation will be:
1.

The Dairy Price Support Program

2.

The Federal Milk Marketing Order Program

3.

International Trade Issues

*Senior Vice President, Planning Marketing, Dairymen, Inc.

and the
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Although all of these are interrelated,
separately.

I will try to discuss each

However, at the outset it should be noted that the issue of

deregulation is important to the first two of these policy issues.
tinued effort by

some to do away

with the dairy price

and the marketing order program can be expected.

Con

support program

These two programs are

significant parts of several studies relating to less government regulation.

Hence,

part

should be continued.

of the policy issues will be

While continuation of these programs (particularly

the price support program)
the first concern
programs.

whether the programs

may depend

on the provisions of the policy,

will be determining the

need for and benefit

of the

The second concern will be for the specifics of the program.

The inability of the industry to agree

or unite on the specifics of the

programs will have an important influence

on whether there will be con

tinuing support for these programs.
The Price Support Program
The dairy price
commodity price
since 1949,
to keep

support program for milk is

support program

that has

the only agricultural

been in

effect continuously

and which has had no restrictions on output.

supply and

demand in

balance,

have

Adjustments,

been directed

through price (and to a degree on Section 22 import quotas).

primarily
Only dur-

ing two periods did production exceed

commercial use to the extent that

burdensome surpluses were developed.

Unfortunately, the present is one

of those periods of burdensome overproduction.
The first question that must be raised is:

Does the dairy industry

need a price support program for milk and, if so, why?
The stated purpose of the dairy
an adequate supply

of milk now and

price support program is to assure
in the future.

However,

the key
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question

or issue

is whether

this could

be achieved

by the

"market

price."
While the dairy industry has
basic conditions of
not changed.

supply and demand for milk and

Milk continues to be

relative to value;
tion is
cows)

have very

investment in

limited alternative

dairying is sunk--it cannot

Adjustment in

total production,

planned 2 to 3 years in advance.
three

years from

births.

a highly perishable product;

specialized resources

now,

the

dairy products have

hence, costly to transport long distances.

with highly
that

uses.

changed considerably since 1949,

(buildings,
uses.

bulky
Produc-

equipment

Hence,

and

once made,

be readily shifted

to other

particularly upward,

must be

In short, to increase total production

additional

calves

must be

Likewise, because of sunk investment,

kept from

current

downward adjustments in

production do not respond quickly to price changes.
These characteristics of production,
tic demand for milk and dairy products,
variable market prices.

coupled with a highly inelas
in the short run,

cause highly

Such price instability results in cyclical pat

terns of production.

It was these undesirable characteristics that the

price support program

was designed to overcome.

relating to price instability and

Since the conditions

cyclical production patterns continue

to exist in dairying, it is apparent, at least to me,
a price support program is present today

that the need for

as it was when the program was

first enacted.
There

are those

who

argue that

unstable

prices and

cycles are more beneficial than is the price support program.
clusions are reached on "social
rium analysis.

production
Such con

cost" evaluations using static equilib

However, the price support program reduces risk for milk
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producers.

If milk producers are risk

program shifts

the supply curve

same price or same

averters,

to the right

supply at lower price).

then a price support

(get a larger
A very

supply at

small supply shift

would more than offset the social cost shown in most studies.
My conclusion:

There

continues to be a need for

a price support

program and a reasonably priced program is beneficial.
Given there is a recognized need for a dairy price support program,
the issue then becomes the level of

supports and the method for adjust

ing the support price, or alternatively, the mechanism for maintaining a
reasonable balance between production and commercial sales.
Hence,

as 1985 legislation is being developed,

the dairy industry

will have to:
a.

work to maintain a price support program;

b.

develop provisions- for a workable program for the long run.

It is my belief
to maintain

a dairy

that the industry can agree and
price support

program.

within the program may be more difficult.
outside the

industry will be strong.

unify on the need

Agreement

on provisions

Opposition to a program from
Some opposition will

come from

people in the government, including the U.S.D.A.
For the price support program to survive, it will have to be:
a.

one in

which the price

disaster,

acts more

as a floor

to prevent

with the market price varying above the support

level most of the time;
b.

one that responds more quickly

to the conditions directly

affecting milk production (a dairy specific parity);
c.

one that,

over time,

within the industry; and

reflects changes

in productivity
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d.

one

that

leaves

a

degree

of

administrator since no procedure

discretion

to

the

for adjustment will work

perfectly.
It is my opinion that in the future, as in the past,
will not accept long term production controls.
tion elsewhere

to production controls,

will

dairy farmers

This, along with opposi
make price the

maintaining a reasonable balance between supply and demand.

basis for
Thus,

the

program will have to recognize the realities of the market.
Marketing Order Program
The only marketing order issue that relates to legislation for 1985
is that of regulation vs. deregulation.
als and groups
Attacks on

that would like to see all

marketing orders

vegetables.

There are a number of individu
marketing orders terminated.

center on marketing

orders for

fruit and

If, by attacks on these, opponents could repeal the A.M.A.

Act of 1937, then milk marketing orders would also be out.
However,
they could

because opponents of milk marketing orders do not believe

succeed in legislation

their efforts will

to repeal

the A.M.A.

be to change the regulations

Act

of 1937,

through court actions,

public hearing activities, and pressures on the administration.
will be on doing

away with classified pricing or by

Efforts

rendering it inef

fective.
While Federal
will be policy

Orders may not be

issues in this area.

the focus of

legislation,

Such issues will relate

things as:
1.

Reconstituted milk.

2.

Equity in distribution of market-wide pool proceeds.

3.

Method of determining Class I prices.

there
to such
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4.

Uniformity of provisions vs.

differences in local condi-

tions and needs.
5.

Transfer costs and price alignment.

6.

Qualification for

pool participation and

attracting milk

for Class I use.
7.

Over-order prices.

Resolution of different views on the major provisions is needed for
both the

effective operation of Federal

Milk Marketing Orders

and for

continued support of the program.
International Trade
International trade

policies of the

U.S.

and other

greatly influence U.S. agriculture and the dairy industry.
blessed with an abundance of natural
tion of food and fiber.

nations will
The U.S.

is

resources conducive to the produc-

Technological developments in production, pro-

cessing and distribution have given this country a comparative advantage
in agriculture.
ever,

the

EEC's CAP)

We are a large exporter of agricultural products.

domestic agricultural
countries

policies of

other (particularly

along with their policies have

for U.S. agriculture in world trade.

How
the

made it difficult

High domestic prices guaranteed to

local producers and government subsidization

of the exports of domestic

excesses have placed U.S. agriculture at a distinct disadvantage in most
world markets.
Of what importance are trade policies for the U.S.
Stocks of dairy products held by

foreign governments are high,

government stocks are in the United States.
ments subsidize exports

just as

Yet, many of these govern-

in order to dispose of such

cannot compete with these exports.

dairy industry?

Whenever the U.S.

stocks.

The U.S.

does any exporta-

195

tion at less than its support purchase price,
upset.

then other nations become

Further, exports (within quotas) to the U.S.

are encouraged by

their trade policies.
The U. S.

needs to re-evaluate and re-establish its trade policies.

Our policies need to become more
strive for freer

pragmatic,

trade by all parties.

even though we continue to

With totally

free trade,

the

U.S. could become an exporter of dairy products.
A Broader View
The dairy industry has taken a narrow view of its policy endeavors.
Its efforts have centered primarily,
grams such as milk price supports,
for dairying, etc.
better than

and

almost solely,

Federal Orders,

on dairy pro

import restrictions

As a result, for several years,

dairying has fared

most other agricultural enterprises.

Dairying,

cannot prosper long if the rest of agriculture is suffering.
ple,

if corn prices are low relative to milk prices,

to feed
grain,

the corn to cows
you can

milk supplies.
duces milk.
sell for cash.

than to sell

profit by feeding more.

it for grain.
In both

however,
For exam-

then it is better
Or,

if buying

cases this increases

However, take the farmer that raises grain and also pro
If grain prices fall, then it pays him to feed rather than
His cost of production may not go down .

Hence, while he

is better off by feeding and milking, his net revenue will be less.

In

short, while increasing milk production, such farmers may be worse off.
Since what happens to total agriculture greatly influences dairying
in the long run, the dairy industry should become more active in general
agricultural policy .

It is in its long term best interest.

IMPORTANT POLICY ISSUES FOR THE DAIRY INDUSTRY:

DISCUSSION

Charles McGinnis*
The announced purpose

of this symposium was to

rent forces acting on the agricultural

"identify the cur

sector and address policy issues

that are expected to be important in the future."
The influencing

forces can be

identified rather easily,

in fact

much easier than an assignment of explaining why these forces exist.
Policy issues that will determine the
ca's dairy industry

in the future in

health and welfare of Ameri

my opinion can be

divided rather

distinctly into two categories:
1.

External forces - These

influences originate from sources

and pressures that cannot be controlled by production seg
ments of the dairy industry.
2.

Internal forces
dairy

producers

- These influences
and

those

directly involved in the
keting of dairy products.
are not

tiny of the industry.
cles,

agencies

production,

and concerns

and

controlled by
organizations

processing and mar-

Currently, the internal forces

being brought forth in

policy or significantly

can be

a form that

will dictate

impact on the direction

and des

I'm referring to challenges, obsta
directly related to the

attitude and

performance of those of us who are dairy industry partici
pants.
The first part of today's session dealt with the current situation.
The burdensome supply of surplus dairy production that exists today is a

*Dairy farmer, Kinards, South Carolina
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direct result of a system that
for dairy products.

guarantees an unrealistically high price

It's a system that is embarrassingly responsive to

political pressures and glaringly deficient in controls,
checks and

balances.

Most of the

southeastern and deep

have only two outlets for dairy production:
and a manufacturing

tion.

area

in

the region.

Other

there must be manufacturer

warehouse storage capability

of production

south states

third outlet--the Commodity Credit Corpora-

To participate in this third market,

facilities and

or

a primary fluid milk market

market to satisfy needs within

areas of the country have a

penalties,

order to

minimize

in close proximity
transportation and

to the
hauling

costs.

Our area does not have access to this outlet because the drying

plants,

cheese vats,

and the refrigerated storage houses do not exist.

Hauling rates into the areas that have these facilities from our part of
the country are prohibitive.

Yet we

are told that overproduction in a

national problem and the consequences of
all dairy producers.

the solution must be shared by

The compromise legislation that has been reported

from the House Agricultural Committee (HR1875)
embraces the philosophy of equal responsibility

and endorsed by the USDA
of penalty for all pro

ducers regardless of circumstance or geography.
I agree with Mr. Ortego that the system needs overhauling.
sonally prefer the
that has

national base or quota system similar

proven so acceptable in

Canada.

I know

I per

to the scheme

that implementation

would be an administrative nightmare of such proportions that the theory
may never be practically applied.
cept,

So,

if we preserve the parity con-

the smallest change that could possibly prove acceptable would be

a trigger mechanism that would dramatically drive down prices to a level
that would be punitive for production

beyond domestic needs plus area-
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sonable national reserve.

You've heard discussion earlier about some of

the influences that I call external forces including international trade
barriers of

various forms

denied and

the political

where the

ability to

and bureaucratic

compete equitably

decisions that

separately and differently from other commodity programs.

is

treat dairy
Import quotas

are an issue that could relegate our own dairy industry to a position of
disadvantage.

The 1979 Trade Agreement Act,

resulted

Round,

in the

allowance of

referred to as the Tokyo

100,000 metric

cheese imports and some exotic cheese.

tons of

foreign

In addition, casein and lactal-

bumin are free to enter this country without quota restrictions.
imports at the present time amount to
consumption,
there is

some two percent of per capita of

but this percentage has been

no industry

Total

influence that

higher in previous years and

can exert

absolute control

over

import levels.
The internal forces that I believe will influence policy and direc
tion of our industry

in the near future must focus

on the demand side.

It is almost inconceivable that so little concern has been expressed for
the consumption

trends and the level

sumption by Americans.
slow

process

dilemma.

But increasing the use of dairy

that cannot

There

provide

but

quick

cheese,

dairy industry has

producers and processor know
about it,

a

is ample evidence that

altered to include more milk,
The California

of per capita dairy

are self-imposed

the

American eating habits
butter,

done it quite

nothing is likely to happen unless

requirements that

products is a

solution to

present
can be

and cultured products.
successfully.

this and they feel a need

are imposed on the entire industry.

product con-

Dairy

to do something

more rigid standards

Improvement ·can be accomplished by
or the same

gains can

be realized
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through

an

ultimatum.

effective.

The

latter course

Few producers realize just how

of

action

the effect

of disassociating the

the

most

good they can be until they

are faced with the prospect of having their milk rejected.
phosis that has developed in the dairy

is

The metamor

industry since the 1960s has had

dairy producer from

the distributor,

from the market, and from brand identification and affiliation.

Market

wide pools, large producer cooperatives and custom processing of private
label brands

for supermarket chains all

tend to make the

sacrifice his dependence on a specific market.
uted to reduced concern for milk

dairy farmer

This trend has contrib

promotion and product quality.

There

is still too much fluid milk offered to the consumer that is poorly pro
duced,

poorly

handled by

the hauler

refrigerated at the point of sale.

and the

processor,

and

poorly

Products of undependable shelf life

turn milk drinkers off.
My point is this.

When one milk consumer is turned off by a rotten

unit of dairy product,

no amount of

advertising and no amount of sweet

persuasion can get that consumer back for you.
level of 15 cents that is

The national advertising

being proposed in this compromise legislation

offers no opportunity for producer input on how it will be spent.
are many unknowns on

who will collect and control the

There

placement of the

funds, and it seems to be more a dictatorial approach rather than a well
thought out, well planned program for increasing dairy product advertis
ing.

Even when the program is underway, we will still have skirted the

problem that too

much product reaches the market

without being consis

tently good.
I'm not suggesting that it is possible to reverse the market evolu
tion that has

occurred,

but simply to

point out that it

has caused a
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lack of concern about quality on the part of many dairy farmers.

It is

an issue that must be addressed.
In summary,

I was pleasantly surprised

0rtego's presentation I

disagreed with.

who has some dirt on his shoes
the producer's standpoint .
tion .

with how few points of Dr.

He is

obviously an economist

because he truly sees the situation from

I'd like to compliment him on his presenta-

It was very deep and very thought-provoking.

TOBACCO IN THE PUBLIC POLICY SPOTLIGHT
Garnett L. Bradford*
In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment
fied as a "basic agricultural

Act (AAA)

tobacco was classi

commodity," meaning that tobacco's impor

tance to the U.S. farm economy was considered to be on a par with wheat,
cotton, corn, hogs, rice, milk,
past fifty years,

and milk products.

numerous ex~eptions have

However,

over the

been made for tobacco.

To

refresh memories, let us chronicle some highlights.
At the outset, the time period of the price parity base was shifted
to 1919-29, from the 1910-14 base,
history for

tobacco.

This

in•order to encompass a better price

was primarily

because cigarettes

become a major tobacco demand factor until the 1920s.
90 percent of parity were continued
most supported
payments.

did not

Price supports at

for tobacco long after programs for

crops had been changed

Later (starting in 1960),

escalation effects created during the

to flexible supports
in

and direct

order to avoid built-in price

1950s by tobacco's more effective

price supports vis-a-vis other basic crops, the parity price for tobacco
was redefined to accommodate producers' requests.
flue-cured in 1965 and for burley in 1971,

established the first direct

output ceilings among agricultural commodities.
compared to most other commodities,
through federal

excise and local

tobacco

Poundage quotas, for

On the "negative side,"

has always taken its lumps

government sales taxes

on cigarettes

and other tobacco products.
Perhaps the most important exception for tobacco from other commod
ity programs

came initially with the

1938 AAA which

established legal

*Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of Kentucky, Lexington.
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continuity-tenure for tobacco.

Unlike most other commodities, the abso

lute necessity to rejustify and relegislate periodically before the Con
gress could be avoided,
pick opportune times.

or at least delayed until tobacco leaders could
This feature, I contend, is a key reason for the

tobacco program's continued life as it exists today.
time,

took on increased energy,

The program, over

inertia which justified it as good for

farm people in certain regions and for

the farm economy,

for the

winds of the

country.

Consequently,

exerted much less force

gram for

Now,

health controversy

in their early stages during the

not seriously cut into tobacco's
1970s.

ill

and thus good

1960s and did

political foundations until the latter

some political observers predict that the fifty-year pro-

price supports and

accompanying supply controls

is finished.

Only the exact termination date is questioned.
However,

political winds are always fickle.

Basic program compo-

nents, certainly program vestiges, could continue for years.
zation of program

costs through the 1982

new legislation to lower or even halt

No Net Cost Act

Internali
coupled with

for a few years the formula price

support increases, along with new provisions altering allotment transfer
provisions,

could

give rise to

a program

(good or bad)

that exists

indefinitely, or at least for several more years.
Continued Program Modifications
In keeping

with the

intent of

this symposium--to

address policy

issues from now through 1985--most of my remaining remarks focus oncer
tain aspects
program.

of possible 1983-85

Primary attention

types, although much of

modifications to the

current tobacco

is devoted to U.S.

flue-cured and burley

the discussion also has

implications for dark

fire, dark-air-cured and Maryland types.

The discussion on future modi-
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fications is divided into brief sections on (1) the structure of produc
tion units,

(2)

quotas,

transfer of quotas

price supports,

and loan stock pricing,

and entry of new producers,

Obviously, these topics are interdependent,
us to

analyze some critical issues

and

(4)

(3)

trade policy.

but this outline will allow

in a somewhat orderly

fashion.

I

conclude the paper with some remarks about program termination--specifi
cally, I advance some guesses or opinions on what happens if abrupt ter
mination occurs,

including how the adverse effects on tobacco producers

and others in the tobacco industry might be· softened.
Structure of Production Units
Flue-cured tobacco

production has undergone

changes over the past 10 to 15

years.

vesting and marketing techniques.
shift to baled
changes.

marketing,

In

rapid,

revolutionary

This is especially true of harcontrast,

other than the recent

burley technology has

undergone only modest

As a result, a large portion of the U.S. flue-cured production

(around 500,000 acres) is now produced by fewer than an estimated 30,000
operators (management units).
or almost

one-half that

Most burley acreage (around 260,000 acres

of flue-cured

is still

produced by

at least

75,000 operators.
For flue-cured, significant production cost scale economies, primarily

due

to

bulk

curing and

mechanical

harvesters,

increased pressure for even more management consolidation.
this pressure is seen in the allotment transfer markets.
North Carolina, for example,

are

exerting

Evidence of
During 1982 in

there were around 117,000 farms with flue

cured quota of over 590 million pounds.

Nearly 73,000 farms leased out

over 268 million pounds to around 25,000 farms.

That is, 45 percent of

the quota was leased in by 21 percent of the farms with quota.

The 1982
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Act allows voluntary sale of flue-cured

quotas within counties,

but as

of this date it is not know how much sale activity is taking place.

It

is

is

likely that

even more

consolidation

through leasing

occurring in South Carolina, Georgia and Florida,

or sales

since practically all

the flue-cured leaf in those states is grown on farmland which is amena
ble to utilization of the most advanced harvest-making technology.
For burley,
In fact,

in contrast,

scale economies are largely nonexistent.

moderately small operators may possess cost advantages,

much of their labor supply comes

fro~ family members who have virtually

no alternative employment possibilities.
i ng

technology which

foreseeable future.
comes from

promises to

total farm income .

Moreover, there is no develop

produce scale

The only reason

farm operators

since

for any

who are expanding

economies during

the

allotment consolidation
simply to

increase their

Voluntary quota sales a r e not lawful for burley, and

there is a 30 , 000 pound limit on lease transfers to any one farm.

Since

1977, the total burley poundage quota leased has stabilized at around 20
percent.
Policy

implications

of

this emerging

structural

dichotomy

are

already in evidence.- Congressional delegations and other tobacco policy
leaders from burley and flue-cured areas
an

essentially homogeneous

type of

(those actively engaged in production)
large farms,

are few in number,

frequently no longer speak for

constituent.

Flue-cured

farmers

operate fairly capital intensive

are rapidly declining in numbers,

and

are actively working to expand production.

Several now question whether

the current

transfer are worth

program's limits on allotment

efits reaped from price supports and other program features.
farmers question these features of the

current program.

the ben

Few burley

Such a dicho-
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tomy

could lead

termination,

to

considerably more

at least for a major

pressure

for eventual

program overhaul,

program

than the combined

pressures of the anti-tobacco, pro-health forces.
Quotas and Price Supports
Tobacco farm
know that

leaders and

the task

policymakers have

of annually

always had

setting levels

reason to

for production

quotas

effectively matched with price supports is delicate and sensitive.
tralized
abrupt,

planning

simply cannot

unknown changes

Increasing quotas and/or

anticipate

in market demand and

handle many

of

the

in aggregate production.

formula level supports too much

excessive build up of loan stocks.

can result in

Decreasing quotas and/or increasing

price supports too little can increase risks
world market share.

and

Cen

of losing even more of the

Yet, somehow over the years, those responsible for

quota-price policy execution usually have managed fairly well.
During 1950-1975 major problems generally were alleviated by policy
modifications and

by minor readjustments in

quotas from year

The price support formula was modernized in 1960.
allotments ceased
shifted to

By 1965, when acreage

to effectively limit flue-cured

acreage-poundage quotas.

(For the

to year.

supplies,

most part,

producers
this

was a

shift to poundage quotas, since the national per acre yield goal of 1854
pounds resulted in pounds being the
in most years.)

most limiting factor for most farms

In 1971 burley producers switched

to poundage quotas

because acceleration of per acre yield increases and an increased number
of producers who had an allotment of
the previous law

less than one-half acre (who under

were exempt from allotment cuts)

continued to negate

needed allotment reductions.
For a

while everything seemed

in order.

Flue-cured

loan stocks
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were gradually worked down to 180 million pounds by 1975 (around 15 per
cent of annual disappearance at that time).
basic quota increase of 15 percent,
turned out to

be a blunder.

pounds (over 20
Basic quotas

But in retrospect, the 1975

even though it was revoked in 1976,

During

those two years over

percent of those two crops)

were reduced

another 196 million

a further

entered

12 percent

into loan stocks.

in 1977.

pounds entered loan stocks.

demand (disappearance)

536 million

Yet still

Hindsight shows that

for flue-cured leaf during those years (1975-77)

was declining fairly rapidly and, perhaps more importantly, much of what
was placed under

loan during that period was undesirable

being fairly high priced down-stalk trimmings.
ing the

situation was the fact

escalating,

going

to the trade,

Simultaneously irritat-

that price support levels

from 83.3 cents

per pound in

were rapidly

1974 to 121

cents by

1978.
Still the flue-cured situation did not appear totally bleak.
into 1978,

loan stocks totaled 534 million pounds,

not seem particularly dangerous compared with
900 million

pounds.

Also,

this 1960s

Going

but this amount did

a mid-1960 amount of over

high in loan

stocks developed

prior to years when the poundage program proved so effective as a supply
constraint.
1968:

But,

there were two big

(1) unlike the 1960s,

obstacles in 1978 not present in

inflation in farm input prices during the

1970s was rapidly

pushing up the tobacco price support

demand

flue-cured leaf

for U.S.

improving production

know-how of

was declining,

level,

due to

foreign competitors,

and (2)

continually

the down-stalk

price-quality problem, and the adverse quality effects of the widespread
adoption of bulk curing and mechanical harvesters.
year matters

turned even worse--259 million

During the 1982 crop

pounds (26 percent)

of a
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small 994 million pound crop were placed under loan at an average market
price of

over $1.75.

Going into

exceeded 700 million pounds.
expected disappearance

1983,

total loan stocks

once again

Total supply was around 3.3 times a year's

at a time

when demand

was showing no

signs of

picking up.
Burley

loan stocks,

quickly dropped

to only

following

12 million pounds

cumulative burley marketings
lion pounds.

institution

of poundage

by 1975.

During 1975-78,

exceeded disappearance by almost

Even though going into 1979

quotas,

100 mil

total loan stocks were up to

155 million pounds they were not considered excessive, given that annual
disappearance was increasing slightly during the entire period.
1979 and 1980,

exceptionally low burley production

Then in

led to essentially

zero loan stocks during 1981 and 1982.
The basic quota for burley was
ing 1981 and 1982,

largely in

turers and from dealers.
from 1979 and 1980

This

increased by almost 11 percent dur

response to calls from domestic manufaccombined with large poundage carryovers

led to a 1981 effective quota

(over 26 percent higher than in 1979)
million pounds.

of 842 million pounds

and a 1982 effective quota of 778

During the latter part of the same period total demand

for U.S. burley was gradually declining; total disappearance in 1981 and
in 1982 averaged only slightly above 600 million pounds per year.
the farm depression for other crops
farmers.

Combine this

with two

weather and the results were a 1981

and other income sources for burley
years of

excellent tobacco

growing

crop of 726 million pounds followed

by a record 1982 crop of 801 million pounds.
and early 1983

Enter

As a consequence, in 1982

burley loan stocks of around 270

storage at an auction level average price

million pounds entered

of over $1.84 per pound,

all
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at a time

when formula level support prices were

Moreover,

it appears

still rapidly rising.

for several reasons that demand

could be entering a period of fairly rapid decline.
is now over 3.1 times annual

expected disappearance.

essentially the same situation as

for U.S.

burley

Total burley supply
Burley is now in

flue-cured--a situation few,

would have dared to predict even as late

if any,

as the middle of the 1982 pro

duction year.
Basic burley quotas were reduced by five percent for 1983.
the maximum reduction allowed by current law.
cut up to
burley farm

15 percent of the next year's
leaders now realize

sudden declines

in demand or supply

Flue-cured quotas can be

expected disappearance.

that more

Secretary of Agriculture to adjust basic

This is

latitude is needed

Most
for the

quotas in order to correct for

excesses of previous

years.

Any

1983 tobacco legislation will likely include provisions to eliminate the
reduction limit or,

at least,

to increase the allowable annual maximum

reduction.
The 1982 No

Net Cost Act may

cured producers and lessors paid an

provide a partial

one

cent in

1982.

Assessments

for

1983

Burley producers
have not

announced, but a levy of at least five cents is expected.
increases were

limited to 65

percent of

1982 flue-cured and burley crops.

Flue·

assessment of three cents per pound

in 1982 and are scheduled to pay seven cents in 1983.
paid

solution.

been

Price support

their formula levels

Still,

yet

for the

the 1982 flue-cured support

level increased 11.2 cents to 169.9 cents per pound and burley increased
11.5 cents to 175.1.
lation is

Many now contend that further price support legis

necessary to

provide the Secretary

authority to freeze or even reduce supports.

of Agriculture

with the
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Pugh and Chappell's

recent paper discusses some of

price freezes for several freeze scenarios.
with the

question of

demanded.

how a

Notwithstanding

years (e.g., Mann,

price freeze

However,

they do not deal

will affect

market quantity

various research studies

Sutton,

Seagraves,

the effects of

and Reed),

over a

number of

it is my contention

that we still know very little about what might happen if tobacco market
price levels are decreased.
The

econometric analyses

time-series data--that is,

of such

studies have

What happens if prices are

Price effects are usually not reversible.

Seagraves contends that the net export

demand elasticity for flue

cured exceeds 13.8, meaning that a price decline of, say,
$1.81 to $1.59 per
exports to 1,071

pound should result in a net
million pounds from

cured marketings would expand to 1,684
to only 1,004 million pounds at $1.81.

is largely

partial equilibrium,

assumptions.

However,

it to be

other

increase of flue-cured
total flue

million pounds at $1.59 compared
Sounds nice.

synthetic

But, he neglects

and his method of analysis
and laden

studies of export demand

highly elastic;

22 cents from

405 million pounds;

to discuss tariffs and other trade barriers,

also show

on

years when prices have always been moving up

within fairly narrow price-quantity ranges.
decreased?

relied mostly

with simplifying
for flue-cured

a realistic estimate

is probably

somewhere between 3.0 and 5.0 (absolute value).
Reed has conducted some recent research which quantifies the export
demand elasticity

for burley

to be somewhere

in the

This means that a

decline in burley prices of 10

0.75-1.50 range.

percent could lead to

around a 10 to 15 percent increase in exports, i.e. around 10 to 15 mil
lion pounds.

This seems plausible, perhaps even conservative.

Burley's
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share of world

burley exports is much larger than

share of world flue-cured exports.
elasticity at the auction

But,

is flue-cured's U.S.

with a domestic price demand

level of 0.2 or less and

with around 75 per

cent of burley sales still entering domestjc channels,

in the short run

it would take a foreign demand elasticity of at least 3.8 in order for a
10 percent market

price cut to generate total dollar

sales revenues to

producers equal to revenues at the current. market price level.
A significant

problem with price

freezes or certainly

with price

reductions is the effects on the salability of present Flue-cured Stabi
lization and Burley Pool Loan Stocks. 1 It's not too difficult to foresee
that a price freeze on 1983 and/or 1984 crops could pose a great deal of
price competition for present loan
est, storage costs,
Furthermore,

the No

etc.,

stocks--considering 9 percent inter

on top of an already fairly high base price.

Net Cost

enough to pay for any losses

Assessment Fund

must first

suffered on loan stocks.

accumulate

(For flue-cured

this does not include loan stocks accumulated before 1982.)
Transfer of Quotas
Quota leasing is
tion,
gram.

a topic of considerable

probably more than any of the
Anti-tobacco forces

and escalating
means of gaining

lease prices,

confusion and misconcep

other features of the current pro-

have pointed to increased
particularly

leasing activity

in flue-cured areas,

general sympathy with the public and

as a

in the Congress.

1Fred Bond of the Flue-Cured Stabilization Cooperative and W.D.
Tous
saint of North Carolina State University discussed certain aspects of
this problem in a recent conference at Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina.
Their papers are scheduled to be printed in a forthcoming booklet pub
lished through the Department of Economics and Business at North Caro
lina State University.
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They contend that the tobacco program provides a subsidy to an elect few
of the nations' farmers.
section of the paper.
as a

I'll say more about this claim

in the final

A few flue-cured producers view high lease rates

threat to their continued

economic survival.

These

people,

it

seems, believe there should be some way (some "magic way") of simultane
ously keeping fairly

stable,

high tobacco prices and

lowering or abo

lishing lease rates.
I'm not

sure whether a logical

still possible.

treatment of the leasing

Rhetoric seems to be winning over reason.

that a tobacco quota is essentially no
carries little political weight.
lem is

to abruptly

apparently

that is

would prefer.

The argument

different than a land site value

Of course, a sure "cure" for the prob

terminate the entire
exactly the

issue is

tobacco farm

cure most

program.

anti-tobacco forces

Until that happens, however,

And,
really

they are willing to settle

for attacks on high lease rates--a most vulnerable current program prob
lem--as a key weapon in advancing their ultimate aims.
Short of program

termination several modifications to

leasing provisions have been advocated,

the current

either by those within tobacco

circles, by anti-tobacco forces, or by both.

Modifications include one

or some combination of the following:
1.

Legally prohibit lease and transfer,

2.

Sale of quotas,

3.

Expand

or remove

geographic

and/or

quantity limits

on

quota transfer,
4.

Reduce tobacco price support levels
net-cost levy
contracts.

to both parties

and/or expand the no

of all lease

and transfer
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Legal Prohibition
The legal prohibition
ical debate.

Lease and transfer markets

cured and burley areas.
are now,
argue,

advocacy by itself is hardly

They can

worthy of log-

are well established in flue-

either be legally sanctioned as they

or they can be deemed illegal (by legislation or,
by executive fiat)

as some now

and shoved into black market arrangements of

various sorts.
Some advocate leasing prohibition after two
voluntary quota sales.
farm policy groups.

This seems to be

or three more years of

the current position of a few

It bears some portions of logic--viz., after enough

time those who now prefer or must lease

out quota will have sold it and

those who desire more quota will have purchased all they need or desire.
But,

this solution embraces a non-changing economic environment.

happens, for example,
farmers who first

various other

two or three years after leasing is prohibited to

purchased considerable quota and then

partially retire

but wish to keep

activities?

disposal route

is a

What

their farm for grazing

They then may

quota sale.

find they must

Why

livestock or

find their only

allow permanent

sales and not allow annual quota transfer (leasing)?

legal quota

quota transfer

This is equivalent

to telling homeowners that they can't rent out their homes, but can only
sell.

Obviously,

(legal or illegal)

potential lessors and

lessees would

discover ways

of drawing up sale-repurchase agreements or some way

to circumvent the sale-only provision.
Quota Sales:
mandated by

Involuntary flue-cured and

the 1982 No

cantly involved

in the

Net Cost Act

for quota holders

agricultural use of

must be consummated by December 1, 1983.

burley quota selling was

their land."

"not signifiThese sales

Who then must sell?

This is
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still being

debated and clarified,

holding corporations such as real

but

it does include

non-farm land

estate development corporations,

public, educational and religious institutions.

and

This probably includes

fairly small portions of the entire quota base, except in the most urban
of burley and flue-cured counties.

However,

in that they set a legal precedent

these sales are important

for forced quota t r ansfer,

for the first time help discover the

and they

actual market value (as opposed to

only annual rental rates) of burley tobacco quotas.
Voluntary within-county selling
burley)

also

of flue-cured quotas (but

was sanctioned by the

exist for market values.

1982 Act.

No published

not for
data yet

Scattered word-of-mouth reports indicate that

sales values are

closely correlated to the lease

within a county.

Sale values appear to be running between three to five

times lease rates .

Thus,

in Wake County,

rate level prevailing

North Carolina,

where 1983

lease rates have a practical range of 40-70 cents per pound, sale values
are in the $2.00

to $3.00 range.

This is consistent

with a perpetual

annuity discount rate of 20 to 33 percent, which allows for considerable
Thus,

uncertainty regarding program continuance.
allows shifting
these risks,

of program continuation risks

since quota selling

to those who

dare incur

it is a step in the right direction of softening the even

tual painful adjustments that would occur with program termination.
Expanding Transfer Limits:

Among farm

and agribusiness groups in

flue-cured and burley areas, there currently seems to be little sympathy
for allowing across-county quota transfer.

Burley

also has a 30 thou

sand pound upper limit on the amount of quota which may be leased to any
one other farm unit.
ments often convey

I say farm unit, because most anti-transfer arguor at least imply

the false notion that

quotas are
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transferred from individual quota holders to tobacco producers.
can only

be legally

transferred from one

unit of

units within a county that already has some quota,
approval and the restriction that each

land to

Quotas

other land

subject also to ASCS

receiving land unit has at least

two acres of cropland for each acre-equivalent of quota transferred in.
Across-county transfer would allow for
shifting of quotas to lower-cost farms.
nomic efficiency would
even more leasing

be improved.

activity,

ative political visibility.

even further (than present)

Thus, aggregate farm level eco
But this would

be accompanied by

thus probably increasing

the current neg

Also, to the displeasure of some farm input

suppliers, tobacco warehousemen and leaf processors,
be a net geographic movement of quotas.

there would likely

How much movement, to where and

from where is not known, although there have been several research stud
ies over the past 20 years that show flue-cured would generally move out
of the Piedmont to Coastal Plains area

and burley would tend to concen

trate in south-central and north-central Kentucky counties.
Reduce Economic Rents:

Enterprise budget studies show that during

the past 10 years both flue-cured and burley annual net returns to land,
quota and management (in nominal dollars) have increased fairly rapidly.
These estimated increases are consistent with
also show fairly
(modal)
pound;

rapid advances in nominal values.

burley and flue-cured quotas leased
by 1983 this had at least

and had increased
cents or more.

data on lease rates which

by at least 150
(It

In 1973,

typical

for around 15-25 cents per

doubled to around 40 cents for burley
percent for flue-cured to

is assumed that during the entire

rate of return was paid to all non-quota resources).

around 50

period a normal

The faster rate of

increase for flue-cured is attributable in part to adoption of cost-sav-
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ing technology, and to no arbitrary upper limit on the quota which could
be leased into any given farm.
Freezes on

support prices

combined with

obviously will work to reduce lease rates.
and Chappell's recent paper .
the program in general.
preserve high
rights.

rates of

Rather,

no net

cost assessments

This is demonstrated in Pugh

Lowering lease

rates could be "good" for

The intent of the tobacco program was never to
return for

investors in

purchasable marketing

the intent was to help insure more stable normal eco-

nomic rates of return to producers' non-quota resources.
program policy leaders

and administrators should

cost margin which reflects some desired,

much lower than

at present;

work toward

This would still lead

of lease rates--but it would be

and ideally,

quota

values should reflect

only the reduction in tobacco market price uncertainty.
tobacco programs a
the Congress.
tioned)

a price

maximum level of tobacco price

variability and resultant net income uncertainty.
to some quota value--to positive levels

Ideally, then,

This could give

much less shaky political image with

the public and

Thus, it could help preserve the continuing (often unmen-

external benefits

of the tobacco program.

As liberal M. I.T.

economist Lester Thurow pointed out in a May 16, 1983, Newsweek column:
No one downgrades the hard work, skills and ingenuity of
the American farmer ... but it took something more than the
American farmer alone to make American agriculture into a
world class operation ...
Productivity: Efforts were made to stabilize incomes and
output with price supports and acreage controls.
They had
important effects, not just on the welfare of farm families,
but on farm productivity.
With more certainty about their
incomes, farmers were willing to make heavy investments in new
equipment.
Banks were willing to finance that new equipment,
machinery makers could gear up for massive production runs-
reducing unit costs--and make large investments in developing
new machinery . ..
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Tobacco Trade Policy
Much ado has been

made about the effects of price

need to lower prices of U.S.

flue-cured and burley.

freezes and the
The basic idea of

price reductions would be to increase or at least hold current levels of
U.S.

exports

and to decrease or

"offshore" tobacco.

stop further increases in

imports of

Without sounding trite, I want to reiterate that it

is an exceedingly complex issue--one in which

I feel we still have only

very limited insights.
Johnson's recent

paper emphasizes that

any valid

trade analysis must separate two main issues:

(1)

11

•••

tobacco foreign
the effect of the

exchange rate and domestic (versus) foreign inflation rates ... ," and (2)
'' ... the effect of a lowered

support price ... 11

other factors not interfering,
among trading
tobacco must be

will offset differential inflation rates

Thus,

countries.

Floating exchange rates,

any

re l ative price lowering

a real price decrease,

in order for U.S.

of U.S.

exports to

increase and/or for competitive foreign leaf imports to decrease.

This,

of course, assumes that tobacco quality is the same across countries and
that other policies (e.g.
not used

tariffs, subsidies, trade quotas,

to block or partially

etc.)

offset exchange rate changes.

extent that U.S.

tobacco is superior

the benefits of

real price decreases.

in quality,
This is the

are

To the

this will accentuate
usual reason cited

why, over time, the U.S. has been able to maintain a fairly stable level
of exports.
But, as Howland's recent paper showed,
U.S.

leaf have centralized government boards

other goals,

are committed

to sheltering

countries from too much world competition.

many countries which import
or the like which,
tobacco producers

among

in their
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The upshot

of all

careful not to make

this,

We know,

leaf should lead

than in domestic markets.
flue-cured or

This is

is

that we

share of exports to production in the

estimates of for-

ceterius paribus,

that real price

to more demand response in foreign

And,

other countries.

rest of the world has been stead

But,

we don't

know a great deal about the

magnitude of this price effect, especially if real U.S.
because

always been

the U.S.

especially so for flue-cured--a point heavily emphasized

in Seagraves' recent work.

ered,

should be

because foreign buyers can purchase

burley leaf from many

ily declining,

estimate,

too much out of most econometric

eign demand elasticities.
reductions in U.S.

in my

our data

and experiences

with increasing real prices.

earlier criticism of the Seagraves paper.

of recent

prices are low

years have

almost

This was the essence

of my

Too much seemed to be made of

the exact magnitude of the estimates of net export demand elasticity.
Where do w~ go?

My answer is to conduct considerably more research

on world competition and foreign trade, because we really have yet to do
very much

in the way of

This will mean

comprehensive empirical analyses

significant increases in expenditures

for tobacco.

for such research

resources at public institutions.
Regarding Program Termination
Some observers mistakenly directly compare the present program to a
free market

situation.

To

some extent,

for example,

this is

the

approach followed by Seagraves in his recent paper on "The Life Cycle of
the Flue-Cured Tobacco
if not invalid.

Program."

Such a comparison

line is misleading

This is because, good or bad, after 50 years of devel-

opment and change, the tobacco program has increasingly grown and become
embedded as an integral social welfare program in the traditionally (and
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still relatively) poor South.

Thus,

the termination problem possesses

several perspectives which policy and

Congressional leaders should con

sider:

(1) economic problems of eliminating price supports and decont

rolling

production--implying

various

tobacco

producing

in

abruptly withdrawn;

areas and
(2)

degrees

tobacco

of

markets

economic
if the

community problems centered

chaos

in

program

is

on relationships

among tobacco farm incomes, tobacco-inflated real estate values, and the
rural economies

of large

states, and (3)

~

geographic areas in

at least

seven southern

problems linked back to the lost income and lost

asset values of thousands of low income farmers,

farm workers and other

small rural businesses.
Economic logic provides us with a rough guide as to what would hapBut other than the

pen and why.
not know

much about the

problems.

The Wharton

1979 Wharton input-output study we do

many dimensions
study,

and actual severity

commissioned by The

of these

Tobacco Institute,

focuses wholly on tobacco farm and industry income and tobacco generated
employment.

This study, of course, had no other proclaimed objectives;

it was not intended to tell us

anything about drops in real estate val

ues and increases in price variability (thus income uncertainty) following program withdrawal.
graphic shifts
termination.

in burley
Finally,

Also,

nothing is included about possible geo-

and flue-cured

production following

income and employment

effects are for

program
a very

abnormal year--1979, a year when largely due to terrible weather, burley
production dipped to only 446 million pounds, far below the current normal range of 550-700 million pounds.

The study,

though quite useful,

now needs updating and expanding.
In my opinion,

sudden declines in farmland values

due to program
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termination

are

the most

program termination.
around 21

In

serious

and

neglected adverse

a 1971 study,

Thompson and

percent of Kentucky's farmland

of

I estimated that

value and over 26

North Carolina's value would be wiped out.
have dropped quite a bit since then

effects

percent of

Probably, these percentages

because land buyers and owners have

increased their capitalization rates for future expected tobacco incomes
as uncertainty of

program continuation has increased.

tobacco producing

areas during the latter

Also,

1970s other crops

in many
and live

stock enterprises emerged as a much larger portion of net farm income.
Even so, in many regions tobacco quota remains as a very large per
centage of farmland values,

e.g.,

in eastern North Carolina around the

towns of Whiteville, Clinton, Goldsboro, Kinston,

Farmville and Tarboro

and in south-central Kentucky around Glasgow, Greensburg, Edmonton, Somerset and London.

Recent (unsubstantiated)

prices in many flue-cured areas make it

reports of

easy to conceive of some "ghost

town" scenarios due to potential land value losses.
lines:

quota selling

It runs along these

sudden farmland value erosion making many farmers highly lever-

aged or even insolvent;
cover existing

mortgage holders caught without enough value to

loan balances;

farm

input suppliers

cash inflows sharply dropping and future

overnight finding

sales prospects much less cer

tain; local government agencies and schools heavily dependent on current
property assessment levels facing the prospect
enues;

etc.

Similar

producing communities.

of sizeable cuts in rev-

scenarios could be hypothesized

for many burley

Facing such prospects makes it even more impor

tant to conduct more research on how likely painful adjustments could be
eased and spread over time.

The

voluntary sale program for flue-cureJ

may be one step in the right direction.

Conceptually, it should attach
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most

quota to

land owned

by people

who could

best withstand

sudden

program withdrawal, at least to those who dare take the risks.
Finally,

it seems very probable that

the markets which develop in

the absence of any supply controls and price supports would possess much
more price variability than at present,
100,000 or

more burley and flue-cured

major buying interests.

which

and labor

pound (in 1982 units)

supply is

it is

current production constraints such as

Further,

producers or fairly rapid expansion of
Thus,

remains

next three to five years,

supply annual production

pounds could be expected.

possible that we could

or seven

year as producers enter and exit and

For burley in the

quite conceivable that even with

current producers.

producers and only six

is increasingly doubtful,

likely to jump around from year to

curing space

as long as there are some

Even if demand (domestic and foreign)

fairly stable across years,

as weather varies.

i.e.

of about

800 million

this does not include entry of new
barn space and labor supplies by

even though it is

a guess,

I believe it is

see burley prices averaging as low

as $1.00 per

in some initial "large - crop" years and as high as

$2.00 in other "small - crop" years.
In the longer run, of course, after many inefficient producers per
manently drop out, production is consolidated, and arrangements are made
with buying interests the markets should settle down.
however, almost anything can happen ·and it usually does .

In the long run,
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TOBACCO IN THE PUBLIC POLICY SPOTLIGHT:

DISCUSSION

Roy B. Davis, Jr.*
First of all, I would like to commend Dr. Bradford on his treatment
of the chronology of the tobacco program over the past fifty years.
a producer and

from time to time with other

development and

administration of

As

responsibilities in policy

the tobacco

program,

I

have lived

through these changes.
As a

member of the Virginia

State PMA,

now ASCS,

helped administer the program in the early fifties.
ade

as president

develop the
formula.

of the

Virginia

Farm Bureau

changes in the program,

Since 1960,

Committee,

I

Later in that dec

Federation,

including the 1960

I

helped

price support

I have served as Virginia's Director on the Flue

cured Tobacco Cooperative

Stabilization Board,

and for

twenty years I

worked for the Virginia Department of Agriculture as its tobacco market
ing specialist with certain other

administrative and policy development

duties.
Time does not permit me to discuss in detail the merits or demerits
of the

modifications that

the tobacco program

has undergone

over the

years except to say that the intermingling of politics and economics has
been at times interesting and often frustrating.

It is surprising that

the program has held together as well as it has.
For many years, I have,
ened the tobacco
the Falls.

in my remarks to groups in Virginia,

program to a boat

on the Niagara River

lik-

upstream from

There the waters were imagined to be quite calm and the par

ticipants in the tobacco program,

as passengers on the boat,

*Flue-cured tobacco producer, South Boston, Virginia.

were able
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to drift and dream without realizing the tragedy ahead a few miles down
stream.

Occasionally they would rouse sufficiently to man the oars and

move the boat
improve

upstream by developing the

production efficiency;

lease-and-transfer program to

modify the

price

support program

to

reduce the price escalation and rapid loss of world markets; develop the
acreage-poundage program to place greater emphasis on quality; implement
the

buyer-rotation and

producer-designation

program

to increase

the

orderliness of flue-cured tobacco marketing; and develop the No-Net-Cost
Act of 1982.
pite but

As these modifications were made, there was temporary res

the boat has

moved closer to

program will be history.
only seen

the precipice beyond

For years this

scene was imaginary for I had

Niagara Falls from downstream.

imagination to

be substantiated

Zambesi River between Zimbabwe
river above

the Falls and

Last February,

when I visited
and Zambia,

later viewed

I

found my

Victoria Falls

went on a boat

the Falls from

On the boat ride the Zambesi was

side.

which the

on the

ride on the

the downstream

as calm and peaceful as a mill

pond but the current was moving slowly but surely to the Falls.

At some

point, no amount of effort would have saved the boat.
I feel
program.

we are rapidly approaching
Our

share of

the precipice with

world production

demand has not increased with the increase
a slight decline,
States

sharply,

total

in world usage but has shown

quantity and quality of production outside the United

have increased

developed the

has dropped

the tobacco

and

ability to

producers outside

the

increase production to

United States
more than

further quota reductions we may make.
Can the 1982 legislation save the tobacco program?

have

offset any
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YES, IF:
(1)

Tobacco producers are willing to accept the present posi
tion of the

tobacco program and make

nificant adjustments

the necessary sigquotas and

with respect to sales,

price supports, and
(2)

Congressional authority can be

maintained to operate the

program with a few further minor amendments.
What does the 1982 legislation do?
(1)

Beginning with the 1982 crop,
ity for operating the price

the financial responsibil
support program is transfer

red from the Federal government to the producers.
CCC funds can still be used to support tobacco,
recourse loan

feature is gone and

While
the non

this money has

to be

repaid with interest;
(2)

An assessment
provide

on all tobacco

funds to

repay CCC

produced is
loans not

authorized to

repaid when

the

tobacco is sold, with interest;
(3)

The price support formula is
65 percent of

adjusted by permitting only

an increase that would

otherwise be added

to the price support level each year; and
(4)

The sale of allotments and quotas

is permitted for flue

cured tobacco without the land and requires non-farm cor
porations and public entities to sell their quotas.
Through this Act,
price their

the Congress has,

tobacco competitively in the

grow it and has provided a way
done.

Through the

in effect,

told producers to

world market if they

want to

by which this competitive pricing can be

assessment program,

producers can

fund a discount
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program that will make their tobacco competitive in world markets.
is a cumbersome

method but it can

work.

lower auction price supports and thus
ments.

A better method

This

would be to

reduce the need for large assess-

This is the current request before the Congress, expressed as a

freeze for two years and possibly longer.
For years the tobacco program was based on the principle of adjust
ing supply to demand to reach a price objective.
ple,

production has been reduced,

loan

Following this princi

stocks have grown,

fallen, and the program faces a very uncertain future.
Act of 1982 provides the mechanism
sales by lowering the price of

demand has

The No-Net-Cost

that will permit growers to increase

their tobacco.

to be increased, lease rates will be reduced and,

This will permit quotas
in time,

quotas will

move to the farms where the tobacco is produced.
In his presentation,

Dr.

about the movement of tobacco if

Bradford indicates we

know very little

market prices fall.

During my tenure

as a Director of Flue-cured Stabilization,

I have seen price reductions

on stocks in storage cause buyers to wait

in line all night to be first

and have seen a second round of price reductions needed to move tobacco.
I am totally convinced tobacco will move
competitive.

I

am,

also,

when the price and quality are

totally convinced

that a method

of price

determination can be developed that will determine the competitive price
level for a given quality of tobacco at a given time.
Dr. Bradford also expresses some concern at the simplistic approach
used by Dr.

James Seagraves in determining a price

for flue-cured tobacco.

elasticity of -5.6

Dr. Seagraves tells me that this means for each

one percent change in price the amount of flue-cured which would be sold
would change 5.6

percent in the opposite direction.

Since efforts to
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maintain price through
our competitors,

production adjustments have been put

I see no alternative but

moves volume upward

to rest by

to move along the road which

gradually at competitive prices.

The

work of Dr.

Seagraves encourages me that this can be done.
In 1982, at a price support level of 169.9 cents per pound,
nies bought 728 million

pounds at an average price of

pound and allowed Stabilization to buy
price of 180.02

cents per pound.

was competitive from a price/quality standpoint.
When these

data were plotted

estimated,

assuming a 25 percent reduction

resulted in 99 percent of the
10 percent

177.76 cents per

259 million pounds at an average

The tobacco bought

on a

by the companies

The remainder was not.

normal distribution curve,

it was

in price support would have

total offering being competitive,

reduction in price support

the market offerings competitive,

compa

would have made 90.5

that a

percent of

reducing the Stabilization purchases

by almost two-thirds at a reduction in

grower average of $3.09 per hun

dred pounds on

In this

all tobacco marketed.

tobacco would have moved to the

scenario the additional

companies at an average price reduction

of $6.05 per hundred po,.nds.
As we think of
vinced that we

tobacco policy in the immediate future,

cannot cut quotas and

work our way out

I am con-

of our dilemma.

Our competitors are increasing their production and will force us out of
production if they can.
But, we know the world will use as much U.S.
as it can afford.

flue-cured and burley

Were this not so,. buyers would have cut us off long

ago and would not as late as 1982 bought as much tobacco from us as they
did at our prices:
Some say in

opposition to a price reduction of

U. S.

tobacco that
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our

competitors

reductions.

would

But by

merely

reduce

being able

growths for less money,

their

to buy

prices

and

their needs

negate

of less

our

foreign

tobacco products manufacturers both at home and

abroad would have more money to buy the more highly desired U.S. leaf.
To avoid a
of going back

high level of disruption and
upstream,

a higher-than-needed cost

I would strongly urge a

policy of gradualism.

For example, the basic quota of flue-cured is 910 million pounds for the
1983-84 marketing year.
pounds to

Set a sales goal for 1983-84

reduce Stabilization holdings

by 100 million

July 1, 1983, and June 30,

1984.

tity of

producers a respite

fresh tobacco and

opportunity to

reduce leasing and

stocks have

by SO

pounds between

To provide buyers an increased quan
from quota cuts

producing costs,

basic quota by SO million pounds.
duction quotas

of 1010 million

increase

and an
the 1984

Continue to increase sales and pro

million pounds

annually until

the Stabilization

reached a desired level,

at which time

larger production

quota increases would be in order.
We are near the falls; we hear the roar; we see the spray; the current is becoming

swifter.

arise, bend the oars,

I believe the oars are

available.

Let us

and move the tobacco program into calmer currents

to return our industry to the significant position it held a few decades
ago.

KEY ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURE
John Napier*
Dr.

Fleming, Commissioner Tindal, Dean Anderson,

guished guests

in the audience,

and I will

because all of you are distinguished guests,

the many distin-

not try to

enumerate you

it is a real pleasure for

Pam and me to have the opportunity to be with you and to learn from you.
I had a friend not long ago who was talking about Congressmen.
friend had
health.

his annual physical

ex~m and was

had perfect

He insisted to the contrary that he had very poor health,

after a number of conversations back and
tor,

told that he

my friend insisted that he must

he was sick.

and

forth between him and his doc-

go to another physician.

doctor sent him to a psychiatrist who told him that, yes,
psychosomatic problem.

My

My friend thought he was sick,

So the

he did have a
and as a result

The psychiatrist sent my friend to see a brain surgeon who

told him he had to have a brain transplant..
he could offer him three brains.
tor for $10,000,

He could offer him the brain of a doc

the brain of a lawyer

congressman for $30,000.

The surgeon told my friend

for $20,000,

or the brain of a

My friend was flabergasted.

He wanted to know

why the brain of a congressman was so expensive, and he was told quickly
that it was

because it had never

been used before--it was

like it was

brand new!
Please bear
today as we talk

with me as

I try to

use my

brain here a

about some of the things that I

little bit

had an opportunity to

learn as a member of the House Agriculture Committee.

*Former Member of Congress and former Member of the
Committee, U.S. House of Representatives

House Agriculture
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To be

here and

something that

talk about

is very dear

agricultural policy

to the heart of

institute is named, Strom Thurmond.

is to

talk about

the person for

whom this

To be here and to talk about agri

culture at Clemson, which is an institution that I look to as one of the
great agricultural institutions in the nation, is a great honor.
bring it all together at the

Thurmond Institute,

And to

with the agricultural

leadership present at this symposium today makes it worth trying to dis
cuss the

very serious

issues upon

which we

must focus

in the

years

ahead.
There are

several benchmark years in

remember it well.

I was watching the

missile called Sputnik.

had been awakened
told that we had

from the sleepier years

feeling of

of the 1950s.

to move again as a country if we

and the

the world.
And

and there

There was a

feeling that if we

was no lack of ability.

The

economic right
country.

problems of the
We became

We became the guarantor of every civil and

and aspiration for people

We became the promiser of hope,

privileged and less fortunate.

put our

There was no lack

world became our problems in agriculture and foreign affairs.
the policeman of the world.

we were

and "Food for Peace" came

food stamp program came into being.
and a

We

Agriculture was on

minds to it we could solve the problems of the world.
of resources,

about a

were to maintain our

America was on the move.

national accomplishment,

I

and years when our people thought

and new programs were implemented,

into being,

1957.

my young years in the

could accomplish any task anywhere in

place in world leadership.
the move,

One in

world series and heard

As a result of Sputnik,

1960s and 70s were years of challenge
that our country

my life.

around the world and

in this

and of dreams for the under-
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Then, in the early years of my adulthood I saw and experienced Viet
Nam,

Watergate,

and severe energy shortages.

unfulfilled promises to
To many

some people,

it appeared that government

Hopes and dreams became

broken promises
was unable to

to other people .

govern effectively.

Some of the promises and policies went ast r ay and worked at counter pur
poses to what we had hoped would be accomplished, and the issue of abundance of food became the issue of surpluses.

We entered the era of the

1970s, which was the era of the high interest rates,
the era when

it looked like this country could

to the challenges

rampant inflation,

not respond effectively

to maintain our position of leadership

in the world.

The government was unresponsive both in Democratic and Republican administrations to the constituency
the 1970s

the problems of

as a whole.

And we had

lack of resources

to confront in

and the inability

government to be all-powerful in foreign affairs,

of our

defense affairs,

and

in agriculture.
For the last five years,

we

have grappled with the severe problem

of restraints that have been placed

upon us because our government sim

ply has not been able to respond as you and I would like.
federal budget of uncontrollable

proportions.

We've seen a

The uncontrollable part

of that budget now reaches some 76 percent of every dollar spent.
not have

control over

that portion

During the last 15 years,
cent.

Approximately

uncontrollable in 1967.
the budget,

uncontrollable

59 percent of the

is already

committed.

spending has grown by 15 per
budget,

or $94

billion,

was

In 1982, over $500 billion, over 75 percent of

was committed to such spending as entitlement programs like

social security, veterans affairs,
stamps.

because it

We do

unemployment compensation,

I don't characterize the programs

as bad,

and food

but rather as good
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programs.

But

appropriated,

these programs are authorized,

and the money

because people have an entitlement.

the deficiency

payments and now

the PIK

uncontrollable spending items.

of prior debts are other examples;

In our farm policy,

program would be

Prior year

must be

examples of

contracting and the payment

or the 1O~ on every dollar that goes

to the payment of our national debt service .

Out of every federal dol-

lar today, our Congress has very little discretion to implement new pro
grams as it did in the 196Os.
That brings

me to the

central point I

would like to

make today.

Our hopes and our dreams in agriculture and other fields of endeavor are
no less today
today

that

than they were 25
we

are

dealing

years ago,
with

but we

limited

have a recognition

resources--both

physical

resources and fiscal resources.

The federal dollar is restricted.

simply do

and development funding that

not have the research

desirable or that

we need to meet the critical

We

would be

problems of agriculture

in the future.
Three significant limitations are placed on us today, and these are
the limitation of
our financial

power to influence world affairs,

ability to maneuver at

natural resources.

home,

the limitation on

and the limitation

on our

They all are interwoven and interact.

First let us discuss our limitation

on power throughout the world.

We live in a very interdependent world

where world trade and world food

supplies impact very significantly on

our domestic agriculture and food

policy.

Limitations on

our military power make

more important in the complicated arena
farmer in

Horry County,

agricultural products

of foreign policy.

South Carolina,

for

How does a

instance relate

to the

emerging competitor in Mozambique; or how does he relate to the emerging

232

competitor's malnourished

child in Mozambique?

potatoes that could be sold to Mozambique
of the

farmer in

tobacco being

Horry County?

tested in

Or

will the food produced
foreign policy,

what about

the new

varieties of

as competition

for our

funded by world organizations?

during the next decade be used as

or should it?

the sweet

to put money into the pockets

the African countries

tobacco here in the United States,

What about

Should it be used,

How

a tool of our

or has it been used

too extensively as a foreign policy tool?
These questions impact
deficits.

very closely on the second

issue of fiscal

What we have to spend domestically impacts upon our own natu

ral resources, and the failure to manage carefully our natural resources
impacts on
years.

our ability to feed

the world as

we have done for

The Council on Environmental Quality published a book last year

entitled The Desertification of the United States.
cited desertification
nation's food

life."

"is

as having very

and energy supplies,

environment.
ity,

so many

That particular book

far ranging implications
our

balance of payments,

for the
and our

"Desertification," said the Council on Environmental Qual 

an affliction

that saps

an arid

I contend today that it saps

land's ability

to support

a great country's ability to main

tain it's leadership position in the world unless we have the resolve to
deal
world,

with the

question of

managing our

resources.

balancing

economy

at home,

our leadership
and

position in

pro_tecting our

national

Of all the issues I saw during the last two years as a Mem-

ber of Congress there were two that especially bothered me.
issue of the rapid Soviet buildup.
are doing to our water
water tables,

the

supply.

The

One was the

other was the issue of what we

Desertification involves the declining

the salinization of top soil and water,

the reduction of
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surface water,

unnaturally high soil erosion,

and desolation of native

vegetation.
Another issue that is so equally timely

today,

news lately, is what we are doing with chemicals.
pesticides.

and so much in the

I am not referring to

We all recognize the need to use pesticides, but I refer to

the storage of

toxic chemicals.

The storage of

highly toxic chemical

residues near the Pee Dee River in Anson County, North Carolina,
or had

the potential of ruining

ruined

the industrial development of

the Pee

Dee area of South Carolina for food processing and agriculture.

Unless

we focus on the question of what to do about chemical waste dumps,

what

to do about problems of overgrazing in the West, the problem of carrying
capacity of the land, what to do about about salinization, the depletion
of ground water resources, and subsequent abandonment of irrigated farm
land,

we are

simply hiding our heads

in the soil and

failing to deal

with a critical issue of the day.
What are we going to do with our water resources as oil shale, sur
face mining,
issue?

biomass production,

and wood gathering all impact on this

Our water supply and the way we have used our water has allowed

us to be a
disturbing.

world leader.

The conclusions of the

Council's report are

I quote,

"Desertification in the arid United States is flagrant.
Ground water supplies beneath vast stretches of land are drop 
ping precipitously. Whole river systems have dried up.
Oth
ers are choked with sediment washed from denuded land.
Hun
dreds of thousands of acres of previously irrigated croplands
have been abandoned to wind or weeds.
Salts are building up
steadily in some of the nation's most productive irrigated
soils.
Several million acres of natural farm land are, as a
result of cultivation or overgrazing, eroding at unnaturally
high rates.
Soils from the Great Plains are ending up in the
Atlantic Ocean.
About 225 million acres land in the United
States are undergoing severe desertification.
They are
roughly the size of our original 13 colonies ...
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In the
final analysis,
when
viewed in
the national
perspective, the effects on agriculture are the most trouble 
some aspect of desertification in the United States.
For it
comes at a time when the United States is losing over a mil 
lion acres of crop and pastureland per year to 'higher
uses' - -shopping centers, industrial parks, housing develop
ments,
waste dumps--heedless of the economic need of the
United States to export agricultural products or of the
world's need for U.S. food and fiber."
Ladies and Gentlemen,

that's one of the most disturbing statements

I read in the time I had the privilege of serving in the Congress.
to this what has come to light

recently with the severe problems of the

storage of toxic chemical wastes,

and the current regulations allowing

site selection, and we have a very severe,
quality.

Add

very acute problem for water

Did you know that EPA site selection regulations for disposal

of hazardous chemical waste today does not even require an environmental
impact statement?

Not even an impact assessment?

ulations require cleanup

Did you know the reg 

not for areas outside the

boundaries of waste

dumps, but simply for the area inside the boundaries?
you do not have to show financial
can clean up what has been caused,

Did you know that

responsibility to the effect that you
and there is no binding requirement

for a bankrupt company?
And the cost of water, and what water means to us,
more that concern.
~

emphasizes even

Let me quote from the May 9 issue of Leisure Bever-

Insight, a trade magazine for the beverage industry,
"Today consumers pay an average of 1/10 of a cent per gallon
for water delivery only. Water as an entity has been regarded
as free.
Now fixing a dollar value to water will change
boldly not only our values, attitudes, and lifestyles, but our
economic system as well.
Industry and crop irrigation cur
rently account for the highest use of all available usable
water, amounting to 43 percent and 47 percent respectively.
Only 10 percent is utilized by individuals, of which 0.3 per
cent is safe for human consumption.
Selling water at even a
penny a gallon would change the entire economic structure of
the United States.
In bread and butter terms, charging one
cent per gallon of water used in production would increase the
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cost of an automobile by $1,000, a pound of hamburger meat by
$30, a pound of synthetic rubber by $3, and a pound of cotton
by $13."
I mention this,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

better forum and no better group of
severe problem

than those of

east.

You

and the

opportunity to study

scholars at

States,

here at Clemson.

You are

and particularly the South-

the Thurmond

Institute have

a comprehensive pattern for

human and nonhuman needs,

think of no

policy leaders to look at this very

you gathered

leaders from throughout the United

because I can

a great

water consumption for

and to make recommendations on policy.

at the problems of pollution and what

it does to agri culture,

Look

and what

it would do to a rich agricultural region like the Pee Dee if contamination penetrates the aquafer.

It almost happened at the Savannah River.

Look at the current and long-term water needs,
but for this nation,

not only for this state,

and then as a body and as a

group that has great

respect, make recommendations on what should be done, and we in the pub
lic will listen.
I read not long ago a very excellent book on the development of our
body-politic over

the last 25 years.

taken from that book.
Itself.

assessment,

our body politic,

which I believe is not

but an assessment

are on the broad question of the future in agriculture.
quote him.

today were

It is Theodore White's book, America in Search of

He ended his book with an

only an assessment of

Some of my thoughts

of where we

I would like to

He says,

"I write and close this book in a clouded time, not knowing
whether it is twilight or dawn, an era ending or an era begin
ning. It is twilight if new policy carries us back to the old
America before its transformation.
It is dawn if new policy
carries us forward to release civil fears in the web of federal control.
Somewhere in the decades of upheaval came a
Another wrong turning in this decade could
wrong turning.
take politics away from traditional politicians and bring us
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to convulsion in the streets.
It would require both strong
nerves and real wisdom on the part of the politicians in the
1980s to avoid that convulsion.
Future historians will find
the Reagan experiment a fascinating study as it approaches its
climax. But this drama is not for the politicians of today to
manage.
And it will be up to them to prove once more that
America,
as Lincoln said, remains the last best hope of
earth."
We face some
severe than

very severe problems.

the problems of food

resources.

limitations and the

its rela

and its relationship to our own
emerging concern for

our natural

One of the great attributes of Senator Strom Thurmond that I

always admired is his ability to take
it to the

problems is more

policy and agriculture and

tionship to the world balance of power,
fiscal financial

None of our

a very complex problem and reduce

lowest common denominator very

greater mission

for the

quickly.

Thurmond Institute,

affiliated groups at the College,

I can think

in cooperation

of no

with the

than taking these broad issues of war

and peace and

studying how food policy is affected

thereby and affects

those issues.

The question of our water quality,

the question of what

we will

do when we

future water policy,
that we have on

run out of money
of chemical

what we can use,

charge to find a new policy and new
austerity.

for research and

waste management,
are momentous

development for

of the limitations

questions.

It is our

solutions in an age of scarcity and

We have that same dream of a quarter of a century ago.

just have different rules

we must play by.

We and

We

the public look to

you at the Thurmond Institute to help develop those rules.
Thank you so much for the opportunity to be with you.

COMMENTS FOR THE PANEL
R. G. F. Spitze*
Those responsible for the vision and detailed arrangements involved
in

the conception,

instructive and
congratulated.

planning,

and

execution

personally enjoyable Symposium

of this

professionally

are to

be particularly

It has raised our awareness of important concerns in the

public agricultural and food policy arena.
My comments

to this

concluding session

have two

objectives:

a

report of the Grains and Oilseeds Workshop; an observation stimulated by
some of the presentations of this

Symposium on the relationship between

public policy for agriculture and food in our system and economic analy
ses from our research establishment.
Report on the Workshop
Such a brief
discussion that
fact,

report as this cannot hope to
characterized the

Grains and

the meaningful summary can only

by each participant.

session which

In

be the new insights carried away

The flavor of the

was set by the resourceful, experienced,
It

Oilseeds Workshop.

It was not our charge nor objective to formulate a

consensus nor recommendations.

cussants.

summarize the spirited

was also a continuation
began to

explore what

workshop discussion

and entertaining lead-off disof the papers from

kind of

the morning

policy alternatives

are

ahead and what policy innovations can be offered.
The content of the dialogue among

the workshop participants can be

captured from the following sample of questions raised and examined:

*Professor of Agricultural Economics,
Champaign.

University

of Illinois,

Urbana

238

1.

What are
target

more economically
price approach?

appropriate ways

An example

declining target price schedule
ers to parallel

to use

might be

to set

the
a

for larger volume produc

the concept of declining

cost of produc

tion with scale of operations.
2.

How can the loan price level be better determined so as to
accomplish its intended important, but limited, objectives
of price

stability without interfering with

An example might be an aver-

markets at home and abroad?

age of the recent annual market prices,
months of

the critical

the marketing years,

or only specified

with drop-out

years for

unusual price gyrations.
3.

Can any useful
tional trade

alternative options be found
institutions to

export function?

for interna-

better serve

Examples might be

the important

trading boards or an

export trading consortium among private exporters.
4.

Is it possible to inject more flexibility into our package
of price and income policy

instruments without losing the

important protections they have

provided the agricultural

sector, our vital natural resources, export dependability,
and domestic food

security as has evolved

year history of the United
policy?

States public price and income

An example might be a quasi-public board charged

with implementing decisions within
The

over the fifty

thrust of

the workshop

a discretionary range.

discussion was

the need

to

search for perfecting and fine tuning remedies rather than
pursue dramatic revolutionary policy changes.
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Public Policy and Economic Analysis
During a few of the presentations to this Symposium, there appeared
to exist an

underlying assumption that public policy

emanated from the

theory of economics or the wisdom of economists instead of from the com
bined values and compromises of
ing process.

The

a participatory governmental policymak-

rationale for such a participatory

system surely is

that people want to control how their system operates and how it affects
their economic and

social welfare.

When society

(people)

experience

some situation (condition) causing a problem and needing a change,
may decide it is a public policy problem.
an adversary of society;

they

Thus such a government is not

rather, it is society's creation, its partner,

along with private activity which is people's primary concern.
In the jargon of economics,

there are imperfections (from a theor

ized model of an economy, not the people's image)

in the operating sys

tem--imperfections in domestic product markets, factor markets, informa
tional markets, and beyond our shores, in international markets.

We, in

economics, have developed tremendously powerful tools of analysis, theo
retical and
will

empirical,

happen in

that can tell

these various

us and policymakers what

markets

if certain

policy actions

are

Economics,

for

taken, and under strict carefully defined assumptions .
example,
trade

can help

and between

can or

us understand linkages between

monetary systems and

various policies

These insights

and trade.

strengthened our understandings about the

have

linkages between our domestic

and international spheres.
However,

what is sometimes forgotton in the rush of our confidence

about these powerful economic tools is

that economists' views of imper

fections reside often in the confines of their theoretical system, under
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carefully specified, highly abstract sets of assumptions,

not the views

of imperfection sensed by society as a problem needing policy attention.
We forget that nothing in our economic analysis gives a logical,
dologically sound basis
~-

We forget

for prescribing policy as being

that society has and is choosing

system to achieve a multitude of

human objectives,

metho

good for soci

an integrated social
of which their eco

nomic objective is an important one, but only one.
Thus,
to improve

as we search in such

important conferences as this for ways

our public agricultural and

food policy in 1984-85,

well to recall that our economic analysis provides invaluable,

it is
dependa

ble, predictable information about alternative policies and their likely
consequences.

Yet,

attempt to substitute

this economic analysis should not be used so as to
the preferences and values

nor held by individual economists,

for

assumed by economics,

those of an ever changing soci

ety.
Our participatory government

has evolved to serve as

a partner in

solving society's problems and will probably be called upon indefinitely
to intervene and change conditions in
Professionally responsible

the agricultural and food sector.

economists should

continually remind

them

selves, as well as those policymaking leaders who may be listening, that
their analysis
society.
nate or

holds no

magic about what

is good

or best

policy for

And their prescription or recommendation to society to elimidismantle that governmental

sector is of little value,
professionalism .

partnership with

and furthermore,

the agricultural

hardly creditable to their

COMMENTS FOR THE PANEL
Lynn E. Elrod1,
I am

probably the only

participate here
about which

person on the

because of the

I know little.

program who was

sheer volume of

I know you

invited to

agricultural problems

will come to

understand this

early in my discussion.
As a

boy I

plowed up knee-high

cotton while my

County and State AAA Committee activities.
work and thought
the 193O's.
I observed

Dad was

away on

I know something about the

that went into the emergency

agricultural programs in

Later, as a student at what was then Oklahoma A&M College,
and was impressed

policy matters

were discussed.

bred

led depression

and farm

by the

urgency with which

There
was so

national farm

were expressions that
severe that

the farm

this experiment

in

democracy could not survive another occurrence of such depths.
I have the opinion

that this sense of urgency,

if

it was general

throughout our university system, gradually eroded and deteriorated, not
so much because

of lack of interest internally

within our intellectual

centers, but because of loss of interest by farmers themselves and farm 
ers' organizations and also because

of adverse public opinion generated

by the media, whose representatives found that negative commentary, how
ever shallow,

drew much more

public attention than objective analysis.

Bright young agricultural economists found more pleasent, less hazardous
challenges than the pursuit of and justification for appropriate governmental intervention in agricultural affairs.
limited research that

Consequently, much of the

has been directed to defining

and recommending a

*Assistant to the President, Associated Milk Producers, Inc.
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rational farm policy has been initiated

with an adversary attitude pre

disposed to negative assessment.
It is said tha t without vision the people perish.
that in recent years we have

I have a feeling

not provided much encouragement for vision

of the road ahead for the farm economy,

for changes in the agricultural

structure, or for long term food costs or food security.
As late

as yesterday morning

virtues of the

free - market.

I heard

If we can

tributes paid again

to the

just commit our future

to the

infallible wisdom of

Adam Smith's unseen hand,

will unerringly tell

each of our farmers

and everybody's going to heaven .
nonsense?

the free-market prices

what and how much

How many

to produce

times will we fall for that

It was the free-market that floundered throughout the 1920's

and finally crashed in the most notable economic debacle in our history.
We again started working back to the free-market in the mid-1970s and we
crashed again.
agriculture's

We may have witnessed several prior massive failures of
free - market in

the successive

money

panics and

severe

recessions of the 19th century.
We have little sense of
ture be like?
just get

If

direction.

What should American agricul -

there is an ideal structure,

out of government's influence?

will

it develop if we

I don't think so.

I don't

think we know enough about American agriculture at this point to specify
what we expect to do.

I don't think we can learn fast enough to write a

rational farm bill in 1985 that will

carry us in a desirable direction,

but it is time to start finding the answers.
will be better met if we can

Surely the 1985 challenge

at least recognize the significance of the

ways farmers respond to commodity price changes .

There are a great many

things that will not be adequately understood by the end of 1985.
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I have complied a long list of facets of American agriculture which
I contend we do not know enough about,
as we talk

about what our farm

or that we are willing to ignore

policy should be.

If

this discussion

stimulates any interest on your part in those facets I shall be happy to
send you such

a list.

Let me point

out some of the

unknowns,

in my

opinion.
1.

We do not know the extent
the

possibility

of public risk associated with

of inadequate

agricultural

productive

capacity to meet (undefined) national goals for:

2.

a.

domestic food and fiber security,

b.

domestic food and fiber prices,

c.

export quantities, and

d.

balance of international payments.

We do not

know whether there is a

critical point beyond

which continued concentration of farm ownership and oper
ation is contrary to the
do not know whether
should

be of

long-term public interest.

We

production efficiency considerations

overriding

importance

in this

judgement

call.
3.

We do

not know the

troubles

long-run public impact

within agri-business

or whether

of financial
agri-business

survival is a matter of critical public concern.
expect prompt reestablishment of
of need?

Can we safely

Is

there a

such businesses in case

rely upon foreign

critical supplies and servi~es
continuing need

Can we

sources for

without domestic sources?
for domestic

agri-business

contributions to further production efficiencies?
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4.

We don't really

know the impact of

agricultural depres

sion upon the general economy and employment or upon fed
eral, state and local tax revenues.
5.

We probably fail

to understand the consequences

tinuing rural blight.

Can

of con-

rural society be satisfacto-

rily maintained through industrialization and shifts away
from farm employment?
6.

We do

not know the public

generations there

interest in nor for

will be vital

potential new dust bowl,
newly exposed hills,

how many

public interest

in the

again exposed by the plow,

the

and

rivers silt-laden by increased

We don't really know what

guidelines are appropriate for

erosion.
7.

federally sponsored farm credit,
cies

serve to

problem.

mitigate or

nor whether such poli-

aggravate

the overall

farm

We do not understand the degree of public risk

associated with depressed commodity
to real world

prices,

prices or to artificial

either down

world prices con

trived through foreign dumping and subsidies.
8.

We

do not

know what

agricultural

land

the long-term

values and

land

public interest
value

in

fluctuations

really is.
9.

We do not understand the U.S.

potential for successfully

pursuing international free-trade
other nations
food

place much

security and

production

system

philosophies when most

higher priority

perpetuation of
even though

upon domestic

their domestic

inefficient.

To

food
what
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extent are

our products now

excluded from

markets U.S.

farmers could profitably and most economically serve?
what extent
that have
that

are our domestic markets
higher real costs

are displaced

than our

only because

To

absorbing products
domestic products

of foreign

government

subsidies?
10.

We do not know whether

our contemporary commercial agri

culture can remain solvent through years of low demand if
we continue

unlimited production

for peak-year

demand,

knowing that for probably seven years out of ten,

output

will far exceed the quantity that can be sold profitably.
11.

We do

not recognize

nature of
nor

the implications

individual farmer

of the

of the

atomistic

relationships to

the total

aggregate volume

of farm

result from rational business

must

decisions of the atomistic

We have not recognized the new dimensions of

producers.

this problem arising from
dency

output that

upon export

agriculture's increased depen

markets

and

price fluctuations that reflect

the accompanying

wider

increased variability in

total demand.
12.

We have not

developed a mechanism for

bility upon the public to pay

placing responsi

the cost of decisions made

in the public interest that impact unfavorably upon agri
culture,

such as decisions concerning multilateral trade

negotiations,
strategy,
policies.

international trade

trade

embargoes,

and

policies,

diplomatic

international monetary
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13.

We do

not know how to

commodity price is

identify the point below

no longer an acceptable

which a

indicator of

long-term supply demand conditions for the commodity.
the early 1930's,

with all

economy in disarray,

of agriculture and the total

10 cent corn was used

otherwise wasted in substantial
there was too much corn.

In

for fuel or

quantities.

Of course,

Is the best answer in agricul-

ture price theory that the corn price should have gone to
five cents?

How is this question affected by the modern

high capital

accelerated cash flow corn

production sys

tem?
14.

Are

we certain

intervention

that

adversary

programs measure

analyses of
against

government

what would

have

been without the government program? _Would negative con
clusions have been different if approached with the prem
ise that there

may indeed be a farm

problem with exten

sive public interests?
15.

I rather doubt if we know enough about the present struc
ture of agriculture and the
est and smallest
delineation
producers,

range in scale between larg

producers,

nor how to

between commercial

producers,

and perhaps sideline

effective techniques

make meaningful
subsistence

producers.

Do we have

to evaluate different

social impacts of various policies

economic and

upon such groups?

I

doubt whether we recognize how unique agriculture is,

in

the

total

approach

economy.

Does

perfect competition?

agriculture

more

Do existing

closely

departures
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from

free-market

increase the

standards

throughout

necessity for governmental

the

economy

intervention in

agriculture?
I

believe most

of these

questions

are relevant

unanswerable, or their answers are not widely known,
being ignored.

It

and are

or they are simply

seems extremely important to me that

priority upon answering such questions as
semination of findings.

It may be even

perpetuate ongoing university

either

we place high

these and upon effective dismore important to find ways to

research on farm policy

through the good

times, in spite of general loss of interest outside of the universities.
Analytical tools and

techniques many times superior

forty years ago are now available.

to those used

Concentration of agricultural firms
On-going programs

has perhaps made quantification and analysis easier.

for effective economic research may well be agriculture's greatest pres
ent challenge.
Finally, with the extensive flow of agricultural commodities across
state lines,
much

are

we perhaps making solution of

more difficult

if we

national policy issues

concentrate primarily

upon the

individual

state or regional equity questions?
It has

been gratifying

to participate in

this symposium,

should like to compliment those who brought it about.

and I

They are encour-

aging vision at a critical time in our agricultural history.

COMMENTS FOR THE PANEL
Dale Hoover*
In the tobacco
sented an excellent

policy workshop this morning

review of the impact of tobacco

tobacco economy and analyzed the prospects
comments were
available,

Garnett Bradford pre

stimulating and

legislation on the
Roy Davis'

for the future.

insightful.

Both

hence my comments represent only

authors' papers

are

a brief and partial review

of their work.
Because tobacco legislation has been permanent, i.e.
quadrenniel renewal,

Congressional action has

"crisis intervention."

There has been a

quency with which crises have been
ment cost act
the

been of the character of

notable increase in

appearing.

the absence

of further

the fre-

The 1982 no-net govern-

made substantial changes which will have

program in

not requiring

legislation.

great impact on
Even

if it

is

altered substantially it is clear it has helped to usher in a new era in
the program's history.
Generally the permanent

nature of legislation of

regarded as protection from its Congressional enemies.
possible that

more frequent "temporary"

for feed grains would have kept the
and less crisis

prone.

tobacco has been
However,

legislation such as

it is

that used

program more in tune with the times

Recurrent or "temporary"

legislation probably

would have stimulated more public interest in research on tobacco demand
and supply.

There has been a disinterest in, and maybe even an animos

ity towards,

research except when treasury costs or storage stocks have

become large and visible.

*Head, Department of Economics and Business, North Carolina State
University.
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At

the

present

time

there

are

large

flue-cured and burley tobacco whose costs
to the federal government.
complicated by

the fact

of the

price supports suggests that the price
relative to the prices of all other

of

farmer - owned

or losses cannot be passed on

The management
that all

stocks

and sale of these stocks is
recent discussion

of future

of American tobacco will decline

goods and services.

In this situ-

ation domestic and export purchasers have every reason to let Stabiliza
tion hold large stocks until tobacco prices have settled at a new, lower
equilibrium level.

Faced with the prospect of losses on storage stocks,

how should Stabilization stocks
equilibrium market price
for

a number

of years

be taken all at once to

quickly?

Or should Stabilization

until the

Which route is likely to be most

get to the new

new equilibrium

run losses

is reached

slowly?

acceptable to farmers who will be pay

ing the assessment for annual losses?
There is more
has been

internal ~onflict in the tobacco

observed in modern

Suppliers of

times.

inputs and production skills all favor
of them

can benefit

slope upward
rates of

return on resources as

quota owners benefit

conflict

increase.

It is not

Only

clear how

and quota

In addition

owners,

there

to the inherent
is an

important

Many renter-producers seem to believe that they can

rent away from

owners if the

amount of quota is expanded sharply.
petition among

supply curves

and quotas expand because the elas-

is not known precisely.

apparent conflict.
take quota

output.

Each

establishes higher

output is allowed to

from low levels of

between producers

if factor

marginal cost curve

much they would lose if prices fall
ticity of demand

marketing services,

a large volume of output.

from expanded production

and an increasing

community now than

producers.

On the

program is terminated

or the

In fact, rent is generated by com
margin it reflects

the differences
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between expected price and costs.

Consequently rent will evaporate as

price falls toward cost of production.

This apparent conflict is proba

bly more important in the current legislative ferment than any real dif
ference in interest between producers and quota owners.
The prospects for
uses the history of
the end of

some future

other programs as a _guide,

the program,

If the program

legislative change are far from
it

so-called "deregulation"

relocation of production to allow the
Another possibility

is the

If one

seems unlikely that
will occur abruptly.

continues to survive even if altered

radical changes still may

clear.

be advisable.

in important ways,
One of

these is

crop to move to low-cost regions.

development of a

marketing order

or board

that perhaps could insulate the program from congressional tinkering and
unify the decisions

made on quota volume,

management of Stabilization stocks.

The

grading,

price support and

current division of responsi-

bility is probably never going to work well.

VIEWS ON KEY FARM POLICY ISSUES
Robert Delano>'<
The candidates

that led

to a need

for a

massive payment-in-kind

program should raise a flag for everyone--farmers and city people alike.
Farm Bureau members have long felt that current farm programs are out of
touch

with

market

reality because

they

have

encouraged

production

greatly out of line with consumption requirements.
The real answer to farm recovery
not be found in federal farm programs.

and improved net farm income can
The return of true farm prosper-

ity depends on

good markets for farm products.

markets depend

upon economic recovery in

In

turn,

strong farm

the United States and

in the

world.
This country's long-term

economic recovery requires placing

on government taxes and spending,
ment programs.

and

a lid

cutting back on federal entitle-

We must face the fact that sooner or later federal farm

"entitlement" programs must be included in these cuts.
Farmers and ranchers
spending.

are alarmed by the continued

rise in federal

In this fiscal year, total federal expenditures are increas-

ing at more than 10 percent.

Worse than that,

payments to individuals

are increasing by nearly 12.5 percent in this fiscal year.
Inflation,

and

the possibility of re-inflation,

ture's number one worry.
purchasing power,

remain agricul-

The inflation of the 70s cut deeply into farm

disrupted land

values,

and

increased the

cost of

money.
Double-digit inflation generated political pressures on Congress to

*President, American Farm Bureau Federation.
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enact farm programs that, in theory,
income supports

were raised

without regard to

would help farmers keep up.

and the

market realities.

market-clearing prices,

Farm

farmer-held reserve

was operated

"Political" prices,

rather than

encouraged excess

production.

The artificial

prices greatly encouraged commodity stockpiling while substantially discouraging consumption at home and abroad.

We are all familiar with the

lower net farm income that has resulted.
While farm income has fallen, farm program costs have soared.
cost of farm support and related

The

activities has risen from $2.8 billion

in fiscal year 1980 to $4.0 billion in fiscal year 1981 to $11.7 billion
in fiscal year 1982.
cost an

Farm program

estimated $20 billion

support and related activities will

or more in

This is

fiscal year 1983.

almost 10 percent of the projected total 1983 budget deficit.
Current farm
reduce taxes,
foreign trade,
grams

programs are out of

step with long-term

encourage savings and investment,
and reduce

cannot escape

inflation.

the spending

policies to

expand consumption and

Agricultural "entitlement" pro-

restraints that

must ultimately

be

imposed on all entitlements if we are to gain control of runaway federal
spending.
ented.

Thus, to be viable, future farm programs must be market ori
They

must operate within what

note for government

has been defined as

in dealing with private

the proper

farming enterprise.

And,

most important of all--their effects on the long-term economic health of
agriculture, and on the national economy, must be-a prime consideration.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE SETTING FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Previous speakers at this Conference
bear repeating with

emphasis.

comprehensive thesis,

have made several points that

While these points

they strike me as

formulating and administering effective
This being a food policy conference,

do not add up

to a

credible and highly germane to
food and agricultural policies.

I offer you a baker's dozen obser

vations, restating points already made or implied by one or more preced
ing speakers.
First, an overall point:

As Ken Farrell put it yesterday,

diagnosis is an absolutely essential
ment of agricultural problems.

proper

prerequisite for successful treat

In other words, this is a time for anal-

ysis, not emotions;

fact, not fiction;

reality,

this point may seem

obvious and trivial,

not rhetoric.

I continue to

be appalled by

the outdated and unrealistic perceptions of the forces shaping U.S.
international agriculture today.
derstandings confuse and
away from

While

and

These erroneous perceptions and misun

divide us and lead

consensus on effective and

the agricultural community

consistent policies.

You

and I

to be.

This

share some responsibility for this condition.
Second,

the world

is more complicated than it used

complicates policy and policy formulation.

But what Ed Schuh had to say

yesterday was not simply the theoretical pipesmoke of some academic phi
losopher.

He was attempting to explain how the real world works, and if

our policies don't reflect that reality

they will be doomed to ineffec-

*Administrator, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agricul
ture.
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tiveness,

at best,

doing is equally

and,

at worst,

to disaster.

Knowing what one is

important for program formulation

and program manage

ment.
Third, we now live in a highly interdependent global economy.
our markets are increasingly global.

But the institutions and policies

that affect those markets are domestic.
kets

do not

operate with

All

one common

In other words the global mar
set of

rules and

institutions.

Rather, there is an interaction of supply and demand forces, modified by
and in the context of the import,
hundred plus

export,

nations of the world.

and domestic policies of one

Nevertheless,

it is

critical to

shaping meaningful farm policy to understand that we do operate substan
tially and increasingly in global markets .
An important parallel

point is that the global

competitive (albeit, not purely competitive)
probability that
ahead.

they will

There are

become even more

markets are highly

and there is a substantial
competitive in

a growing number of countries

the years

that are agricultural

exporters; they have increasing production capacity; and all are looking
for a place in this shrinking globe to sell their goods.
ferent perspective from that
largely because

of slower

held by many at the end
growth and

This is a dif

of the seventies,

expectations for

growth in

the

world economy, shifting global monetary phenomena, and perhaps a greater
capacity of

the world's agriculture

than earlier assumed.

As a result

country policies and institutions.

to respond to

there will be increased pressure on
But institutional change is painful

and costly.

Thus,

could well be

accompanied by increased political

tility and

increased competitive

by attempts

of nations

economic incentives

pressures in

to postpone

world markets

sensitivity and vola
the costs

of internal
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institutional change by isolating themselves

from the effects of global

market pressures via protectionist measures.

Ultimately, such measures

will prove to be counterproductive,

decrease domestic well-being,

and

increase the eventual cost of adjustments.
A fifth reality

is that most of the growth

agriculture are linked to exports.

opportunities for U.S.

Domestic consumption is relatively

stable and unresponsive in the aggregate to prices and incomes.
tic

market

changes.

growth

can

be expected

to

Productivity increases in U.S.

roughly

parallel

Domes-

population

agriculture could well exceed

the rate of growth in domestic markets, meaning that modest increases in
exports would be needed to utilize the existing capacity of our agricul
tural plant.

To those who suggest

markets it should

be pointed out

we should withdraw from

that doing

so would idle

the world
about one

third of our present land base and require some rather traumatic adjust
ments in

the industries that supply

farm inputs and market

farm prod

ucts.
The sixth
than domestic

point is that global
The

markets.

(export)

markets are

instability arises

from the

trade relative to total world production and consumption.
percentage changes in

world production translate into

changes in the residuals traded.
volatility
events.

are

abetted

and

are

Hence, small

causes of this

episodic

Whatever the causes, the outcome is that U.S.

residual suppliers to the world,
in demand,

policies

thinness of

large percentage

The natural (weather)

by country

less stable

political

farmers, as the

whiplashed by these ups and downs

and farmers' consequent fortunes and misfortunes reverberate

through the surrounding agricultural industries.
agriculture is increasingly dependent on

The point is that our

export markets,

and that fact
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increases

the riskiness

The policy

of farming.

pertains to how the increased risk

issue that

emerges

should be shared between farmers and

From an economists' perspective the answer lies in the dis-

taxpayers.

tribution of costs and benefits of both increased exports and reductions
in price volatility.
The next observation

is that in formulating policy

for the future

we must recognize the major transformation in American agriculture since
the 1930's and 1940's.

The conditions that led to policies in the Great

Depression and following World War II are no longer the dominant characteristic of

The

the farm sector.

commercial farming sector

today is

high technology, capital intensive, and large-scale, albeit still family
dominated.
to

Recognition of these fundamental changes reaffirms the need

clarify our

policy

goals,

especially regarding

the

distinction

between income enhancement (transfers or welfare payments from taxpayers
at large to farmers)

and price

and income stabilization (primarily for

improved efficiency of production and markets).
The next four points again revolve around the growing importance of
export markets.
of U.S.

The one that gets

farm policy being oriented

shaped the mindset of farmers,
regarding policy tools,

an open

agribusiness,

markets has

policymakers and analysts
linkages with other aspects

But managing U.S. agriculture in the con

global economy is

closed domestic economy.

primarily to domestic

supply management,

of the economy, and so forth.
text of

overlooked is that a long tradition

much different than

doing so

in a

Hence we find ourselves using traditional pol

icy tools to cope with being residual adjusters to world changes in sup
ply

and

demand and

being

achieving traditional goals.

frustrated

with their

ineffectiveness

in

Moreover, trying to deal with our agricul-
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tural problems by increasingly frequent

(frantic?)

rates, release prices, storage loan rates,
global market forces,

etc.,

macro-economic policies

tinkering with loan
etc.,

in a time when

and global monetary phe

nomena are dictating the market environment has been recently likened to
preoccupation with rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
There is some evidence that the United States has a strong competi
tive potential in world markets for some agricultural products.
tainly have a wealth of natural

productive resources which can be main-

tained with appropriate practices.
effective

public and

Our farm

private infrastructure

sector is supported by an
which keeps

production and marketing progressive and efficient.
two oceans

that serve the markets

nects by water
Moreover,

we continue to experience a
and we have

agricultural

The U.S.

faces the

of the northern hemisphere

and land with major markets in

in agriculture,

We cer

and con

the southern hemisphere.

high rate of productivity growth

considerable unexploited production capac

ity.
Further,

a

case can be made

that both global interests

and U.S.

societal interests can be best served if we properly exploit the competitive potential

of our agriculture.

The

potential to be

realized is

that of an increasingly efficient source of food and fiber for U.S. citizens and

for the rest of

the world.

Realizing the

true comparative

advantage potential for our agriculture, as with any sector,
standards of

living of both

the U.S.

Certainly we

have become more dependent

and importers of
on the net export

raises the

our products.
earnings of

U.S. agriculture than is likely appreciated by the nonfarm community.
Realizing the

potential benefits

from our

competitive capability

will require appropriate policies, considerable wisdom and a disciplined
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national will.

Among the requirements

do not undercut

trade objectives or underwrite

competing exporters.

U.S.

will be commodity programs that
production expansion by

fiscal and monetary policies will have to be

supportive or at least neutral in their direct effects on domestic agri
culture and their indirect effects on
markets.

our competitive position in world

If the United States has a comparative advantage in some agri

cultural products there
products less

will be other agricultural

competitive and which we

and sell if they

and nonagricultural

must let other

are to have the wherewithall to

nations produce

buy our exports.

We

cannot be "free-traders" for our competitive commodities and protection
ists for our less competitive industries.

Finally, we must continue to

make public and private investments in U.S.

agricultural research, edu-

cation, and resource conservation and enhancement.
A related but

somewhat different kind of point

covered is that the single greatest
ducers (and agribusinesses)
international markets.

This

from those already

source of uncertainty for many pro-

is Federal farm programs,
is a major source

not weather or

of inefficienty.

conclusion is not necessarily to eliminate the programs,

The

nor is it rea

sonable to assume that a set of prices can be put in place and kept constant regardless of changes in market circumstances.
is to

establish a set

ways to

of operating

evolving circumstances.

remove the

great temptations

Rather,

rules that respond

This could

in predictable

mean finding some

to intervene in

the ~peration

lished programs to satisfy short-term political objectives.
be reasonable
duration.

to consider farm legislation

Experience

since the

the need

of estab
It may also

with more than a

mid-seventies certainly

way to

four year

suggests the

need to eliminate the constant annual tinkering with program provisions.

259

Finally,

all the foregoing observations

for effective public policy education.
our

single

greatest

failure

suggest the critical need

Despite some notable successes,

within the

USDA/Land

Grant

system

is

reflected in the general lack of understanding among our constituents of
the changing economic,

institutional and

tion and marketing here and abroad.
shot;

the

task is

to do
The

This is not intended to be a cheap

extremely difficult,

understand the subject or possess
the job well.

But

long- term health

of

political setting for produc-

and

few among

us adequately

the requisite skills and proclivities

difficulty cannot become pretext
American agriculture

and

for delay.

the potential

for

improvement in the well - being of consuming publics here and abroad could
well be at stake.

COMMENTS FOR THE PANEL
Ewen Wilson*
Prior to the 1970s

there seemed to be ample room

poultry to grow side by side.

In the mid 1970s that changed.

tion of red meat peaked out and went into decline.
in the

meantime,

for red meat and

has continued

Consump-

Poultry consumption,

People have looked

to grow.

at the

declining consumption for red meat and labeled it a demand phenomenon.
However, demand and consumption are not the same thing.
defined by economists, is a rigorous concept.
quantity consumed,

It refers not only to the

but also to prices paid for a product.

real prices against

Demand, as

per capita consumption you get a

If you plot

demand curve that

shows that consumption decreases as prices rise .
If livestock numbers are cut back,

as cattle were in the mid 1970s

and hogs were in the 1980-82 period, meat supplies fall, per capita consumption declines
demand curve,

and prices rise .

If

economists would tell you

If prices associated

prices remain on or

above the

that demand is alive and well.

with a particular level of

consumption fall below

(to the left) of the demand curve, then demand is in trouble.
Dr.

Pat

Luby,

Vice-President

and Corporate

Mayer, recently gave a report on meat demand.
the past three

years demand has declined.

Economist at

Oscar

His figures show that in
This is true not

only for

beef and pork but also for poultry.
There has been a lot of talk about diet and health,
styles, and aging population.
affected demand

changing life-

These things are said to have permanently

for meat--shifted us

to the left

of the curve

*Director of Economics and Statistics, American Meat Institute.
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like.

Granted, these factors cannot be entirely discounted, but at the

same time most

economists recognize other factors that

are more impor

tant in explaining demand.
The most important of these is income.
expenditures for meat grow.
tionship.

consumer

Research shows it is not a one-to-one rela

As you become more wealthy you do not consume proportionately

more meat--satiation takes

place.

This relationship explains

percent of disposable income spent on
time.

As income grows,

meat (and poultry)

why the

declines over

Some analysts have pointed to the fact that the portion of dispo

sable income spent on

red meat is only 3.2 percent

cent a few years ago as evidence

today versus 4 per-

of declining demand.

That is a total

misrepresentation.
Real per capita
grew in 1981 and
meat demand.
The brunt

disposable income declined in

1982.

1980,

That seems to contradict the

but actually

income effect on

You have to delve deeper--into distribution of income.
of the recession was

group is a large consumer of

borne by the young

The rising unemployment,

meat.

percent in 1979 to 9.5 percent in 1982
cent in December,

1982)

people.

This

from 5.8

(and a monthly high of 10.7 per-

was particularly hard on the young.

They are

normally debtors and were the victims of the higher real interest rates.
They had to pay rising social security taxes.
of their personal income from wages and
percent (from 1237.6
in 1982)
It is

country's employees

salaries and these rose only 26

billion dollars in 1979 to

compared with

likely that

They normally derive most

a 33 percent rise in the

the wages and
rose less than

income from transfer payments,

salaries of the
26 percent.

largely

1560.7 billion dollars
Consumer Price Index.
younger half
Meanwhile,

social security,

of our
personal

direct relief
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and veterans'

payments rose

dollars)

personal income

and

50 percent

(from 250.3

from interest

(from 218.7 to 371.2 billion dollars)

from

to 374.7

payments rose
1979 to 1982.

income in these last two groups benefitted older people.

billion

70 percent
The jump in

In other words

there was a sizable redistribution of income away from younger people to
older people and that hurt the demand for meat.
Nevertheless

a

changes in demand.

fundamental

question

remains

about

structural

There are two hypotheses which, incidentally,

have

quite different implications for industry action.
The first hypothesis is that there has been a fundamental change in
tastes and preferences--that diet-health

concerns,

changing lifestyles

and demographics have caused a permanent shift in demand.
The second

hypothesis is that

tively cheaper products.
far cheaper

substitution has occurred

Poultry is the obvious candidate.

alternative to consumers

than it

did ten or

to rela

It offers a
twenty years

ago.
Depending upon which hypothesis is true, there are different implications for industry action.
an appropriate
help pinpoint

If the first is true,

strategy is to
strategies for

then this suggests

conduct consumer surveys.
advertising and

promotion.

These would
Maybe

this

should be called the "Madison Avenue" scenario.
If the substitution hypothesis is true, then the appropriate industry response

would be to do

things that improve the

position of red meat vis-a-vis poultry.
needed in production efficiency.

competitive price

That suggests improvements are

How can the red meat industry improve

feed efficiency and lower costs of production so as to compete more with
the highly

efficient,

vertically integrated poultry

industry?

Basic
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research

is

needed--this

scenario would

favor

increased

funds

for

Like all complex questions, the answer is not black and white,

but

research scientists at public and private institutions .

rather shades of grey.

The real question is whether that shade of grey

is closer to black or closer to white--we

need to know that in order to

best allocate industry resources.
There is a risk associated with doing nothing while we wait to find
the answer

to that question.

That

is why AMI has

moved aggressively

into programs that help correct negative perceptions of meat.
been one of our priority goals and
tion as part

we have started putting out informa

of an expanded consumer education program

ative perceptions of meat.

This has

to correct neg

SYMPOSIUM SUMMARY
R. J. Hildreth·''
This has been a rich and full conference.

On behalf of the partic

ipants I wish to extend congratulations to Bob Robinson,

Dean Anderson,

and the Planning Committee.
It is often useful at the end of a symposium to consider its objective.

The

objective of this symposium

is contained in

statement:

"Commodity,

institutional issues affecting

agriculture

directly affect

products.
affected

resource,

and

producers

and

the following

consumers of

agricultural

Open discussion of these issues offers policymakers and those
by policy

an

implications of each.

opportunity to

understand

The objective of

the importance

and

this symposium is to provide a

forum for the examination of economic conditions and policy alternatives
that will determine the future direction of agricultural programs."
It is

my judgement

measure achieved.

that the conference

objectives were

There was open discussion of issues:

tions and policy alternatives were examined .

in large

economic condi

We did not reach a concen

sus on the future direction of agriculture

programs and I count this as

a success.

to future directions

Rather perspective was given

by our

discussion and examination.
The framework

I choose to bring

together the robust set

of ideas

and information contained in the conference is one that policy extension
specialists have developed.
that it enables

This framework

the policy specialist to

educate on controversial issues without

*Managing Director, Farm Foundation.

is practical and useful in

come back year after

year to

losing their legitimacy as edu-
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cators.

The framework consists of:

1) issue definition, 2) development

of alternatives, and 3) statements of consequences of alternatives.

The

people who wrote the rules for our political system, e.g., the U.S. Con
stitution,

put

political power
citizens,

the ultimate political

power with the

of elected or appointed

especially when

citizens.

officials is derived

they decide to use it.

All

from the

If conflicts about

policy are to be -managed by using the policy process, public policy education of the citizens becomes

important.

crats should nol answer the question,

Thus economists and bureau-

"What should be the future direc

tion of agricultural programs?"
Issues
There was
conference.
fied.

not a single,
Rather,

defined issue brought forth

in the

there was a complex set of related issues identi-

there was

However,

well

an amazing amount

of agreement

among the

speakers on most of the issues.
It is my judgement that all of the speakers agreed with the following set of issues:
There is

a need for a

long term agricultural policy

to be

put into place during the next 12-18 months, i.e., the "1985
Farm Bill."
The PIK ~rogram is a short term policy.
It is growing increasingly harder to get legislation of ben
efit to agriculture than in the past.
The problem of

the growing cost of

government agricultural

programs is increasing.
There is a need to bring production in line with demand.
Agricultural policy should

not price U.S.

products

out of
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the world market and we need

to be concerned about the loss

of the U.S. share of total world agricultural trade.
In developing the

new longer term policy,

there

is a need

for compromise among the agricultural interests, and between
agriculture and the other sectors of our society.
The following

issues were emphasized

by certain of

the speakers.

The presentations of the other speakers did not disagree with them,

but

did not emphasize them.
A growing

interdependency

between

national and world economy -

agriculture

Schuh,

Robinson,

and

the

Knutson and

Myers.
Export levels with present programs
ciently to negate

will not recover suffi

the need for adjustment

programs in U.S.

agriculture - Myers and Schuh.
Farm income is low as are

the returns to resources in farm-

ing - Naylor, Talmadge and Robinson.
There

is need

agriculture

for continued

on the

concern about

environment and

the impact

of

of soil

and

wise use

water resources - Batie and Napier.
Food prices will not be of major concern to consumers in the
development of a longer term policy - Hoagland.
"Hunger in America" will continue to be debated - Hoagland.
Alternatives and Consequences
A number
were presented

of alternative
by the

policy proposals

symposium presentors.

and their
The

consequences

main thrust

alternatives were presented, but not defined in great detail.

of the
The con-

sequences of the various alternatives were defined in even less detail.
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Knutson's paper

outlined four

major policy

options for

Farm Bill and stated their consequences in terms of their:
the level
exports,

and stability of producer
3)

prices and income,

impact on the level

political acceptability .

the 1985

1) impact on
2)

impact on

of government expenditures,

and 4)

The four options were:

Moving to a free market.
Developing a system of mandatory production controls .
Fine tuning the current policy.
Establishing

a stabilization

and cost-sharing

partnership

between producers and government.
I will not repeat the thrust of the policy option~ and the alternatives as they can be found in Knutson's presentation .
tent

by other

presentors could

be

included within

Much of the conthese four

major

options with modest disagreement on the consequences.
Schuh presented

quite a different

set of alternatives.

He sug-

gested domestic agricultural programs have outlived their usefulness and
are counterproductive in terms of the
that domestic

agriculture programs

income of farmers.
be phased

He suggested

out gradually,

that an

income insurance be instigated and a modest loan program be retained for
stability.
policy
exports.

He

also suggests a major

that would

lower

the value

He also suggested the

according to

Schuh,

of the

dollar

and monetary

and thus

increase

establishment of an International Cen-

tral Bank and some reform of GATT.
icies,

emphasis on fiscal

The consequences of this set of pol-

would be more exports,

higher income for

farmers, and lower government costs.
Sandra Batie suggested that there was

a need to integrate resource

policy with price and income policy as was done in the 1930's.

The con-

~
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Hoagland

sequence would be less erosion.
1)

programs:

comprehensive

welfare reform,

increased direct commodity assistance,
Few consequences

programs.

listed four options for food

and

2)

4)

new

federalism,

3)

reformation of existing

of these alternatives were

spelled out by

Hoagland.
It is my

evaluation that more specific

and their consequences is needed.

While

definition of alternatives

this symposium made an excel-

lent start, much remains to be done.
Most of the discussion of the

One final comment.
consequences of the
information .

There was little attention given

ers, consumers,
of

alternatives took place in a

and citizens.

alternative policy

options,

prices is very improtant.

such

as government

statement,

problem personally."

cost or

consumer

Questions from the audience often
question.

of perceived goodness and
and presented ·.

"The farmer's
I suspect

It is my judgement that

badness of outcomes

Skill in

this kind

can be

of analysis

A student of mine once instructed me

needs to be developed by us all .
with the

to values held by farm-

However, values, that is the goodness or bad

had a value position implied in the

objectively analyzed

framework of positive

Positive information about consequences

ness of outcomes, are also important.

the consequences

issues and the

problem is

that he takes

the same statement

can be

the farm
made about

consumers and taxpayers.
May I offer my congratulations

to Clemson University,

the persons

on the program and the audience for a stimulating and useful symposium.
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